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What is the ethical responsibility of companies towards animals? 
How do companies deal with this responsibility? Based on both 
empirical and normative-philosophical research, Monique Janssens 
argues that animal ethics is a blind spot in both business practice 
and academic business ethics, whereas companies do have 
significant responsibilities towards animals. Companies who engage 
in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) often consider the impact 
of business activities on people and the natural environment, but are 
less likely to consider their impact on animals.
This book offers insight in how the commitment to animals of 
companies differs, how it can be assessed by website analysis, and 
what managerial and communicative factors promote an ethical 
corporate position towards animals. It connects animal ethics and 
business ethics on both an academic level and an applied level. 
In addition, it offers recommendations for both academic research 
and corporate practice to make animal ethics, and therefore animal 
welfare, part of CSR.
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Dit werck dat ick meyne te onderstaene en es negheen cleen dinck, maer hets een
werck van groter pinen ende aerbeyde, dat mi menighe ruste ende nachtslaep benemen
zal eer ict volbrenghe.
De Bijbelvertaler van 1360 (In: Wereld in Woorden, Frits van Oostrom, 2013, p.
214)*
Zoals
Zoals je soms een kamer in gaat, niet weet waarvoor,
en dan terug moet langs het spoor van je bedoeling,
zoals je zonder tasten vlug iets uit de kast pakt
en pas als je het hebt, weet wat het was,
zoals je soms een pakje ergens heen brengt
en bij het weggaan, denkt, vreest
te licht te zullen zijn, zoals je je, wachtend,
minutenlang verlieft in elk nieuw mens
maar toch het meeste wachtend bent,
zoals je weet: ik ken het hier, maar niet waar het om ging
en je een geur te binnen schiet bij wijze van
herinnering, zoals je weet bij wie op alert
en bij wie niet, bij wie je kan liggen,
zo, denk ik, denken dieren, kennen ze de weg.
Judith Herzberg (In: Zoals, 1992)*
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This work that I am trying to undertake is not a small thing, but a work of great effort 
The Bible Translator of 1360 (In: Wereld in Woorden, Frits van Oostrom, 2013, p. 
214)*
The way
The way you enter a room sometimes, not knowing why,
and must return along the trace of your intention,
the way you grab things from the shelf without fumbling,
and only when you hold it, know what it was,
the way you take a parcel somewhere sometimes
and while you’re leaving, think, worry
you might be too light, the way you, waiting,
start loving every new human for minutes
but still are mostly waiting,
the way you sense: I know this place, not what it was about
and then a sudden scent jumps to your mind as
a memory, the way you know with whom on alert
and with whom not, with whom you can lie,
that is, I think, how animals think, know the way.
Judith Herzberg (In: Zoals, 1992)*
*translation: Monique Janssens
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Abstract
The twofold question of this PhD thesis is: What is the ethical responsibility 
of companies for animals and how do they deal with this responsibility?
and that this seems to be a blind spot in both business practice and academic 
business ethics. As a rule, companies who engage in Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and scientists who engage in business ethics consider the impact of business
activities on people and the natural environment, but are less likely to consider
their impact on animals, although they do indeed have a responsibility in this
arena. My conclusion is based on three types of research: quantitative, qualitative,
and normative-philosophical research.
Together with Muel Kaptein I developed a method for quantifying companies’
commitment to animals as expressed on their websites, which we applied to 200
multinationals (quantitative research). More than half of these multinationals
do not show any signs of commitment to animals. Companies who do express
themselves as acknowledging responsibilities towards animals do so mostly in 
less-important locations on their websites, and not often in the central places
where the subject would belong, such as texts on CSR policy and business codes.
Together with Floryt van Wesel, I researched factors that promote an ethical
corporate position towards animals. We zoomed in on the food industry. Through
analysis of interviews and written texts (qualitative research), we found three
groups of stimulating factors: showing leadership, forming partnerships, and
is responsible for animal welfare to use communication to encourage such an
attitude: by communicating with internal and external parties, and by facilitating
communication between these parties.
Based on existing ideas from philosophy and other disciplines about animal ethics 
towards animals, which I translate to various industries (normative-philosophical
research).
This thesis connects animal ethics and business ethics on both an academic
level and an applied level. As for the latter, I recommend that companies: do a
self-assessment with our CAN scoring method; include the interests of animals
in materiality assessments; make a particular manager explicitly responsible
for animal welfare; explore how progress can be made through leadership,
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Abstract
partnership, ‘championship’, communication with a variety of parties, and
encouraging these parties to communicate amongst each other; include animal 
welfare in current CSR communication; add new communication channels where 
appropriate; and communicate proactively and honestly about plans, goals, 
obstacles, and achievements.
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands (in Dutch)
In dit proefschrift stel ik de tweeledige vraag: wat is de ethische verantwoordelijkheid 
van bedrijven voor dieren, en hoe gaan bedrijven met die verantwoordelijkheid om?
Mijn conclusies zijn dat bedrijven een sterke ethische verantwoordelijkheid
hebben voor dieren en dat dit een blinde vlek is van zowel de bedrijfspraktijk 
als de academische bedrijfsethiek. Bedrijven die Maatschappelijk Verantwoord
Ondernemen (MVO) en wetenschappers in de bedrijfsethiek houden zich veelal
bezig met de invloed van bedrijfsactiviteiten op mens, natuur en milieu, en minder
met de invloed op dieren, terwijl ze daarin wel een verantwoordelijkheid hebben.
onderzoek.
het commitment aan dieren zoals geuit door bedrijven op hun website. We pasten 
die methode toe op 200 multinationals (kwantitatief onderzoek). Ruim de helft van
de multinationals geeft geen blijk van verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel voor dieren.
Bedrijven die zich er wel over uiten, doen dit veelal op minder belangrijke locaties
op hun websites, en minder op de centrale plaatsen waar het onderwerp thuis zou
horen, zoals teksten over MVO-beleid en bedrijfscodes.
Met Floryt van Wesel onderzocht ik factoren die een ethische houding van bedrijven
ten opzichte van dieren stimuleren. We zoomden in op de voedingsindustrie. Door
analyse van interviews en geschreven teksten (kwalitatief onderzoek), vonden we
drie groepen stimulerende factoren: het tonen van leiderschap, het vormen van
partnerschappen en het openlijk tonen van besluiten en successen. Ook stelden we
vast dat de manager die verantwoordelijk is voor dierenwelzijn op twee manieren
communicatie kan inzetten om een extra stimulerende rol te spelen: door te 
communiceren met interne en externe partijen én door onderlinge communicatie 
tussen die partijen te stimuleren.
Uitgaande van bestaande ideeën over dierethiek en bedrijfsethiek uit de morele
onderzoek). De uitkomsten vertaal ik naar concrete adviezen voor verschillende 
bedrijfstakken.
Dit proefschrift verbindt de dierethiek en de bedrijfsethiek op zowel academisch
als toegepast niveau. Wat betreft het tweede doe ik de volgende aanbevelingen 
voor bedrijven: doe een zelfonderzoek met onze CAN-methode; neem dieren op in
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de materialiteitsanalyse; maak een manager verantwoordelijk voor dierenwelzijn;
zoek verbetermogelijkheden door leiderschap, partnerschap, naar buiten treden 
en communicatie met en door diverse partijen; neem dierenwelzijn op in MVO-
communicatie; voeg nieuwe communicatiekanalen toe; en communiceer proactief 
en eerlijk over plannen, doelen, obstakels en prestaties.
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of both animal ethics and the societal responsibilities of companies. The research
This chapter is partly based on the chapter Animal Ethics, which I wrote with co-
author Franck L.B. Meijboom and was published in the Encyclopedia of Business and 
Professional Ethics (Springer, 2017).
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Introduction
Ethical dilemmas about animals play a part in our lives, and our choices affect their 
lives, as we eat, drink, buy things, go on a holiday, or take care of our companion
animals. Some people think animals are meant to be owned and used by humans, 
while others think they are not, or have not given the question a thought. There 
are people who take the interests of animals into account in every conscious choice 
and there are others who acknowledge the interests of animals but do not always 
have the energy, the money, the information, or the drive to do so. In addition, some
of these choices are based on competing interests: my tasty dinner or the pig’s life, 
my soft leather shoes or the calf’s life, my child’s nutritious milk or the cow’s ability 
to feed and raise her calf, my enjoyment of a marine animal show or the dolphin’s 
freedom, my preference for a short-nosed pedigree dog or the dog’s health. These 
ethical choices may remain unrecognized by the people who make them, and the 
outcomes may be incorporated in culture. In society, the treatment of production 
animals is ‘outsourced’ to companies, for example – staying with the former 
examples – to industrial farming, the entertainment industry, and professional 
dog breeders. This takes us to the role of companies. Are they responsible for their 
impact on animal welfare?1
In Western society, philosophical and societal support for the idea that animals 
should receive more protection has grown since the 19th century, with an
aim of the European Union to improve animal welfare (European Convention for
the Protection of Animals kept for Farming 1976). NGOs for animal protection play 
an important role in this development (Verdonk 2009). Some consumers whose 
awareness has been raised vote with their money and stop buying products or
services that have a negative impact on animals (Hancox, 2018). They may switch 
to products with animal welfare labels or stop eating animals at all. They may even 
stop visiting zoos and marine animal parks, and boycott animal-based products
1 Throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‘animal welfare’ when referring to animal welfare 
in a broad sense, meaning roughly: the good for animals, or the interests of animals. For ethics 
specialists, the term ‘welfare’ is strongly connected to a utilitarian approach, which considers 
welfare the central value that should be maximized. Other ethical approaches may use other 
terms with different ethical notions, such as: rights, respect, care, autonomy, or intrinsic worth. 
At the same time, in everyday language, ‘animal welfare’ is often used in the broader sense used
here. To connect to this practice in society, I will use it in the same broad way. In chapter 5, I will 
explore the meaning of the term ‘animal welfare’ in the context of this thesis somewhat further, 
including the question of whether it includes continuing a good life. Insights from this chapter are 
not necessary for understanding the previous chapters.
1
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Chapter 1
besides meat (dairy, wool, leather, et cetera). Nevertheless, it is not always clear 
who bears responsibility for animals affected by corporate activity. Part of the
responsibility may lie with different parties, such as companies, the government,
and consumers.
Those who look into both animal ethics and business ethics may get the impression
that the two hardly intermingle (Van Liedekerke & Dubbink 2008). In animal ethics, 
it has been argued extensively that humans have strong moral obligations towards 
animals, but not much is said about obligations or responsibilities of companies 
as institutions towards animals. In business ethics, the achievements in animal 
ethics have hardly been considered. Exceptions are papers about responsibility 
Few researchers treat animal ethics as a topic of CSR. (See Chapter 2 for a more
elaborate description of literature in which animal ethics and business ethics
overlap.)
The broader question whether companies bear responsibilities towards animals
at all, and what these responsibilities – if any – consist of, remains unanswered. To
answer this question, it is helpful to know whether companies express themselves
about responsibilities towards animals. Therefore, in this thesis I will explore the
question: What is the ethical responsibility of companies towards animals and how do
they deal with this responsibility? In doing so, I will explore and try to answer the
following sub-questions, which are related to the chapters2 of this thesis as follows.
Are companies prima facie responsible for their impact on animals? This question 
towards animals, which I will undertake in the following sections of this chapter 
normative philosophy.3
offer an empirical view on the same matter, by answering the second sub-question:
In
2 As the chapters are based on separately published papers, the content may overlap.
3 Partly based on the chapter Animal Ethics, which I wrote with co-author Franck L.B. Meijboom and 
which was published in the Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics (Springer, 2017).
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Introduction
Chapter 2, Talking about animals, I will present a study by Muel Kaptein and myself,4
in which we show on a quantitative basis that slightly fewer than half of the world’s
200 largest companies make statements of ethical responsibility towards animals
in the commitment towards animal welfare they express. We will conclude that 
companies who do express responsibility express quite a high level of concern,
but do so in documents and places on their websites of relatively low importance.
Our approach results in the CAN (Commitment to ANimals) scoring method for
measuring the commitment to animals expressed by companies on their website.
This method can be used by companies for self-assessment as well as by NGOs or
others interested in animal welfare.
Having concluded the above, I will try to explain the divergence in the expressed
commitment and try to gain more knowledge about factors that play a role in the 
attitude companies take towards animals. Because this is relatively unexplored
ground as well, together with Floryt van Wesel I undertook explorative qualitative 
research into the third sub-question: What drivers help to make companies adopt an 
ethical stance towards animals? In Chapter 3, We are the Champions, I will present an
explorative study conducted by Floryt van Wesel and myself,5 in which we present 
a model that shows how, in companies, three sets of drivers we called ‘leadership’, 
‘partnership’, and ‘championship’ are helpful for creating a positive attitude 
towards animals. We show that by strengthening these phenomena, stakeholders 
can accelerate a change towards a more widely felt corporate responsibility 
towards animals within the company and its business environment. Our model 
helps to explain the differing positions on animal ethics of companies as found 
in the study in Chapter 2. We gathered the data on which our qualitative study is 
based by zooming in on the food industry, probably the most animal-consuming 
and animal-welfare-threatening industry. We held in-depth interviews with 
managers in large Western-Europe-based food companies (producers, processors, 
wholesalers, and retailers) who were made responsible for animal welfare, and 
we used written sources from these companies.
4 Based on Janssens, M.R.E., Kaptein, M. (2016). The Ethical Responsibility of Companies Towards 
Animals: A Study of the Expressed Commitment of the Fortune Global 200. The Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship 63(3): 42-72.
5 Based on Janssens, M.R.E, Van Wesel, F. (2018). Leadership, Partnership and Championship as 
Drivers for Animal Ethics the Western Food Industry. In: A. Linzey & C. Linzey (eds.), Ethical 
Vegetarianism and Veganism. Routledge, London, pp. 276-290.
1
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Chapter 1
In Chapter 4, Connecting Parties for Change, I will present a second study by Floryt 
van Wesel and myself,6 based mainly on the same data set, this time focusing
companies towards animals. Its purpose was to answer the fourth sub-question: 
What factors of communication help companies to take responsibility for animals, 
and how do these factors interact? Again, we focused on the food industry, for the 
same reasons as above. Our conclusion, presented in a second model, is that a 
manager who is responsible for animal welfare in a company can strengthen the
is to connect with stakeholders within and outside the company. The second way is 
to facilitate, as a moderator, connections between these stakeholders in which the
manager is not involved per se. In both cases, if these connections take the form 
of personal meetings, this is extra helpful for enhancing a responsible attitude 
towards animals, because that is how insight, trust, and collaboration are gained 
and sustained. Our model outlines all the supportive communicative connections 
we found. An additional table displays the different communication channels that 
are used for each different stakeholder. We also offer practical advice for managers.
Having done this, in Chapter 5, Animal Business, I will return to a normative-
philosophical approach, where I will leave the prima facie stance from Chapter 1 
and go deeper into thorough step-by-step philosophical argumentation, to answer
the fourth sub-question: What are the ethical responsibilities of companies towards 
animals from a normative-philosophical point of view? There, I will argue that, if there 
is a human obligation to respect the interests of animals, and if corporations have 
responsibilities towards society, companies bear an institutional responsibility 
towards animals. I will offer arguments for why animals count from an ethical 
perspective and how moral obligations of individuals lead to responsibilities of 
companies for different types of impact on animals. Finally, I will offer implications
for different industries.
I will conclude with Chapter 6,7 in which I answer the last sub-question: What do
the ethical responsibilities of companies towards animals entail in practice? To do
this, I will resume my conclusion that companies can and should take steps to 
take the interests of animals into account in their policies and actions, summarize
6 Based on Janssens, M.R.E., Van Wesel, F. (2019). Connecting parties for change, A qualitative study 
into communicative drivers for animal welfare in the food industry. Food Ethics, 3: 5-21.
7 This chapter is based on Janssens, M.R.E. (2019). Animal Business: An exploration of corporate 
responsibility towards animals, under review.
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Introduction
the different conclusions and implications, and offer action points for managers 
and other decision makers in companies, ranging from doing an informative
assessment on their own corporate website to incorporating animal ethics into
their business codes and CSR policies. Special suggestions are made for the CSR 
manager (or any other manager potentially responsible for the corporate impact 
on animals) and for the role of communications in the change process. An extra
ethics and animal ethics to work together more closely to accelerate the notion
of responsibility for animals as one of the corporate social responsibilities that 
cannot be ignored.
Having said this, in the following sections of this chapter I will roughly sketch the 
1.1 Animal ethics
Animal ethics deals with the moral relationship between humans and animals.8
This implies a discussion about whether and why animals are morally important for
their own sake and if so, what consequences follow for human action. Traditionally,
animal ethics is concerned with individual animals and their moral value, their
interests, and their preferences (Bovenkerk & Meijboom 2012, Cochrane 2016, 
Engster 2006, Fraser 2012, Keulartz 2016, Meijer 2017, Milligan 2016, Nussbaum
2007, Regan 1983, Rollin 2016b, Singer 1975/2009).
approaches of animal ethics are consequentialist or deontological by nature, or 
a type of virtue ethics. What these approaches generally have in common is that 
they include sentient animals in the sphere of the morally relevant. This means
we should take animals into account for their own sake when deciding about the
good and the right.
8 In animal ethics literature, ‘humans’ are often called ‘human animals’, and what we call ‘animals’ in 
daily life are often called ‘non-human animals’. The purpose of this choice is to stress that humans
are also an animal species. Although this is my personal preference, I have decided to connect 
with conventional language in this thesis and will use the terms ‘humans’ and ‘animals’.
1
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Chapter 1
Consequentialism and utilitarianism
The father of utilitarianism, Bentham (1780/2007:311), wrote a short but famous 
fragment that turned out pivotal for animal ethics: ‘The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ With these words, he opens up
the possibility of including sentient animals (animals who can experience pleasure
and pain) in the sphere of the morally relevant. If a utilitarian – a consequentialist 
who sees welfare or happiness as the central value that should be maximized – 
is calculating the added or diminished value for all affected, then the added or 
diminished value for affected animals counts as well. To put it simply: as soon 
as we know that other creatures can be harmed by negative experiences such 
as pain, we should take their interests into account, because being sentient is
why we as humans count morally ourselves. In our times, this approach has been
developed further by Singer (1975/2009; 1981/2011; 1993), theoretically as well 
as practically. He examines how we should weigh up the different value changes
for animals and humans in different situations and argues that by the above
pleasure and pain) are morally relevant and that their interests should receive 
equal consideration.
Deontology and rights ethics
According to Kant (1785/1996), humans have direct duties towards other
rational beings, who by virtue of their rationality have moral agency. They can 
decide about principles that qualify to be universal laws about moral obligations.
Towards animals, who are in his view non-rational beings without moral agency, 
humans have only indirect duties; people who behave badly towards animals could
hurt the feelings of humans with these actions, or start behaving badly towards
humans too. Although this may be true, there have been recent proposals that 
show that a deontological account is compatible with the notion of direct human
duties towards animals. Korsgaard (2018) argues that animals as non-rational 
beings can be ‘passive citizens’ who can have moral claims on ‘active citizens’ 
(rational beings). We, rational humans, should acknowledge these claims because 
animals are ends in themselves who care about themselves. Regan (1983/2004) 
developed a deontology-based rights approach to animal ethics, by which he claims
that humans have direct moral duties towards animals. His approach is based
on the inherent value of subjects-of-a-life: sentient individuals who in addition
to sentience have other violable abilities, such as memory and belief. They are 
aware of the world and of what happens to them, and they act intentionally. These 
they can undergo it. They have inherent value and a right to be treated respectfully 
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 37
37
Introduction
and not to be harmed. There are circumstances where overriding this right is
permitted: if not harming them would harm many more. The criterion of being
subject-of-a-life leads to many empirical and philosophical questions about who
and what should be included in the moral realm. Regan is aware of this, but 
postulates that mammals from around the age of 1 year should be included, as it 
encompasses both animals and humans such as young children and people with
and that the group of subjects-of-a-life may be larger, including for example birds.
Virtue-ethics inspired capabilities approach
Nussbaum (2007) developed a virtue-ethics inspired capabilities approach for 
and respect towards other creatures, we should allow animals the capabilities 
approach assigns to humans to a list of capabilities animals should be allowed. 
These are: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, access to sources of pleasure, 
emotions through attachment to others, practical reason (to the extent to which 
the capacity is present in the animal), non-humiliation, relationships with other 
species, play, and control over their environment. Nussbaum does not go very 
deeply into differences between animal species but acknowledges that priority 
should be given to changing the situation of animals who suffer from the way they 
are being treated.
Which animals to include: some consensus
Departing from differing ethical strands, the philosophers mentioned above seem 
that more species than these may be sentient in the sense that they can have 
experiences they evaluate as positive or negative, and recognize stimuli which 
they try to encounter or avoid. To begin with, crustaceans and cephalopods have 
indications of relevant cognitive capacities that might imply sentience of, for 
example, shrimps (Broom 2007; Elwood et al. 2009) and honeybees (Bateson et 
al. 2011). Knowledge about the biological systems of animals is increasing rapidly, 
and may lead to species or subspecies being added to the group of sentient animals 
which should be treated respectfully by avoiding the risk of making them suffer. 
(See Chapter 5, Table 11, for an overview of current knowledge about sentience
of animal species.)
1
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1.2 Responsibilities of companies
Various scholars have argued that companies have responsibilities towards
society. Joyner and Payne (2002:298) state that ‘business cannot exist without 
society and that society cannot go forward without business. Thus, business must 
acknowledge society’s existence and society’s growing demand for more ethically 
responsible business practice.’ Jeurissen (1995:69) states: ‘it is only due to the 
integration with the moral community that business can exist.’ Kavaliauskas
(2011) gives a brief summary of the general obligations of companies to society, 
quoting Solomon, Buchholz, De George, and Duska about the respective obligations 
(in a broad sense) which they put forward in their writings: the good life as a goal 
of business, corporate responsibility to help society, business as a means to create 
a good society, and the betterment of society as a purpose of business. But how do
society’? A broad variety of answers to these questions is possible, but our focus 
is now on animals: are they part of society, and should companies help animals to 
pursue and achieve ‘a good life’? Without the need to answer these questions at 
this point we have reasons, based on the foregoing argument about the relative 
consensus of the three main modern ethical approaches on moral obligations 
of humans to animals, to take a closer look at the responsibilities of companies
towards animals.
In businesses, animals are often treated as an instrument for human goals: for
obtain laboratory and companion animals; animals in circuses and marine
animal parks are taught tricks for human entertainment; others are trained to do 
agricultural, rescue, or guide work for humans. Apart from these forms of direct 
impact on animals, companies can have an indirect impact on animals, for example 
through habitat destruction, road kill, food provision in company restaurants, and
pollution, including noise and light pollution. From an animal ethics perspective,
this could lead to moral concerns about business activities in relation to animals.
complicated, not only because of the huge variety among animals and animal 
and their institutions relate to animals in very different ways in the context of 
different practices, and (in general) view and treat them accordingly. They can
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farmed animals, research animals, wildlife, animals in entertainment, working
animals, and companion animals (WAP 2013). This is not a static categorization.
Animals can change categories. A wild animal can be captured and put in a zoo to
continue its life as an object of entertainment. A farmed animal can be purchased
by a private individual and be kept as a companion animal.
It is possible that what a company owes to animals in moral terms depends not only 
on its direct or indirect impact on the animals, but also on its relationship with
the animal. Companies that own animals may bear a more primary responsibility,
resulting in a moral duty of care. However, ethical responsibility towards animals
is not limited to their owners; it can pass through the production chain and affect 
the responsibility of business partners, so that any company that buys animal-
based products bears a shared responsibility for the animals the products were
derived from. Even outside the production chain, procurement, for example of 
restaurant food, can be an activity in which ethical responsibility is involved.
Therefore, it is important that each company explores its own responsibility 
amongst other responsibility issues. I will return to how this can be done in the
studies I conducted to approach the research question mentioned earlier: What is 
the ethical responsibility of companies towards animals and how do they deal with
this responsibility? and its sub-questions.
from animal ethics and offering recommendations for companies on how to take
responsibility for animals.2
1
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This chapter describes a study that shows that 47% of the 200 largest companies 
in the world make statements of ethical responsibility towards animals. There is 
concern in their words, but they do so in documents of relatively low importance. 
Statements regarding ethical responsibility for animal welfare are generally made in
consequentialist terms. The results of the study presented in this chapter show that it 
closely together.
This chapter is based on Janssens, M.R.E., Kaptein, M. (2016). The Ethical Responsibility 
Global 200. The Journal of Corporate Citizenship 63(3): 42-72.
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on a great number of animals, be it in the
natural environment (Braithwaite 2010, Chepesiuk 2009, Sai Leung & Sze Leung
2003), within the walls of (other) companies (Foer 2009, Schwartzkopf-Genswein
et al. 2012, Vetter et al. 2014), or even in private homes (Bermudez et al. 2014).
However, animals are not always treated well by companies (Engster 2006, Fraser
2008) and are even abused on a large scale (Braithwaite 2010, Foer 2009, Leder
2012, Singer 1975/2009). Companies are therefore under growing pressure from
animal welfare organizations and consumers to change this behaviour (Brinkmann
2004, Ventura et al. 2015).
Research in business ethics does not address corporate responsibilities towards 
animals in its full scope. Van Liedekerke and Dubbink (2008) observe that animal
preventing harm to animals or optimizing animal welfare is mentioned by only 
2% of the largest companies in the world. However, companies can also express
an ethical responsibility towards animals in other documents, such as strategy 
plans, annual reports, detailed policies, press releases, and corporate magazines.
This raises the question of how companies actually do express themselves on
their responsibilities towards animals, or on any other ways of looking at animals
through an ethical lens. Therefore the research question of this chapter is: Do 
 This 
question and its answer will contribute to answering the second half of the larger
question of this thesis: What is the ethical responsibility of companies for animals 
and how do they deal with this responsibility?
An annual benchmark on farm animal welfare has been published since 2012: The
Business Benchmark on Farm Animal Welfare. Though not peer reviewed, it is well
2018) assessed the approach to animal welfare of 110 global food companies by 
their published information. Findings are that performance and reporting on farm
animal welfare is still underdeveloped, but that there are signs that companies are
increasing the attention they pay to farm animal welfare.
The company website is often used to disseminate these documents and thus to
communicate the ethical responsibilities of the company (Mann et al. 2014). In
this study, we use the web-based approach of Mann et al. (2014) and Fukukawa
and Moon (2004) to analyse company websites to establish whether and how they 
2
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articulate ethical responsibilities towards animals. Websites are more often used
as a source in business ethics research (cf. Kim & Nam 2012, Snider et al. 2003).
There are good reasons to be cautious. Website content is subject to continuous 
change. It may not tell the whole story, or it may tell more than the whole story by 
painting a rosier picture than the truth. Still, we think that web-based data can 
be very revealing, since our intention is not to draw conclusions about the actual
behaviour of these companies in relation to animals, but merely about the way 
they express themselves on this topic.
Our main reason for adding this study to existing studies like the annual benchmark 
on farm animal welfare is our observation that all companies have an impact on
animals (as was argued in section 1.2), which may result in non-food companies
in general see reasons to express themselves regarding their attitude towards
animals. We did not know of such a study.
We studied the websites of the 200 largest companies in the world as these
companies have the resources to build and maintain extensive websites, and to
publish information they perceive as relevant on these websites. Furthermore, the 
Fortune list is a common data source in business ethics research (cf. Kim & Nam 
2012, Muller & Whiteman 2009, Kaptein 2004, KPMG 2008, KPMG 2014).
We would like to indicate that we do not assume beforehand that companies should
express themselves about animals, which would mean that communicating about 
animals is a moral obligation. What we did was to evaluate their communication 
about animals in order to analyse how they view their responsibilities towards
animals.
and explore why companies would have an ethical responsibility towards animals.
In the two sections that follow, we describe the research method and discuss the
research and business practice.
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2.1 Theoretical background
In this section we explore the relevant theoretical background from animal ethics 
and business ethics.
Animal ethics
Journal of Animal 
Ethics and several publications in bioethics and agricultural ethics journals. A
core element of animal ethics is the moral status of animals, not as a species but 
as individuals with interests (DeGrazia 1996, Des Jardins 1993). Animal ethics is 
therefore concerned not with the instrumental value animals have for humans or 
institutions, but with the value animals have in and for themselves, or as Lynch 
(1988:268) puts it, the animal as ‘a subject for-itself as well as in-itself’.
To capture the scope of this chapter and this complete thesis, it is necessary to 
not correspond to environmental ethics. Though animals in the wild and the 
their continued existence as a species can be part of the environment, there is 
a difference in focus. Environmental ethics focuses on the moral status of the 
natural environment with the animals in it (who need it as a habitat, a provider of 
food and shelter) and possibly on preservation of animal species. Notwithstanding
the importance of this strand in bioethics, the focus of animal ethics in its current 
academic interpretation and as understood in this thesis is on the interests of 
individual animals. It is also necessary to distinguish between animal ethics and 
nature ethics, which may research the ethical value of ecosystems, species or 
biodiversity. Wildlife management by hunting, for example, can have a positive 
impact on nature, and at the same time a negative impact on the animals involved. 
Keeping animals in zoos where breeding programmes dictate their lives can be 
positive for their species but negative for the individuals involved. An even more 
important difference is that animal ethics is also concerned with animals in the 
non-natural environment, such as laboratory animals, companion animals, and 
animals in the food industry. Some philosophers, such as Benson (2000), do regard 
animal ethics as one of the many elements of environmental ethics, but even in 
that context animal ethics has its own approach.
The three main traditional approaches in animal ethics, which I presented 
in Chapter 1, coincide with the main approaches in business ethics, which are 
consequential, deontological, and virtue ethics (Kaptein & Wempe 2002). Singer 
2
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(1993) represents the utilitarian and, therefore, consequentialist approach to 
animal ethics, Regan (1983, 2006) proposes a deontology-inspired rights approach 
to animal ethics, whereas Nussbaum (2007) has developed a capabilities approach 
for animal ethics which is mainly inspired by virtue ethics.
Utilitarianism is concerned with the maximization of happiness or welfare.
The right action is the action of which the consequences maximize ‘pleasure’
and minimize ‘pain’, for the greatest number, each individual counting as one
(Singer 1993). Through his famous words, ‘The question is not, Can they reason? 
nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’, the father of utilitarianism, Bentham
(1780/2007:311), explicitly includes animals in the sphere of the morally relevant.
Singer (1975, 1993) expands this approach by including moral considerations for
using and killing animals for human ends. Given that aggregate pleasure and
pain are central to utilitarianism, it includes all sentient beings, and therefore all
crustaceans and octopuses (Elwood et al. 2009). Within this tradition Norwood
includes human and animal preferences and costs.
Regan (1983, 2006) develops a rights-based animal ethic which is grounded in
the inherent value of what he refers to as ‘moral patients’. Moral patients are 
individuals who are aware of the world and of what happens to them but who lack 
the capacity to do right or wrong. One could say, ‘the innocent’: they cannot act 
morally or immorally but can be treated morally or immorally (DesJardins 1993). 
Due to their status as moral patients, animals have inherent value and therefore 
a right to be treated respectfully and not to be harmed. This right is, according
to Regan, prima facie: there are circumstances where it is permitted to override
even greater number of innocent beings.
Nussbaum (2007) develops an animal ethic that connects virtue ethics with
an attitude of wonder towards complex forms of life in nature and of kindness 
and compassion towards animals. Based on the list of capabilities that humans 
should be allowed: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, access to sources of pleasure,
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emotions through attachment to others, practical reason (to the extent to which
the capacity is present in the animal), non-humiliation, relationships with other
species, play, and control over their environment. Although Nussbaum would argue
that a mosquito’s ability to continue living is a capability that has value in itself, 
she would also agree with Singer that priority should be given to sentient animals.
Although the group of animals Regan is referring to is narrower, we will focus on
sentient animals, henceforth referred to as animals. In Chapter 5 we will elaborate 
on the moral status of different animal species.
Animal ethics and business ethics
To date, business ethics has not broadly incorporated animal ethics. Van Liedekerke 
and Dubbink (2008:278) observe that there is a strong need for business ethics to 
The
Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility (Carroll 1991) does not even mention 
animals. Freeman’s stakeholder theory (Freeman et al. 2010) only touches on the 
subject. Few researchers treat animal welfare as part of corporate responsibility, 
in descriptive than in normative studies. We will now list a few examples.
With regard to the limited scope, Maloni and Brown (2006) address responsibilities 
of companies in the farmed-animal food-production chain. Allievi, Vinnari and 
Luukkanen (2015) discuss animal ethics as one of the aspects of sustainability 
in meat production and consumption. Simpson and Rollin (1984) work out the 
consequences of welfare enhancement of cattle and broiler chickens. Some cite 
laboratory research on animals as an ethical issue for companies (Holder-Webb & 
Cohen 2012, O’Riordan & Fairbrass 2014; Rappaport & Himschoot 1994). Eastman 
and Santoro (2003) mention animal welfare as an example of a value-laden issue 
for a drug company. In their studies of the ethical policy of the British Cooperative 
Bank, Harvey (1995) and Kitson (1996) note the issues of animal research, blood 
sports, and fur production. Scholtens (2007) mentions animal research as an issue 
for socially responsible investments, and Taylor (2005) discusses animal research 
thoroughly. Boyd (1997), examining business ethics in Canada, addresses the issue
of animal ethics in the context of the country’s much-discussed seal pelt industry. 
Rojas et al. (2009) identify animal rights as one of many issues of shareholder 
activism. Finally, Low and Davenport (2009), in their examination of the challenges 
of ethical trade, mention the animal-friendly restaurant policy of a UK zoo.
2
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Some scholars note consumer concern for animals. Auger and Devinney (2007) 
and Auger at al. (2007) cite animal testing as an issue that matters to ethical 
welfare on consumer websites. In their research into ethical product labels in
welfare. Crane (2001) mentions a few animal welfare topics in exploring the notion 
of an ethical product.
consequentialist biocentric business ethics but rejects it on practical grounds. 
Zuzworsky (2001) examines unnecessary suffering in factory farming from a
spiritual perspective. Vogel (2001) notes that in the Jewish tradition, humans, 
and thus also companies, have an ethical responsibility towards animals, so long it 
scholar explores animal stewardship from a biblical perspective.
principles for assessing social and ethical initiatives. Inclusivity is among these 
principles, which means taking all stakeholders into account, also animals. And
then there is Hoffman (1991), who pleads for ethical consideration of and legal
rights for ‘non-human natural things’.
Notably, Elkington’s (1997) Triple Bottom Line concept of the Triple Bottom Line
of its interpretations such as ISO 26000 (2010), animals are treated as part of the 
natural environment (planet). This however does not guarantee that the interests 
of individual animals – the concern of animal ethics – are also taken seriously.
Gray et al. (1996), for example, recommend disclosing social, environmental,
and employee information in annual reports, but make no mention of animals. 
It is possible that companies may believe that addressing environmental issues
embraces addressing animal interests, but since ‘the environment’ is an extremely 
broad concept, the interests of animals are bound to be overshadowed by the
more obvious environmental issues, such as pollution and impact on plant and
animal species. This can be seen in the publications of Bansal and Kistruck (2006), 
Driscoll and Starik (2004), Hoch and Giacalone (1994), and Phillips and Reichart 
the ethical policy of the Body Shop as having three branches – Human and Civil
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presents animal ethics as an important aspect of environmental ethics, which
allows for a connection to business ethics. Nevertheless, it appears that animal
ethics is discussed only marginally in the business ethics literature.
Ethical responsibilities of companies towards animals
Animals can be found to occupy six different relationships to humans and 
companies: as wildlife, farmed animals, companion animals, animals in 
entertainment, working animals, and research animals (WAP 2013). Farmed 
animals, animals in entertainment, working animals, and research animals are 
often owned by companies. Companion animals and wildlife live mainly outside 
companies (with a few exceptions, e.g. animals in zoos, pet shops, and breeding 
facilities), but can be affected by companies as a result of their activities. A few
examples include the construction of buildings or development of land destroying 
animal nesting places and habitats, manufacturing processes polluting the 
environment and causing damage to animal health, the use of company trucks 
occasionally hitting animals on the road, and oil spills or contributions to plastic 
has some impact on animals. At the very least, it is most likely that it makes use of 
a catering company for its company restaurants which sources, prepares, and sells 
animal food products, such as meat, poultry, eggs and dairy products. Google and 
in World Farming (CIWF) Good Egg Award after this award was established 
in 2007 (CIWF website). The award is granted to companies that use, or have 
committed to use, only cage-free eggs or egg products in their supply chain. CIWF 
found it rewarding enough to invite these companies to meet the requirements, 
and in this way illustrates that any large company has a strong impact on animals.
What implications does the moral status of animals have for companies? How and 
to what extent are we to assign companies responsibility for animals? Apart from 
the three main theoretical approaches in both animal and business ethics, which 
will be discusses further in Chapter 5, there are three additional approaches that 
can be of help when looking into whether companies express their responsibilities 
between animals and institutions.
human activity can affect animals, and four matching ‘principles’ for acting 
ethically. By these ‘principles’, people who are responsible for these animals 
2
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are attributed moral obligations. He does not address companies explicitly but 
emphasises that the four principles apply to individual decisions as well as to issues 
related to social policy and collective action. According to Fraser, anyone who
keeps animals (farmers, zoo owners, owners of labs where animal experiments 
(shelter, food, protection, companionship, health care, and a painless death). When 
intentional harm is caused to animals (through hunting, slaughtering, conducting
experiments on them, etc.), they should be treated with compassion (analgesics,
a quick death). When direct but unintended harm is caused to animals (through
oil spills, by-catch, vehicle collisions, underwater noise, pollution of their drinking 
water or food, et cetera), one should be mindful of potential harm (challenge 
animals). When animals are indirectly harmed as a result of interference with 
life-sustaining processes and balances in nature (through change of water levels,
light pollution that may result in species extinction in the long term, et cetera), 
these processes and balances should be protected. This latter way in which human
activity can affect animals is often treated as a dimension of environmental ethics 
not only their species are affected, such impacts should ‘be seen as fundamental 
to a practical ethic for animals’ (p. 737).
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), look at animal ethics from a political perspective.
They represent a second approach to the relationship between animals and 
companies, and propose seeing animals as co-citizens in the political community,
whose interests count when people determine the collective good. Although
animals cannot be citizens in the sense of being able to vote or engage in the 
public debate, they can be citizens in the sense of having certain rights. These
rights function independently of their capacity for political agency, just like those 
of children and mentally disabled people. Animals are part of society. Adopting this 
and animals. Animal products like milk, eggs, and wool can be used as long as the
animals are not harmed. Meat can no longer be produced. Another implication 
the authors cite is that animals living in the wild have their own communities
that should not be invaded, colonized, or robbed by humans. This would prohibit 
A third approach to the relationship between animals and companies is to see
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of Freeman (2010:207): ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’. This does not resolve the
question of the nature of these groups or individuals. Must they be human to be a
stakeholder? Starik (1995), who is acknowledged by Freeman et al. (2010), argues 
that the natural environment is a stakeholder. As animals are part of the natural
environment, they can be regarded as stakeholders. Hart and Sharma (2004:7)
argue that it is in the interest of companies to include in their policies the views
of stakeholders on the ‘fringes’: ‘the poor, weak, isolated, non-legitimate, and even
non-human’. Webster (2006) also regards (farm) animals as stakeholders, along
with farmers and customers.
What these different approaches to the relationship between companies and
animals have in common is that they conclude that companies should consider the
interests of the animals on which they have (or may have) an impact. An interesting 
question is to what extent companies do consider the interests of animals. For this
reason, we will examine how and to what extent companies make statements on 
their websites that are related to these responsibilities, focusing especially on their
expressed commitment to safeguarding the interests of animals.
2.2 Method
We will now present the sample and scope of this study, the study protocol we
the way we developed our measurement tool: Commitment to Animals (CAN).
Sample and scope
The scope of this study comprises the statements of responsibility towards animals 
that can be found on the websites of the 200 largest corporations in the world. The 
companies were selected from the top of the 2012 Fortune Global 500 list, which 
is ranked by revenue. Given the time-consuming nature of analysing each website, 
we limited the scope to the 200 largest companies, as this is also a regular scope 
of research (cf. Kaptein 2004). The information accessible on a website is often 
extensive, and therefore it is a good source to consult to determine whether and 
how companies acknowledge and articulate ethical responsibilities concerning 
animals (Fukukawa & Moon 2004). According to Frostenson et al. (2011), almost 
all large companies use their websites to communicate their ethical commitments 
to the outside world. These companies share a great deal of information including 
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social reports, policies, and codes of conduct. According to Brønn and Brønn 
websites. Given the budgets these large companies have for maintaining their 
websites, it is reasonable to expect websites to be quite complete and up to date.
Data collection took place from April 3 to October 21, 2013.
Protocol
Using the website search tools available on most sites, we searched all of these
companies’ websites for the word animal as well as its synonym fauna. Sometimes
an additional Google search was required. When an English-language website 
was unavailable, we used terms in the language encountered. When there were
cattle,
and pet but soon found that in these cases the word animal was always close by. 
When a website included a web shop with a large number of products with ‘animal
print’, for example, we searched for ‘animal welfare’ and ‘responsibility’ (terms 
often found in the texts of other companies) in order to locate the relevant texts. We 
us that relevant hits would hardly be missed. Two companies were excluded from
and another whose website was not accessible without knowledge of Japanese. In 
Japanese-speaking colleague to assist us.
Each hit was analysed for statements of responsibility towards animals. Mere
references to animal health were excluded. Although animal health is related 
to animal welfare, such references tended to be inspired by economic concerns
(keeping them alive and healthy for reasons of productivity, research quality, et 
cetera). The same holds for mere references to the protection of animal species, 
animal habitats, or biodiversity. Not only do these categories fall outside the
were largely the subject of nature ethics or environmental ethics. We are, however, 
aware that aspects of animal ethics could be included in issues concerning nature 
or environmental ethics. References of this kind were therefore included if they 
references to saving individual animals merely to save the species, but we
included such references if a concern for the individual animal’s interests was 
also expressed.
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 53
53
Talking about Animals
We accepted hits only if the text represented (directly or indirectly) the view of the
company or a staff member of the company. We excluded hits such as news items
about the company quoted from the media, reports from independent committees
or juries, or letters from consumers. We made an exception for blogs or columns,
given that allocating space to a blogger or columnist makes a statement as well. In
the event that we found different versions of the same text, for example, updates
of the same text with only small differences, the most recent version was used in
the analysis and the older ones were ignored.
Company features
in the Fortune Global 500 list), by sector (especially: dealing in animal products 
or not), and in terms of their impact on animals. To identify companies in terms of 
impact, we used the approach of Fraser (2012) discussed above. However, a few 
aspects of his approach appeared problematic when applied to companies.
We will start with Fraser’s his last category: causing direct but unintended harm
to animals. In many cases this can be regarded as environmental damage. If we 
were to include harm of this nature it would be problematic to distinguish between 
companies that consider individual animals to have moral status and those that 
support the protection of a species as part of biodiversity or ecological balance. 
This problem is nevertheless easily overcome since large companies will always 
also cause direct, unintended harm to animals, through construction work, land 
development, transport, and catering (as discussed above). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that all companies in the research cause direct, unintended harm to
animals.
A second potentially problematic aspect of applying Fraser’s model is that it does
not address the supply chain or the purchasing of animal products outside the
supply chain. A wholesale company selling meat products does not keep animals, 
and does not directly harm animals either intentionally or unintentionally. 
However, given that it buys farm animal products for which animals are deprived 
‘causing intentional harm to animals’. As noted above, there is good reason to 
presume that all large companies are at least buyers of animal-based products, as 
they contract the services of caterers for their company restaurants.
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Therefore, the only criteria that remain to classify a company as displaying the 
feature of impact on animals are ‘keeping animals’ and ‘causing intentional harm
to animals’, the second of which can be direct, or indirect through purchasing.
In view of the above, we are distinguishing only between companies that keep 
animals and those that do not keep animals.
Measuring corporate Commitment to ANimals (CAN)
To assess each company’s expressed commitment towards animals, we developed
the following scoring procedure. We analysed the level of commitment to animals
expressed in each quote with reference to three elements: the degree of concern 
a company shows in its statement about animals, the level of importance of the
document in which the statement appears, and the length of the text section that 
individual text could score 1 (lowest level) to 5 points (highest level) for each item,
and therefore 3 to 15 points in total. Next, the commitment scores were added up
for each company, the total being the Commitment to ANimals score (CAN score). 
We will now explain how we built up the ranking for each measure.
First factor of commitment: concern for animals
Companies differ in the level of responsibility they adopt towards animals. Some
take responsibility for animals, whether voluntarily, under stakeholder pressure,
or obliged to do so by legislation. Others accept no responsibility whatsoever. The
depth of concern for animals thus varies considerably. How important are the
interests of animals to companies? Do they mention taking animals into account 
in a more or less neutral way, or do they make statements about real action for 
(2010) highlight a discrepancy between the aspiration to and implementation of 
corporate responsibility, which in their view has more to do with implementation 
incompetence than window dressing. Since the aim of this study is not to draw 
Pompe and Korthals’ ‘aspiration’ and an additional four features as signifying the 
level of concern.
Information. The lowest level of concern is represented by neutral information
about the ethical relevance of animals, but without the company taking a stand. 
For example, a company can state that some consumers prefer products that 
are not tested on animals. The fact that it is mentioned shows that the company 
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acknowledges the issue of (not) harming animals; however, whether or not the
company actually cares about not harming animals is not made explicit.
Attitude. The second level of concern is represented by the expression of a positive
attitude or disposition towards the interests of animals. For example, the term
‘animal welfare’ could be included in a list of corporate responsibilities. It may 
be concluded that the company has a positive attitude towards animals, but it 
remains unclear what the concrete implications of that attitude are. A positive
it entails a positive moral stance towards animal interests.
Aspiration. This third level of concern can be discerned when companies make
statements that express aspirations or ideals (Pompe & Korthals 2010). For
example, a company announces its ambition to reduce the number of animals that 
are annually used for research purposes. Aspiration can be assigned a higher level
of concern than a positive attitude, since it does not only signal a positive stance
but also the desire to improve performance.
Action. This level of concern is indicated by the company acting or having acted in
a positive manner towards animals. For example, it has given an amount of money 
to an animal welfare charity or has started an animal welfare program. Actions
signal a higher level of concern than aspirations because the company also declares
that it is in fact doing something for animals.
Result. This highest level of concern applies when statements are made about 
intentional action with positive results for animals. For example, a company 
could state that it has created better living conditions for farmed animals. Result 
represents the highest level of concern because it indicates that the company has
taken action which has had a positive effect on animals.
Second factor of commitment: document type
The level of concern statements express is only one factor relevant to a company’s 
in a corporate policy document, for example, signals a stronger commitment than 
mentioning animals in connection with a single product. Capriotti and Moreno 
(1996) name three relevant factors in the presentation of corporate responsibility 
discussed below. The second is the hierarchy of information in the web structure.
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This factor has become obsolete due to technological progress: it is less relevant 
third factor concerns the location of the information. In this study, the location of 
the information is translated as ‘document type’, given that it is indicative of the 
relation to this factor.
with marginal scope, for example the opinions of staff or guest bloggers about 
personal consumer choices or volunteer work. The second level is
information with a narrow scope
project, volunteer program, donation or study. The third level is information of 
short-term relevance, such as news items, press releases, magazine articles, or
campaign information. It does mean something to the company, but the focus 
is temporary. The fourth level is information of mid-term relevance, such as a 
corporate responsibility report dealing with one year, or a mid-term policy 
document. Information of this nature is not an expression of the core of the 
corporate information
of long-term relevance, such as corporate brochures, long-term policy statements,
and a business code.
Third factor of commitment: length of the statement
A third factor indicative of a company’s commitment to animals is the length of the 
statement. It can range from a few words on the moral status of animals to lengthy 
documents elaborating on the topic in detail. Five levels were distinguished for
this measure as well, using not a ratio scale but an ordinal scale since on a ratio
scale the differences between the smaller numbers of words would blur. We chose
to create our own ordinal scale based on what we believe the number of words 
indicates about the importance of the issue to the company.
Statements of a few words or a short sentence (20 words or less) represent the
which are made in a few more sentences (21-100 words) represent the second level.
Where a company elaborates broadly on animal welfare in a substantial paragraph 
or a few short paragraphs (101-300 words), the third level is reached. The fourth
level is achieved in instances where a company elaborates extensively on the 
subject (301-1,000 words). The highest level is represented by large texts that are, 
or could be, autonomous documents (more than 1,000 words).
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Ethical approach
moral status of animals through their use of terms such as welfare, well-being, 
pleasure, pain, suffering, happiness, or balancing interests. Texts employing 
rights, integrity, respect for life, inherent value or sanctity of life. A virtue ethical 
references to the Five Freedoms from the Brambell report (1965), which are not 
approach by analysing the context.
Data analysis
The statements found were given scores for level of concern, document type and 
length. The scores were subsequently analysed in a manner that yielded the most 
relevant information: for each of the factors it was assessed how many companies 
(and what proportion) reached at least a certain level through the statements made. 
This approach was adopted because the highest level is the most informative: when 
lower level of concern were treated as ‘extras’, covered by this higher concern. 
The same holds for companies making statements concerning animals in more 
or less important documents, or larger or smaller text fragments: the lower-level 
document types and fragment lengths add no extra level to the highest level found 
on the website of any given company.9
2.3 Findings
In this study, we found that 94 of the 198 companies (47%) make statements 
concerning ethical responsibilities towards animals on their websites. The number
of texts for each of these 94 companies ranged from 1 to 57.
Commitment
Table 1 depicts the companies that make statements of responsibility regarding 
animals on their websites, ranked by their CAN scores. The 5 companies that 
scored highest are Bayer, Unilever, Nestlé, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, and Tesco. 
9 The study protocol followed is presented at the end of section 6.3 in the form of an instruction: 
Commitment to ANimals (CAN) assessment in brief.
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These high scores were obtained in different ways, as many different types of 
industries are represented. Bayer states its concern for research animals in many 
instances on its website, referring to actions and also to some outcomes. Unilever
expresses a high level of concern for farm and research animals, and expresses
this concern in many documents at a corporate level. Nestlé includes farm animals
as well as companion animals (for which they make products), and scores high on
document type as well as level of concern, and the company cites several actions
and outcomes. The website of Royal Bank of Scotland Group contains several pages
of consumer information on how to treat pets: the large number of individual texts 
is the main contributor to the resulting score. Tesco not only presents its Animal
Welfare Policy online, which pertains specially to farm and research animals, the
company also addresses the issue of animals in different ways in news releases 
and corporate responsibility reports.
American, with the exception of Woolworths, which is Australian. Asia is
represented from number 26, with the Japanese IT company Fujitsu scoring 55 
points thanks to a few annual reports and news items. The geographical spread 
of the companies in this study is shown in Table 2. North America (30%), Europe
(34%), and Asia (32%) are each home to about a third of the companies included 
in this study. Of all companies that make statements of responsibility towards 
animals, the majority (40%) are North American companies, followed by European 
(33%) and Asian companies (21%).
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Table 1: Companies Ranked by CAN Score
Position CAN Name
1 507 Bayer
2 452 Unilever
3 358 Nestlé
4 338 Royal Bank of Scotland Gr.
5 314 Tesco
6 293 Procter & Gamble
7 206 Roche Group
8 182 Novartis
9 160 General Motors
10 150 U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
11 139 Aviva
11 139 Woolworths
13 138 Dow Chemical
14 135 Walmart
15 125 BASF
16 124 Target
17 95 IBM
18 81 Johnson & Johnson
19 78 Exxon Mobile
20 77 Boeing
21 76 PepsiCo
22 74 Wells Fargo
23 71 State Farm Insurance Cos.
24 69 Volkswagen
25 67 Siemens
26 59 Fujitsu
27 55 Kroger
28 50 Chevron
29 43 General Electric
30 40 Hitachi
30 40 Groupe Auchan
32 39 ING Group
33 38 BHP Billiton
34 34 Barclays
35 32 Wesfarmers
36 30 Samsung Electronics
36 30 Metro
36 30 Intel
39 29 RWE
40 28 Petrobras
41 26 Bank of America Corp.
41 26 SSE
43 25 Enel
43 25 LyondellBasell Industries
45 24 Royal Dutch Shell
45 24
47 23 Carrefour
47 23 United Parcel Service (UPS)
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Table 1: Continued.
Position CAN Name
49 22 Japan Post Holdings
49 22 Vinci
51 21 Crédit Agricole
51 21 Home Depot
53 20 INTL FCStone
53 20 Kraft Foods
55 19 Daimler
55 19 Assicurazioni Generali
57 18 China National Petroleum
57 18 Deutsche Post
59 16 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co
59 16 Honda Motor
59 16 Lowe’s
62 15 E.ON
62 15 Freddie Mac
64 14 Vale
65 13 Boasteel Group
65 13 Walgreens
65 13 UniCredit Group
68 12 PTT
68 12 Lloyds Banking Group
70 11 ENI
70 11 CVS Caremark
72 10 Sinopec Group
72 10 Total
72 10 China National Offshore Oil
72 10 Marathon Petroleum
72 10 AEON
72 10 Rio Tinto Group
78 9 Hewlett-Packard
78 9 Cardinal Health
78 9 Prudential Financial
81 8 Sony
81 8 Toshiba
81 8 Caterpillar
81 8 Saint-Gobain
85 7 Valero Energy
85 7 Lukoil
85 7 Verizon Communications
85 7 Mitsui
85 7 Sumitomo Mitsu Fin. Gr.
90 6 Citigroup
90 6 Telefonica
92 5 MetLife
92 5 Itochu
94 4 Microsoft
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Table 2: Geographical Spread of Companies (N=198)
Continents
North 
America
South 
America Europe Asia Oceania Total
N=60 N=5 N=67 N=63 N=3 N=198
Companies that do
make statements of 
responsibility towards 
animals
38 (63%) 2 (40%) 31 (46%) 20 (32%) 3 (100%) 94 (47%)
Companies that do not 
make statements of 
responsibility towards 
animals
22 (37%) 3 (60%) 36 (54%) 43 (68%) 0 (0%) 104 (53%)
Table 3 shows that four animal groups are mentioned by more than a quarter 
of the companies that make statements of responsibility: companion animals, 
research animals, wild animals, and farmed animals. These are the primary animal 
groups companies have an impact on through production, manufacturing, or retail 
sales of food, drugs, raw materials, insurances, etc. Animals falling into the two 
remaining groups – animals in entertainment and work animals – are mentioned 
less frequently.
Table 3: Companies Mentioning Animal Groups (N=94)
Animal group Number Percentage*
Companion animals 39 41%
Research animals 33 35%
Wild animals 33 35%
Farmed animals 25 27%
Entertainment animals 6 6%
Work animals 5 5%
whereas others refer to more than one.
Of the 21 companies involved in animal-based food products, 16 (76%) make 
statements of responsibility towards animals. This is a far higher proportion than 
the 44% (78 out of 177) of the companies that do not sell food products derived 
from animals. These 21 companies’ average CAN score is more than four times the 
average of the other companies (98 versus 21). Of the companies that keep animals 
(mostly research animals), all 14 (100%) make statements of responsibility. Of the 
2
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remaining 184 companies 43% make statements of responsibility. The average 
CAN scores for these two categories are 180 and 18 respectively. This indicates
that company commitment to the welfare of animals is more prevalent among 
companies keeping animals than those selling animal-based food products.
Concern for animals
As Table 4 shows, 13% of the 94 companies that make statements of responsibility 
towards animals do so only in a neutral manner (level 1). A positive attitude can
be detected in the statements of 5% of the 94 companies that do not reach a higher 
level. None of the companies express aspirations (level 3) without also referring 
to actions or results. 59% reach level 4, referring to actions, and 23% reach level
5, referring to positive results for animals.
Table 4: Companies Reaching Concern Levels (N=94)
Level of concern for animals Number Percentage
1 Information 12 13%
2 Attitude 5 5%
3 Aspiration 0 0%
4 Action 55 59%
5 Result 22 23%
Document type
As Table 5 shows, none of the 94 companies that make statements of responsibility 
towards animals do so only in documents of the lowest level of importance, that 
at a higher level could be found among the statements of responsibility of each of 
these companies. This does not mean that level 1 texts could not be found but that 
they were always accompanied by texts at another level. 31% of the companies 
the companies provide short-term corporate information at most (level 3), whereas 
21% of the companies include mid-term information at most (level 4). 34% of the
companies also include long-term corporate information (level 5).
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Table 5: Companies Reaching Document Levels (N=94)
Document Level Number Percentage
1 0 0%
2 29 31%
3 Short-term corporate information 13 14%
4 Mid-term corporate information 20 21%
5 Long-term corporate information 32 34%
As Table 6 shows, 20% of the companies that make statements of responsibility 
towards animals that reach the ‘concern level’ of actions or results (CL levels 4 
and 5) limit their statements about these actions or results to the lowest-level 
documents (DL levels 1 and 2).
Table 6: Companies Reaching Document Levels (DL) and Concern Levels (CL) (N=94)
CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL5 Total
DL1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
DL2 8 (9%) 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 18 (19%) 1 (1%) 29 (31%)
DL3 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 5 (5%) 4 (4%) 13 (14%)
DL4 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 16 (17%) 2 (2%) 20 (21%)
DL5 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 16 (17%) 15 (16%) 32 (34%)
Total 12 (13%) 5 (5%) 0 (0%) 55 (59%) 22 (23%) 94 (100%)
Length of the statement
Of the companies that mention responsibility towards animals, 3% use only a 
few (1-20) words. A large majority reach the three mid-size levels: 44% go up to
level 2, 33% go up to level 3, and 17% reach level 4 (see Table 7). Only 3% have 
at least one large document consisting of more than 1,000 words: Unilever (in a 
lengthy sustainability webpage that elaborates on the topic), General Electric (in 
an extended statement on animal research), and Roche Group (in a large text on 
its use and care of animals under Frequently Asked Questions).
Table 7: Companies Reaching Length Levels (N=94)
Length Level Number Percentage
1 1-20 words 3 3%
2 21-100 words 41 44%
3 101-300 words 31 33%
4 301-1,000 words 16 17%
5 >1,000 words 3 3%
2
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Ethical approach
In most of the quotes, the underlying ethical theory could not be detected reliably 
(Table 8). Taking this into consideration, the 33% that use terms implying a 
consequentialist approach is relatively high. BASF, for example, writes: ‘We 
commit to minimize pain and distress for the animals we use’. Johnson & Johnson
that make statements of responsibility use terms that can be associated with a
deontological approach. Roche, for example, writes: ‘Medical research respects all
living creatures – also those used in experiments’, and Hitachi mentions ‘animal
rights’. A virtue ethical approach could be detected in the statements of 5% of 
companies: for example, ‘Norwich vets […] also provide for a dedicated out of hours 
emergency service’ (Royal Bank of Scotland Group), or ‘Carers must have time,
commitment, dedication and training’ (job vacancy of Rio Tinto Group).
Ethical approach Number Percentage
Consequentialism 31 33%
Deontology 11 12%
Virtue ethics  5  5%
Finally, we present in Table 9 the companies with 0 references of responsibilities
towards animals. Correspondingly, their CAN score was 0.
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BP
State Grid
ConocoPhilips
Toyota Motor
Glencore International
Gazprom
Berkshire Hathaway
AXA
Fannie Mae
Ford Motor
Allianz
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone
BNP Paribas
AT&T
GDF Suez
Pemex
PDVSA
McKesson
Statoil
JX Holdings
Nissan Motor
Hon Hai Precision Industry
Banco Santander
EXOR Group
HSBC Holdings
ICBC
Apple
UnitedHealth Group
SK Holdings
Panasonic
Société Générale
Petronas
BMW
ArcelorMittal
Electricité de France
Nippon Life Insurance
Munich Re Group
China Construction Bank
Costco Wholesale
China Mobile Communications
Indian Oil
Agricultural Bank of China
Peugeot
Banco de Brasil
Deutsche Telekom
Noble Group
Archer Daniels Midland
Bank of China
AmerisourceBergen
Reliance Industries
China State Construction
Groupe BPCE
Deutsche Bank
Vodafone Group
American International Group
Robert Bosch
China Railway Construction
China Railway Group
Sinochem Group
Mitsubishi
Hyundai Motor
Medco Health Solutions
ThyssenKrupp
EADS
Tokyo Electric Power
Landesbank Baden 
Wörttemberg
China Life Insurance
SAIC Motor
Banco Bradesco
France Télécom
Dongfeng Motor Group
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group
Dai-ichi Life Insurance
POSCO
Dell
Wellpoint
Seven & i Holdings
China Southern Power
Grid
A.P. Müller-Mörsk Group
Renault
Bunge
Prudential
United Technologies
China FAW Group
Comcast
Marubeni
China Minmetals
Nokia
Armérica Mevil
Zurich Insurance Group
Deutsche Bahn
Nippon Steel
Manulife Financial
CNP Assurances
Best Buy
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria
Sabic
Intesa Sanpaolo
Citic Group
LG Electronics
Idemitsu Kosan
Foncière Euris
2.4 Discussion, conclusions, and recommendations
The data reveal that almost half (47%) of the Fortune Global 200 companies 
make statements of responsibility towards animals. This marked deviation from 
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of only 2% of the Fortune Global 200 can mostly be attributed to the range of 
documents included in this study, that is, aside from changes that might have 
high level of concern: of the companies that do make statements, 82% mention 
actions or results. Just over half of this group (52%) address the issue in documents 
of mid- or long-term corporate relevance.
It is remarkable that several companies do not express themselves in documents
that match the actions taken or the results achieved. They put their actions
or results in ‘hidden’ documents of a low status and temporary nature. Of the 
companies that make statements of responsibility, 20% do not mention their
actions or results in online corporate-level documents. They limit communication
about such actions or outcomes to documents of marginal importance. Based on
results of Frostenson et al. (2011) we can add that this will apply even more to
effect: part of the communication is left behind in the transition from parent 
company to subsidiary or retailer.
European and North American companies express the highest level of commitment 
towards animals. Europe dominates the top in this respect, whereas North
America has the highest percentage of companies that show any commitment at 
all. Although it is striking that all 3 Oceania companies in the list make statements
of responsibility towards animals (positions 11 (second), 33, and 35 in the ranking
in Table 1), the small group of Oceanian and South American companies included
in this study precludes drawing any reliable conclusions about these regions. 
The study did not include any African companies. Given the geographical spread
of the companies included in this study, further conclusions about geographical 
differences cannot be drawn.
No animal group stands out strongly. Only companion animals stand out a little,
which is not surprising since humans have a stronger relationship to them. The
texts referring to companion animals often provide information about employee 
volunteer work and company donations to charities. The fact that research
animals share second place with wild animals is not surprising either. For decades,
companies have had to contend with legislation and pressure from stakeholders
regarding animal research. Examining the texts, one also sees that companies 
mentioning their impact on the environment often add a few words about the 
protection or care of animals in that environment as individuals with interests.
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individual animals in the natural environment. For example, Sinopec states, ‘While
conducting 3D seismic prospecting activities, Sinopec […] takes every measure to
avoid disturbing living creatures, including rabbits, foxes and snakes. Moreover,
injured animals are taken good care of until they recover and are released into the
nature.’ Animals in entertainment and work animals are mentioned less often, but 
neither do they feature very often in a business context, nor in society as a whole.
The most remarkable result regarding animal groups is that research animals
(35%) and wild animals (35%) surpass farmed animals (27%). This is striking
given that all large companies have an impact on farmed animals at least through
the caterers they hire for their numerous restaurants. The truth is that not one
company mentions animals in the context of its restaurant catering. It could
be that the impact on animals through the supply chains beyond the primary 
production process is regarded as too far removed from the core business to be
worth mentioning.
Finally, keeping animals appears to be a much stronger indicator of company 
commitment than selling animal-based food products. There are three possible
experience towards the animals they own, and which are encountered by their
employees daily. Another possible explanation is the fact that companies that own
animals are obliged by law to look after their welfare. And thirdly, companies that 
own animals might be more aware that they could potentially become the target 
of animal welfare groups.
Company commitment
Based on the CAN scoring depicted in Table 1, we can roughly divide the companies 
with very high scores. These are the companies that make several different types 
of statements of responsibility, of different lengths, and on several different parts 
of their websites. Unilever and Procter & Gamble are among them. Of the 200 
companies included in the study, they are the only ones that deal in animal-based 
products and at the same time keep animals (for research). They thus have at 
least two good reasons to feel extra responsible. Nevertheless, they are surpassed 
on the CAN score by Bayer, a company that has good reason to demonstrate 
accountability given that it relies strongly on animal research, its primary products 
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being pharmaceuticals. How then do Nestlé, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, and
Tesco surpass Procter & Gamble? Nestlé includes several lengthy, strong, action-
oriented texts about different animal groups in its Frequently Asked Questions and 
corporate responsibility documents. It shows concern for the pets the company 
produces food for and for the farmed animals it uses for its food products. Here 
the type of product a company manufactures is a strong indicator of displaying a
commitment towards animals. Royal Bank of Scotland links to its pet-insurance 
products extensive texts on how to take good care of companion animals. Tesco 
articulates its responsibility towards farmed animals in high-level documents: 
corporate information, corporate responsibility reports, and a few news releases. 
their own ways of expressing them.
The second group consists of numbers 7-16. These companies all have scores
well above 100. Most of them have very good reason to make statements of 
responsibility towards animals: they either keep animals or they are food retailers 
that sell animal-based products. There are only three exceptions in this group: 
General Motors, USPS, and Aviva. By informing consumers and supporting animal-
friendly initiatives, they display a strong responsibility towards animals somewhat 
beyond the company’s core business (potential road kill, animals in shelters).
The third is a large group, numbers 17-69, which scored 12-95 on the CAN scale. 
What they have in common is that more than one text fragment was found on 
their websites. A minority have more reason to demonstrate commitment, keeping 
animals or being in (animal-based) food retail, but the majority must have other 
reasons to do so. A great variety of texts was found: from the Thai oil- and gas-
producing company PTT mentioning vegetarian and vegan lifestyles in their
magazine, to PepsiCo sharing its animal research supplier policy and information
on its donations to animal charities.
The fourth group consists of those companies where exactly one statement could
be found, numbers 70-94. Their CAN scores vary from 4 to 11. In this group there 
are two (Japanese) food retailers: Mitsui and AEON. The former mentions the term 
‘animal well-being’ in a newsletter to shareholders, while the latter mentions animal 
conclusion must be that companies refer to animals in many different ways and may 
have just as many reasons for doing so. The level of commitment these companies 
display is, however, low considering the fact that they are food retailers.
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The last group consists of those companies that scored 0 (104 of the total 198, listed 
in Table 9). This group does not include any companies that keep animals. This is in 
line with the strong relationship we found earlier between this variable and the CAN 
score. Only two companies are selling animal-based food products: Costco Wholesale 
in the USA and Seven & i Holdings in Japan. Seven & i Holdings has an extensive CSR 
report in which eco-friendly – not animal-friendly – products are mentioned.
It may be clear that the CAN score as a tool is not a measure of company behaviour, 
but merely of the commitment expressed by the company. It is very well possible 
that there is a gap between the two. In addition, the score does not claim to draw 
conclusions about the company impact on the welfare of animals, as it does not 
say anything about the type of activity the company is talking about. A preventive 
activity, for example, could be far more effective than a restorative one.
Ethical approach
The results show that companies refer more often to a consequentialist approach 
than to other ethical approaches. This could be a sign that this approach might 
consequentialist approach bears similarities with the economic system within 
which companies function (Kaptein & Wempe 2002). Trade-offs are possible in 
some companies in this study regarding animals in experiments. Shell formulates 
its dilemma clearly: ‘We recognise the dilemma of balancing potential animal 
suffering against, in some cases, the lack of a reliable alternative to ensure 
that new products are safe for people and the environment. We are working to 
reduce the number of animals used to test our products, to make test methods as 
humane as possible, and to replace animal tests wherever possible’. Or, as General 
Electric puts it: ‘GE is committed to using the smallest number of animals that will 
therapies’. Negotiability can also be found in this Quote from Tesco: ‘Buying and 
selling our products responsibly means [….] that care is taken to minimise the 
impact our products have on the environment. That includes how we: […] establish 
and monitor animal welfare.’
Opportunities
The companies included in this study diverge greatly in their expressed 
commitment to animal welfare: some do not mention animals at all on their 
websites, others expand on public concerns, initiatives they are involved in, 
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measures taken, or results achieved. We found several texts that express
responsibility towards animals, and we found that no company made negative
statements about animals. Still, over half of the companies in this study do not 
mention responsibilities towards animals.
Although texts alone do not reveal how much companies actually do for animals,
more companies could acknowledge animal ethics as a topic of corporate
responsibility by making statements about it. Several companies in Europe and
North America do so already, but many are neglecting the opportunity to make 
their apparent position known in documents on a corporate level. In its eight texts 
on the subject, Exxon Mobil, for example, emerges as a company that seems to take 
responsibility for the impact of its operations on individual animals, sometimes 
structurally, researching the impact of underwater sounds on individual marine
mammals, sometimes incidentally, cleaning, treating, and releasing oil-soaked
animals. It seems to take animal interests into account, but it in its CAN score
it is not a frontrunner company (CAN = 78, No. 19). Statements on actions and
results are published in a corporate online brochure called Arctic Leadership,
but do not appear in other corporate documents on the website. Other statements 
appear on their website in separate documents like company magazines and local 
newsletters.
Recommendations for future research
For future empirical research we recommend in-depth qualitative research within 
companies, for example, to assess how they reached their current CAN score, what 
their considerations are, and how they view their relationship to animals. This 
can help us understand the differences we found in the present study in whether 
and how companies articulate ethical responsibilities towards animals on their
websites. Understanding this would help us to better evaluate the ethical stance
of companies towards animals. It would also help to improve the way companies 
articulate and meet their ethical responsibilities towards animals. By studying 
best and worst practices, for example, their determinants can be traced, common
improve and maintain their commitment. (Two studies were conducted and are
presented in the Chapters 3 and 4.)
Secondly, we recommend a more thorough exploration of the CAN method for 
assessing the expressed corporate commitment to animals. The method would
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impact of the individual factors (level of concern, document type, and length of 
the statement) and how are they related? Can the method be used for smaller
companies than the Global Fortune 200? These are a few of the questions that 
might be further explored.
Further empirical research could also assess the relationship between what 
companies say and what they do. Research into other business-ethical issues has 
shown that there can be a decoupling between companies’ ‘talk’ and ‘walk’ (MacLean 
et al. 2015). Ultimately, what companies do to safeguard animal welfare is most 
important, but what they say is also important. A company communicating what it 
stands for and how it performs makes it easier for stakeholders to hold it to account, 
For this reason, we believe that the manner in which companies formulate their 
statements of responsibility concerning animals is already in part a demonstration 
of their ethical commitment towards animals. This is also one of the reasons we 
have conducted this study. In fact, according to Speech Act Theory and the CCO 
perspective (Communication Constitutes Organizations), some forms of ‘talk’ can 
be seen as action (Schoeneborn & Trittin 2013). These concepts could be applied to
In addition, there is still the question of the relationship between what companies 
say they do, and what they actually do to have positive impact on animals. Is this 
relationship positively linear (the more they say, the more they do); negatively 
linear (the more they say, the less they do); or, for example, curvilinear (companies 
that do the most communicate less in words than the average company since they 
communicate through deeds, and companies that do the least also communicate 
This study also has conceptual implications. As mentioned earlier, the ethical
responsibility of companies towards animals is hardly addressed at all in business-
ethics literature. This study has shown that almost half of the largest companies in 
the world do make statements regarding ethical responsibilities towards animals. 
Several of these companies tell what they do to safeguard animal welfare, and they 
provide information on the impact of their efforts. For example, Volkswagen states 
that it takes measures to prevent a negative impact on animals; General Electric 
Kroger, and Nestlé state that they buy products where animals are treated best; 
Shell and Exxon Mobil state that they help wounded wild animals; Royal Bank of 
2
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Scotland Group states that it designs pet-friendly products and services; Hitachi, 
Siemens, Cardinal Health, Nestlé, and Target state that they support animal
charities that prevent animals from being abandoned or neglected; StateFarm 
states that it applies welfare criteria to company excursions, for example, to zoos 
and circuses; USPS states that it refrains from doing business with companies 
that abuse animals for entertainment; and JP Morgan Chase & Co states that it 
supports organizations that work towards better treatment of work animals and 
good animal retirement facilities. Thus, the question is whether all companies
have an ethical responsibility towards animals (which would imply that half of 
the companies in this study are failing), no company has an ethical responsibility 
towards animals (which would imply that the half that do make statements of 
responsibility are doing more than necessary), or whether there are certain factors 
that determine whether a company does or does not have an ethical responsibility 
towards animals. We will explore this question further in Chapter 5.
In this chapter we advanced some arguments as to why all companies have an 
ethical responsibility towards animals. However, much more work still needs
to be done to further develop and ground persuasive arguments. Assuming all
companies have an ethical responsibility towards animals, it also needs to be
established whether they have the same level of responsibility, or whether there 
are legitimate reasons why the level of responsibility differs among companies.
business ethics and animal ethics.
Recommendations for companies
In this chapter, we presented a CAN scoring method by means of which companies
can gauge the level of their commitment towards animals. We advise companies 
to make their own assessment to determine whether their ethical responsibilities 
towards animals are adequately articulated. Companies whose results have been 
considering their own ambitions, expectations from stakeholders, the arguments
that ground an ethical responsibility towards animals, and what their peers
are doing. Stakeholders can also use the CAN score to evaluate whether a given 
request improvement.
This study offers several avenues for improvement. The CAN score is set up in
a manner that points towards four directions for improvement: (1) the number 
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of statements concerning ethical responsibility towards animals, (2) the level of 
concern expressed, (3) document type, and (4) length of statement. By presenting
information in more places on their websites, in higher-level documents, expressing
higher ambitions, and in greater detail, companies can better articulate their
responsibilities towards animals.
Examples can be taken from this study. In order to increase the number of statements, 
companies can, for example, interview staff members about their private ideas 
about animals or voluntary work involving animals. In this way the company can 
express on a very basic level that animals matter, as some companies in this study do. 
Boeing, for example, does so in its magazine: ‘Most rewarding part of volunteer work: 
Knowing that my contributions make a difference […] to the health and well-being of 
the animals’. Companies can also make corporate staff activities regarding animals 
known, as Shell does in a news item: ‘Shell workers rescue baby great horned owl’. 
Companies can check their products and mention positive aspects for animals. In 
this respect Target mentions simply: ‘NP Set Bath & body is not tested on animals’. 
They can provide extra consumer information, like Royal Bank of Scotland: ‘If you 
they make to animal welfare organizations. Exxon Mobil lists its donations in this 
way: ‘Azle Animal Shelter & Humane Society, Texas: 5,000 dollar’.
A company that wishes to make small positive steps in its CAN score could lift 
animal topics to a higher document level. If product information contains anything 
of relevance to the interests of animals, a news item could be made about it. If 
there has been news about the company taking responsibility for animals, it could 
be included in a responsibility report. If the item is mentioned in a responsibility 
report, it could be incorporated into the Frequently Asked Questions or a policy 
document, like an ethical code.
Before starting to communicate (or communicate better), we would advise 
animals. The position adopted in this study is that companies have an ethical 
responsibility towards animals. But what is the view of company management? 
Do they acknowledge the moral status of animals? Do they view animals as 
stakeholders and, if so, which animals does the company regard as its current 
and future stakeholders? Chapter 5 can provide inspiration. Articulating the 
company’s ethical responsibilities towards animals would therefore be a fruitful 
start in integrating animal ethics into the ethics of business.
2
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study of drivers and challenges of animal ethics in large Western-Europe-based 
food companies. This is done through in-depth interviews with managers who
are responsible for animal welfare policy in combination with analysis of written
documents. We present a model that shows how in these companies ‘leadership’,
‘partnership’, and ‘championship’ are crucial drivers for a positive change for animals.
By strengthening these phenomena, all stakeholders can accelerate the change toward 
a more widely felt corporate responsibility towards animals.
This chapter is based on Janssens, M.R.E, Van Wesel, F. (2018). Leadership, Partnership
and Championship as Drivers for Animal Ethics the Western Food Industry. In: A.
Linzey & C. Linzey (eds.), Ethical Vegetarianism and Veganism. Routledge, London,
pp. 276-290. We are grateful for comments received when the article was presented 
Animal Ethics Summer School 2016 on The ethics of eating animals.
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Today, concepts like Corporate Social Responsibility and Triple P or ‘People,
people, nature, animals, and sustainability of the planet and its ecological and social
systems. Business ethics offers extra food for thought, not only for philosophers,
seems to have ignored the ongoing debate about the moral standing of animals 
(Janssens & Kaptein 2016, Van Liedekerke & Dubbink 2008). Furthermore, 
Janssens and Kaptein (2016) found that some multinationals extensively express
responsibilities towards animals, whereas others do not mention animals.
Although keeping animals and being part of the animal-derived food industry 
are both factors that correlate positively with expressed commitment to animals,
this does not account for all differences.
The Business Benchmark on Farm Animal Welfare 2017 (Amos & Sullivan 2018)
the recognition of farm animal welfare as a business risk, the recognition of farm
animal welfare as a strategic opportunity, customer and client demand, and
lack of customer willingness to pay for higher farm animal welfare, costs and
investments needed, and a lack of awareness of the wider business and marketing
more knowledge is needed about the drivers and challenges companies and their
corporate responsibility managers (RMs) encounter with regard to animal welfare.
Based on the above and on the aim of this thesis to explore what drivers help
companies to adopt a responsible stance towards animals, the research question
of this study is: What are the drivers and challenges for large Western-Europe-based 
food companies to take responsibility for animals? Answering this question will 
not only explain differences between companies; at the same time, it will offer
companies and their stakeholders tools for change. We chose the term ‘drivers’ for
stimulatory factors because it is a common term in managerial literature (Amos &
Sullivan 2018, Mauser 2001), and the term ‘challenges’ for obstructive factors, for
reasons of positive framing: a challenge is surmountable. To explore the drivers
and challenges RMs encounter, we conducted a qualitative study among nine
Western-Europe-based companies producing, processing or selling meat, poultry,
several drivers and challenges and the way they interact.
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This chapter provides a connection between theory and practice. We identify 
drivers and challenges for incorporating animal ethics into corporate responsibility 
large companies hire caterers for their company restaurants, or have impact on 
animals through transport, pollution, development and construction.
This chapter is organised according to the qualitative study reporting guidelines
issue of animal ethics as a theme in corporate responsibility and presented our
research question. In the next section we explore the theoretical background. 
Next, we explain how this study contributes to animal and business ethics theory 
3.1 Theoretical background
In this section concepts that are related to the topic of this study, drivers and 
challenges for the food industry to taking responsibility for animals, are explained
and previous research is presented, as a starting point of the research and as an
analytical lens.
Status quo of the economic system
People have bred and slaughtered animals for ages. In the second half of the 20th
century an industrial system emerged that systematically breeds as many animals
as possible at the lowest possible cost and sells them at the best possible price.
McMullen (2015) argues that the place of animals in our economy is determined 
specialization. It is very hard for individuals to change the system. This is why RMs
may encounter challenges related to the economic system. Rollin (2011) thinks 
it probable that in the heads of those responsible, a positive correlation between 
individual animal welfare and individual animal productivity from traditional
agriculture, was extrapolated to an alleged correlation between overall animal
welfare and system productivity in industrial agriculture.
Schultz and Wehmeier (2010) see competition, regulative norms, professional 
norms, and public pressure as triggers for institutionalization of CSR. One of 
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the regulative norms could be legislation about reporting (Delbard 2008), as
could non-coercive regulations, such as political pressure or the international
CSR guideline ISO 26000 (2010). Castka and Balzarova predicted in 2007 that 
multinationals would adopt this standard to legitimize their policies. It is 
company takes responsibility for animals.
Managerial decision making
It can also be expected that individual (managerial) decision making plays a role. 
managerial decision making about corporate responsibility measures, Hoffman 
institutional resistance can result from resource constraints, fear of the unknown, 
threats to political interests, and habitual distrust.
Organizational culture
Constantinescu and Kaptein (2015) found that under particular conditions,
responsibility awareness of companies and of individuals within these companies 
can be mutually enhancing. The most important condition for that effect to emerge 
is for corporate structure and culture to be disconnected: then there is room for 
doing something better or worse than corporate regulations dictate. However, 
if people in the company act according to culture more than to structure, this 
strengthens the corporate ethical culture.
Ingenbleek et al. (2007) studied four European ‘criteria formulating organisations’ 
of ethical standards for animal welfare. They found that standards are uplifted 
by strong positive shared ethical values and are lowered by negative shared 
values. In addition, norm diversity leads to lower standards in the short term, 
but to more upgrading standards in the longer term. Strong shared values lead to 
more symbolic artefacts which stimulate compliance and innovative behaviour, 
companies.
Collective responsibility and leadership
Isaacs (2011) explores moral responsibilities in the collective context of a company. 
She sees companies as having collective responsibilities because they have 
3
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agency. Professional actions can be seen as contributions to a larger collective act.
Decision-makers bear extra responsibility, because outside their role their actions 
and decisions would not have the same impact. Isaacs concludes that individual 
agency is not absorbed by collective agency, but on the contrary, adds power. At the
same time, an individual agent in the company has to deal with policies, structures,
collective agents: groups that act upon certain moral issues. In fact, she sees a
responsibility to form them. This responsibility can be diminished by vagueness 
about what can be done or by a status quo of wrongful social practice. These are 
all factors that can be expected to be perceived as challenges. In addition, we learn
from Isaacs that when decision-makers are aware of their power, they can take 
individual responsibility and stand up as leaders.
role in corporate ethical behaviour. Angus-Leppan et al. (2010) follow Matten 
and Moon (2008) in making a distinction between implicit and explicit CSR (the
former being collective and embedded in the relations of the political system, and 
the latter being more a voluntary and often strategic choice of the company) and 
explore different forms of leadership. A combination of leadership types can lead
More institutional determinants
Basu and Palazzo (2008) made a study of internal institutional determinants of 
CSR. They distinguish between different kinds of dimensions of sensemaking 
in CSR: cognitive dimensions (identity orientation and legitimacy), linguistic
consistency, and commitment).
points for transition to sustainability in organizations, moving from an inactive
position, through a reactive, and an active, to a proactive one. Drivers that take 
companies from tipping point to tipping point include perception, involvement and
satisfaction of employees, purchasing policy, chain management, organizational
communication, internal coherence between departments, openness to 
stakeholders, the need to set priorities and appointing a manager with excellent 
communication skills.
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four drivers for environmental performance: policy & strategy, communication,
organization structure, and management commitment. To achieve optimal 
environmental performance, the right balance between these four has to be found.
for its potential success: creativity, scalability, responsiveness (being proactive, in
dialogue with stakeholders), glocality (tailor-made adaptations to global solutions)
and circularity (renewability and no waste).
Resuming
animal ethics in the food industry. Nevertheless, the literature we found makes us 
new factors.
moral status of animals, not as a species but as individuals with interests. CSR in 
this chapter is approached as all ethical responsibility of a company beyond what 
is legally required (Carroll 1991).
3
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 82
82
Chapter 3
literature
Authors
Status quo of the
economic system
Industrialization, wrongful 
extrapolation from individual 
animal productivity to general 
animal productivity
McMullen (2015), Rollin 
(2011)
External pressure competition, regulation, 
professional norms, public pressure, 
political pressure,
Schultz and Wehmeier 
(2010), (Delbard 2008), 
Castka and Balzarova
Managerial decisions Internal rewarding systems, fear of 
the unknown, threats to political 
interests, habitual distrust
Hoffman and Bazerman 
(2006)
Organizational 
culture
Shared values, shared norms,
disconnection of corporate 
structure and culture
Constantinescu and 
Kaptein, (2015), 
Ingenbleek et al. (2007)
Taking collective 
responsibility, taking 
leadership
Limitations by vagueness of what 
can be done, wrongful social 
practice, having leadership as a 
personal quality
Angus-Leppan et al.
(2010), Matten and Moon 
(2008), Isaacs (2011), 
Mostovicz et al. (2009)
Other institutional 
determinants
The role of employees, coherence
between departments, openness 
to stakeholders, communication, 
organization structure
Basu and Palazzo (2008), 
Mauser (2001), Van 
Tulder et al. (2014),
Visser (2014)
3.2 Method
The current study is exploratory in nature. Our focus is on the animal-derived
food industry, as that is where large numbers of animals are bred, kept, cared
for, transported and slaughtered. Our methodology is based on grounded theory 
(Boeije 2010, Corbin & Strauss 2015), a research method that has proved to be 
applicable to organizational research (Gehman et al. 2013; Martin & Turner 1986; 
McLean & Behnam 2010; Sonenshein 2009; Treviño et al. 2014).
We studied nine large, internationally operating food companies based in Western
Europe. Western Europe was chosen because it is where we ourselves are based 
(the Netherlands) and because there are signs that Europe is one of the areas where 
animal ethics in businesses is the most developed (Janssens & Kaptein 2016). The
companies were found by searching on the internet for the most important players
in the animal-derived food industry and by asking interviewees for more names
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(snowball method). We invited thirteen companies to participate. Four companies
rejected our invitation. Seven companies are based in the Netherlands, one in the
United Kingdom and one in Switzerland. They all operate internationally and have
opening in 1887) and some relatively new (2007). They are producers, processors,
wholesalers and retailers.
For reasons of data triangulation, we studied the companies’ responsibility reports,
their websites and interviews we conducted with the managers responsible for
animal welfare policy (CSR managers, quality managers, et cetera, in short: RMs).
We used the ‘semi-structured interview’ method, which provides the richest 
source of data for theory building (Boeije 2010, Corbin & Strauss 2015). Each
interview was started with announcing the main topic (drivers and challenges
for their company to take responsibility for animals) and inviting the interviewee
to elaborate on it. At the end we checked our topic list to remind them about topics
we missed. Guiding topics on this list were derived from the theory presented
earlier.10 Trust was created by offering the research plan beforehand by e-mail,
declaring we would use the data anonymously and for research purposes only, and
conducting the interview in person. One interview was done by telephone because
of the geographical distance and the lack of video call options on the part of the
background in both communications and ethics, and 25 years of experience in
journalism and communications. Audio recordings of all the interviews were
transcribed by one of the researchers or an assistant, and in the latter case
checked by one of the researchers. The interviews that were done in person took 
40 to 90 minutes each, with an average of 62. The interview by telephone was
10 Guiding questions and topics for the interviewer during the interview were:
I) How did the company come to integrate, maintain and expand animal welfare in CSR? What are 
stimulating and what are inhibiting factors?
II) What moves the people in the organization to do that, and how do they get others to do it?
III) How is animal welfare communicated internally and externally?
a) View on animals (things, means of production, raw materials, beings, biological systems, 
stakeholders, friends)
b) View on CSR (valid for animals or not, how far should a company go)
c) Ethics (personal norms and values, those of others, business ethics, cultural differences)
e) Economic considerations (costs, business case, competition)
f ) Identity and internal communication (mission, vision, culture, formative aspect of 
communication)
g) Image and external communication (advertising, website, image in media, public pressure 
through campaigns)
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relatively short (24 minutes) because enticing the interviewee to elaborate was 
taken the interviewee through the topic list, the interviewee started to refer to 
written sources on their website.
comparison, and analysis. Three of the interviews were open-coded by both
authors. Inter-coder reliability was high (around 90%) and differences in coding
according to the adapted coding system. All additional text documents (websites 
NVivo (QSR International, Australia). After analysis of the data from the eighth 
participant, saturation occurred, the point ‘where all major categories are fully 
developed, show variation, and are integrated’ (Corbin & Strauss 2015). We decided 
to look for one more participant to be sure, which is recommended in this type of 
research, and after coding the information from the ninth company, saturation was
the codes, restructured them, and investigated relationships between the codes,
3.3 Findings
As a result of the axial coding we created a matrix, based on the ten types of factors
we found (emotional, attitudinal, ethical, cultural, communicative, historical,
levels at which these factors appeared to occur (the RM, the company, external 
organizations, the consumer, and the broader public). We placed all encoded topics
in this extended matrix and looked step by step for meaningful relationships
between the topics, then clustered the topics based on these relationships. Taking a
step back and looking at our data, then going once more through them in detail, we 
once more under three main terms: immobility, dilemma, and slander. We then 
discovered that the solutions that seemed to make these challenges manageable 
could also be clustered into three groups. These respective clusters of drivers we
called leadership, partnership, and ‘championship’. How they are connected to
the company and its surroundings is shown in the model we present in Figure 1.
Leadership of the company, a CEO, the board or at least the RM, is crucial. 
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 85
85
We are the Champions!
Figure 1: Model of interaction between drivers for animal ethics in the food industry
UPPERCASE TEXT = drivers for enhancing the ethical stance of the company towards animals
towards animals
Partnerships with partners inside and outside the production chain are very 
helpful, and so are ‘championships’: ways of externally celebrating moments of 
importance, for example when a goal is set or an achievement is reached. We will
now go through the model and explain the different clusters of drivers, connect 
them to the challenges we encountered, an offer a few illustrative quotes from our 
data: mainly from the interviews (marked RMx), but also some from the annual 
reports (marked ARx), and the websites (marked WSx) we analysed.
Leadership overcomes immobility
A large collection of challenges can be grouped under the term ‘immobility’, 
of the company towards animals, what animals prefer, the special taste of meat, 
3
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is enough’, ‘animal welfare equals animal health’, ‘animal welfare equals animal 
productivity’, ‘animals are lower creatures’, and ‘the farmer represents the
animals’. We will now offer a few examples.
RM1: ‘The farmer is a stakeholder, and that includes the cows and the land and
them, he’s our most important stakeholder, because he’s our stockholder and
our biggest milk supplier, and he knows the best way to do that.’
RM3: ‘If these animals have had a [good] life like that and at a certain point 
get slaughtered, that doesn’t bother me at all, because I like to eat meat, and 
that is the purpose of those animals. That’s what meat production is.’
RM5: ‘A huge aspect of meat is that it represents some of the cosiness of 
eating together. It has a huge social side. At parties we almost always eat 
meat. Barbecuing is a meaty thing. Now there’s Christmas: eating together 
and doing things together says something about those you visit, and is socially 
very important. It’s a way of living together, as is the case in many cultures.
Traditionally, meat plays a very important role.’
Immobility can take the form of seeing animal welfare as the exclusive concern of 
the RM, of feelings of powerlessness of the RM, of a reward system with a short-
term sales focus, and of clinging to a traditional money-driven culture in which
there is no room for compassion. External factors of immobility we encountered
in our data are the capitalist system, the public’s prejudices, strictness of animal 
welfare label requirements, rigidity of NGOs, or entrenched stakeholder values
originating from historical, geographical, national or cultural differences. Here are 
RM2: ‘Ultimately, I think the commercial side is still winning. (…) But after
all, we’re in a capitalist system, and money’s important. (…) Every morning,
our Category Managers look at yesterday’s margins.’
RM6: ‘[Some NGOs] actually want people to stop eating meat. (…) If you want 
to improve things, then you have to make sure what you want to do is realistic, 
and not be too extreme with new standards.’
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These different types of immobility can be overcome by leadership. RMs can, for
example, play the devil’s (animals’) advocate within the company about potential
commercial success, or offer an ethical decision-making framework that can be
used in the event of arguments.
RM8: ‘The main obstacles were, indeed, the targets of our commercial
colleagues. They have to be overcome. That surely took us a few meetings to
do. Deciding these things together doesn’t happen overnight.’
RM5: ‘I (…) also wrestled for a long time over which decision-making
framework to use. Ultimately, I made it very simple: if I can’t explain it on
the Alexanderplatz in Berlin, in Soho in London or on the Dam Square in
Amsterdam, we won’t do it.’
It appears to be helpful if the RMs are sensitive to trends and future issues, eager
to learn, and open to new ideas, such as the idea that animals are individuals with
their own needs, or that they can be stakeholders. This was one of the answers to
the question whether animals could be stakeholders:
RM2: ‘I think so, because we see suppliers as stakeholders as well. But then
you would actually have to see products as stakeholders as well. (…) But then
could do that by ways of research.’
Although RMs are aware that within the company their own commitment to animal
leadership stance seems stronger if they encounter animals now and then, and
if they are respectful and empathic towards animals, but also to people. In the
following example the RM is connecting to farmers by translating animal suffering
to a case involving children.
RM7: ‘[I ask them:] Let’s say thirty school kids take a bus trip, and three of 
them get out with a broken arm. Is that normal?’
As is shown in Figure 1, a CEO, the board, or the company as a whole, can take 
leadership as well. The company can commit itself to an ethical approach to
animals, eventually as part of CSR policy. It can communicate this stance, quantify 
animal welfare or create demand for products with higher animal welfare. In
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general, a proactive attitude appears to be helpful, as well as real engagement, 
true involvement, and corporate pride in animal welfare.
RM8: ‘If we’re talking about people, animals and the environment, the 
principles of our CSR policy, but also how we see our formula, then [animal 
welfare] is a part of that.’
RM4: ‘We’re not having people here who are animal welfare advocates on
personal or emotional grounds, no, it’s a fully accepted, and, of course, an
integrated element of our sustainable-agriculture approach.’
RM3: ‘Targets are also there to show your buyers that you’re more than
someone doing simply what they ask from you. I think that’s also becoming
more and more important… some authenticity, some honesty, openness about 
what you do.’
Organizational communication helps spread information and pride through the 
company (see also Chapter 4). Extra optimisers are innovative ideas, short lines 
of communication, discussions with employees, and budget. Here is an example
of innovation:
All employees are asked to participate. (…) This year one of the challenges 
change case with our sustainable agriculture sourcing activities (…); [animal
welfare] could be an element there. [Employees could also] sign up to visit 
one of our pig farmers. (…) Because our experience is: if you take people with
you, then it comes alive.’
The leadership stance can be translated into goals, projects and programs,
companies explore new markets and look for new solutions to practical problems. 
They invent new rewarding systems, spread sales risks over different food 
categories (for example: sell vegetarian alternatives as well), conduct research on 
animal housing, or focus on value creation. They make animal welfare a business 
case, for example by building animal welfare into the cost model, choosing quality 
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markets, or calculating the extra productivity of animals that live longer. The
general line in these drivers is an open attitude and a willingness to anticipate
and change, which is expressed by the following example:
RM2: ‘Recently, [our CEO] made a wonderful statement. He said: ‘Sometimes
we just have to take certain steps to create market share. That means we 
advantage for suppliers, so that they can start to produce cheaper, and we can
go to a lower price level.’
Partnership overcomes dilemmas
balance, for example between strategies or competing values. Should we go for a
low-price or a high-quality reputation? Are we going to invest in animal friendly 
production systems or in a reputation campaign? Shall we take risks or play it 
safe? Are we going to choose for free range systems or should we concentrate on 
minimizing emissions? Do we engage in a money-making culture or a responsibility 
culture? Will we be taking small steps or do we want to provoke radical change? 
Shall we use idealistic or commercial arguments? Do we accept being paternalistic 
or should we respect the autonomy of others more?
WS7: ‘[Company] is standing in the middle of society that demands a well-
balanced equilibrium between people, animals, the environment and 
differs from consumer expectations, that is not responsible environmentally 
speaking, and that is absolutely not competitive. So, you always should look 
to produce with animal welfare, or, my product was produced without any 
concern for animal welfare. There is always a gradation of animal welfare 
in it.’
AR8: ‘[Brand] will establish the balance between people-animal-environment 
per group of fresh products. We will do this on the basis of criteria and
corresponding assurance.’
3
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RM8: ‘Finally it’s about someone else’s KPIs, (…) our commercial colleagues, who
at their goals. (…) I try not to be into it in an idealistic way, so, [more] with a 
commercial lens. Otherwise you’re not going to make it in the discussion.’
cannot always say: these are my ideals, and I want to work towards those.’
Operating internationally, companies encounter the dilemma of imposing
national or European standards on suppliers, or accepting foreign standards. The
materiality analysis, an assessment of the company’s most important responsibility 
issues, plays an important role, but also creates dilemmas when many issues are
animals.
RM3: ‘For example, how can you tell if an animal’s in pain? That’s always tricky 
for me. And everyone has an opinion about it.’
RM3: ‘In Ireland you have these calves, which are with the mother, and which 
are taken away after six months. That is a critical process in the sense of, well,
side. Then the calves can still walk back and forth. And at some point, the gate
closes and during a period of two weeks… well, there’s a whole process so that 
they don’t have too much stress as a result. That sounds super responsible.
The reaction of someone at [our retailer’s]: Gosh, how awful that they do that 
So we all have our own ideas about that.’
RM2: ‘Now you have the Meadow Milk, which says: animals have to go outside, 
because we have decided that, and as humans we think that animals are best 
off that way... But when you start talking to farmers, those farmers say: those 
animals, those cows, do not want to go outside at all, they prefer to sit inside,
because inside it is warm, they have good food, they have space – I really have 
to chase my cows out to be able to meet [the requirements of] that Meadow 
Milk. So what often happens is that the stable door is opened, and they do
not want to go outside at all. That is not entirely the case at the beginning of 
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special. So, then the question is, what does an animal want? But I’m sure that 
if I would ask a broiler chicken, philosophically speaking: gosh, do you want 
to live in a stable with 40,000 others or do you prefer a Rondeel farm where
you can walk around and make your own way?, I know what he will choose.’
Partnerships with other parties, as shown in Figure 1, are crucial for tackling
these complex dilemmas and the numerous practical problems that come with it,
demand while taking the life cycle of animals into account. Partnerships make
it possible to exchange knowledge and do a well-informed materiality analysis
in which choices between different options can be made, or choice can be made
about their animal welfare achievements are those who take part in extended
partnerships, with mutual trust and understanding.
RM2: ‘For example, we work with the Consumer Goods Forum. (…) That’s an
organization, 400 retailers and manufacturers are associated, and they also
do a lot of research. (…) Actually, it’s how we try to signal all the trends, and
work them into our policy.’
thousand euros to be able to deliver in this segment. A daylight system has
to be applied in the stables. Straw bales have to be added. Other enrichment 
perhaps twenty million euros of investments needed to start even a very small
chain. This is only possible if you work together very well in a partnership. If 
[the retailer] says: ‘It’s a nice idea’ for now, but, uh, not any more in two years, 
then we all have huge disinvestments, which we, the slaughterhouse or the
poultry farmer, cannot bear. So, you have to issue very good agreements about 
down. Because there’s a fairly long-lasting relationship and [the retailer] has
always presented themselves as a trustworthy partner. And we’ve tried to
do the same.’
Partnerships with suppliers offer companies some security and empower them to
change. Farmers tend to appreciate values like naturalness, craftsmanship, respect 
for animals, and reciprocity between farmer and animal. Acknowledging these
values in the partnership is helpful.
3
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RM1: ‘We’re not going to tell farmers how to take care of their cows or 
dictate the size [of the stall] or what kind of bedding they have. Farmers can 
[determine] that much better than we can. (…) It’s almost patronizing to ask 
them to. (…) It’s so much part of their skills and their passion for farming,
that it’s almost a question of [laughs]: how dare you, why would you think I 
wouldn’t care about that?’
Broad partnerships can also include governmental organizations.
RM1: ‘Then the Ministry of Economic Affairs says: We actually want to look at 
what’s possible; could we do a project about it? Then we and the Agriculture
and Horticulture Association become the mouthpiece, for the dairy farmers
too.’
Partnerships with researchers can be drivers too. RMs appreciate evidence for
their decisions. Research can end discussions, show the way out of dilemmas and 
reveal animal preferences.
RM4: ‘So then I started setting it up from the role of sustainable agriculture
for [Brand] and, uh, quickly contacting [University], of course, the experts. A
fairly academic approach. In the opinion of the [Brand] headquarters [it was]
totally over the top, because they wanted it to be all nice and fun. I said: Well,
if you want to be distinctive here [in this country], it needs some back-up.’
The collaboration with NGOs ranges from participation in the materiality analysis
awards. RM’s mention as positive factors an open dialogue, and personal leadership
of NGO directors.
RM2: ‘So in terms of people: yes, [name] is the director there, and he is, of 
course... He comes to our stakeholder events and talks to a lot of people, so 
he’s the face of the NGO. There is, of course, a whole organization standing 
behind him. And you see that these two different approaches... For us as a 
company it is much more pleasant to work with [this NGO]. And we are much 
more inclined to say: ‘No, we are going to cooperate, and we do see the win-
win situation in it’, than with [another NGO].’
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Finally, companies can combine leadership and partnership by starting to work 
with new partners.
us understand better the external landscape and to target our assets. (...)
We have been working with [NGO]. They’ve been helping us in terms of 
implementation, and also helping us formulate a vision. (...) It was at that 
animal welfare NGO.’
Championship overcomes slander
The third crucial element in Figure 1 is ‘championship’, which overcomes the third 
type of challenges we found, clustered around the concept of slander. Slander from 
will see later, a critical stance is accepted and is even experienced as an important 
driver, but, on the other hand, prejudices, extreme demands, and strong unfounded 
opinions from critics have a negative effect on the willingness of the company to 
make a change.
RM6: ‘Then you do a tour through the store and there are people from [an 
NGO], and then it appears, for example, that they have never been to our 
stores before. Then I think to myself: how can you cry wolf, while you yourself 
know nothing? They were surprised at what we all did as a supermarket 
organization. They had no idea at all. I think that’s a bad thing (…) It can 
also be immensely annoying if NGOs make statements on TV without any 
substantive knowledge.’
RM8: ‘Some NGOs take a harder stand than others (...) There’s something going 
on now (...) that can have a pretty disruptive effect. While you’re sticking 
your neck out as a retailer in so many ways, and you’re really serious and 
committed, it can work against you at the point it gets unpleasant. And that 
absolutely has a huge impact on the people involved (...) Then it’s not a positive 
energy (...), but more a negative energy.’
traditional or social media, by which the general public can be reached as well as 
the consumer. Here NGOs play an important role too, because they can share an 
3
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animal welfare item on a trustworthy basis. Media and NGOs can help companies
celebrate their achievements through awards, reports, events, and news items.
RM4: ‘The moment we have again reached a big milestone, of course we
communicate that, internally and externally.’
WS7: [Company] has received the so-called [Award] (…). This prize was 
awarded for [our] unique free-range chicken chain by [NGO]. In [year],
[Company] developed a new farming concept for broilers with a number of 
broiler farmers and [other NGO]. This animal-friendly initiative has also laid
the foundation for [animal welfare label].
Critical questions asked directly to the company via the media are supportive too.
RM2: ‘[This NGO] raises a very loud voice, with harsh commercials. And on
the one hand they have enticed us to (...) ultimately improve the chicken shelf, 
because internally we started seeing: Right, we can’t go on like this, there is
a need for sustainability, for improvement. That happened on the basis of a 
steps, but they did contribute to that process.’
themselves in it. Publicly expressed ethical demands (transparency, integrity, 
accountability, traceability of products, naturalness of food, welfare) are extra
drivers for companies to take action.
RM2: ‘People know more and more about it, and so they’re asking more 
questions, and you have to have answers ready.’
Related to the concepts of slander and championship is the risk of reputation
damage as a driver. Publicity on genuine positive achievements can be a buffer to
future reputation damage. In the following example, the company shows pride in 
the way they tackle slander from a television documentary together with an NGO,
and turn it into something positive.
WS5: ‘The [NGO] and [Company] had intensive discussions about the
allegations regarding the [animal welfare label] in [the documentary]. The
joint conclusion of these talks was that the interests and the reputation of the
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[label] are of key importance to all those concerned with this ‘animal-friendly’
meat. For that reason, the [NGO] is instigating an independent external
investigation. As a holder of the [label], [Company] wholeheartedly supports
regarding the reliability of its internal production processes and the [label].’
3.4 Discussion, conclusions, and recommendations
We sketched a model of the central drivers for taking animals into account 
ethically. The most important drivers that help overcome challenges we found, 
based on the clusters of information we derived, we called leadership, partnership 
place, leadership from the company or the decision makers in it, including the 
RM, is important. What helps as well is the second element: partnerships with 
other companies, governmental organizations, research institutions, individual 
researchers, NGOs (sometimes in combination with leadership). Thirdly, 
‘championship’ is helpful: showing and celebrating positive steps or achievements
of the company, for example as leaders and partners. These interactions with 
the public or the consumer, through media, eventually organised together with 
partners, have a positive impact too, and can relate back to marketing decisions 
in the company through consumer behaviour, which in its turn can stimulate 
its leadership. In Figure 1 the three elements and the way they can interact are 
outlined.
from our data. We saw how a money-driven culture (McMullen 2015) and a short-
term sales focus (Hoffman & Bazerman 2006) can be challenges. These and many 
other challenges for companies we encountered in our data, can be overcome by 
taking leadership (Isaacs 2011, Mostowicz et al. 2009, Visser 2014), initiating 
collectives (Isaacs 2011, Rotter et al. 2013, Visser 2014), and paying attention 
to the purchasing and supply chain as well as to organizational communication 
(Van Tulder et al. 2014) and intra-organizational communication (Mauser 2001).
(2001). Strategic market opportunities and stakeholder expectations appear 
3
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(2018), just like competition, regulative norms, professional norms, and public
pressure, found as well by Schultz and Wehmeier (2010). Identity, accountability 
traces of the mutually enhancing effect of responsibility awareness of corporations
and of individuals within these corporations (Constantinescu & Kaptein 2015), 
welfare policy.
In our data political, legislative (cf. Delbard 2008), and employee (cf. Tulder et al.
based on the topic list. We have tried to explain this. It is conceivable that they 
remained implicit because they were not mentioned explicitly in our topic list.
On the other hand, neither was public pressure, which was mentioned by several
data sources. Another explanation is that it is possible that other CSR issues are
(or were) higher on the public and political agenda than impact on animals.
welfare would equal animal productivity (Rollin 2011). Additionally, we found
welfare equals animal health’, ‘animals are lower creatures’, and ‘the farmer 
that can be overcome by taking leadership.
Though most of the individual challenges and drivers we found seem applicable to
other CSR topics as well, the total of the model as we found it, is strongly related to 
the position of animals in the food industry as vulnerable living creatures, locked
away from the public, not acknowledged as stakeholders themselves (whilst very 
much is at stake for them), unable to tell us in words what they experience. This 
combination of characteristics is not applicable to other stakeholders of CSR, like
people, who have a voice, or the environment, which can be seen and experienced 
every day. Eventually a comparison with children in child labour could be tenable.
Those RMs who feel responsible for animal welfare, in surroundings where a
different culture prevails, have a tough job in letting the voice of animals be heard. 
Our model might help them and other parties to strengthen their case.
The small number of rather diverse companies in our study is one of its limitations.
in the same industry, and by proceeding till saturation was reached. Secondly, we
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realize that our discussion of championship as a driver to overcome slander is
of championship overcoming it (fully or partly), than references to the other topics,
but we treated this evidence in the same way: we offered a variety of ways in
which this issue was expressed, including a few illustrative examples. Because
qualitative research can never lead to quantitative claims, we presented this pair
as an equally useful result. We recommend further research be done into this topic
the weight of the drivers we found. Secondly, it would be helpful to explore the
complex role of animal welfare NGOs, who on the one hand put off companies by 
naming and shaming, and on the other hand achieve changes. In this light, a more 
thorough analysis of the role of communications would be useful. We will take a
Our recommendation to RMs and companies in the food industry would be that,
on the basis of our model, they explore how they can make progress through 
leadership, partnership, and championship. This can be done by, amongst others,
exploring how the numerous examples we gave in this chapter apply to their own
company.4
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an attitude of responsibility towards animals in companies in the animal-based food 
industry. It shows that a manager who is made responsible for animal welfare can 
one is to connect with stakeholders within and outside the company. The second way is 
to facilitate, as a moderator, communicative connections between these stakeholders 
in which the manager is not involved per se. In both cases, if these connections 
because in that way insight, trust, and collaboration are gained and sustained. We 
present a model outlining all supportive communicative connections, a summary of 
communication channels that are used to effectuate them, and practical advice for 
managers.
This chapter is based on Janssens, M.R.E., Van Wesel, F. (2019). Connecting parties 
for change, A qualitative study into communicative drivers for animal welfare in the 
food industry. Food Ethics, 3: 5-21. We are grateful for comments received when the
article was presented in Vienna at the EURSAFE 2018 conference on Professionals 
in Food Chains, ethics, roles and responsibilities.
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Communication by companies plays an important role in CSR (Golob et al. 
2013). Without communication, customers or corporate buyers would have no 
extra stimulus to buy responsibly produced products or services. On the other 
hand, CSR communication can lead to accusations of ‘greenwashing’ and ‘window 
dressing’, even if the communication is honest and accurate (Schlegelmilch & 
Pollach 2005). Fear of this type of accusation may be one of the reasons for doing 
the opposite and keeping silent about a decent CSR performance (Mauser 2001;
Nielsen & Thomsen 2009), a phenomenon we propose to name ‘window blinding’.
Communication with internal and external stakeholders is of importance for CSR in 
several ways and on several levels. CSR communication studies so far have focused
merely on communication with consumers and other external stakeholders (Golob 
at al. 2013). Communication is not only supportive of CSR, it can also trigger 
responsibility (expression is followed by action) or be an act of responsibility itself 
by virtue of its performative role (Schoeneborn & Blaschke 2014; Schoeneborn & 
Trittin 2013). Writing on a website that animal welfare should be taken seriously, 
for example, is a way of taking animal welfare seriously (Janssens & Kaptein 2016). 
In addition, communication can lead the right employees to the right company. 
Jobseekers and employees increasingly value the CSR achievements of companies 
(Grayson 2010; Rodrigo & Arenas 2008), and therefore want to be informed in 
order to make the right career choices. Finally, and in addition to these topics 
of public communication, it has been argued that organizational values can be 
integrated in organizations through (internal) organizational communication,
for example by writing about them in vision documents that are shared with 
employees (Begley & Boyd 2000).
Animal welfare is a rather special CSR issue. In business ethics literature, it is a
relatively new and unexplored topic, and in business practice it appears to be a 
blind spot for many (Janssens & Kaptein 2016). In a previous exploratory study 
(Janssens & Van Wesel 2018) we presented a model for explaining differences 
between companies in the food industry regarding the corporate responsibility 
they take for animals. In the present study, we build on data from that earlier 
study to deepen the topic of communicative drivers and will therefore explore the
role of communication in gaining and strengthening an ethical corporate stance 
and CSR communication by exploring how the topic of animal welfare acquires, or 
advice to those who are involved in this aim.
4
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We are zooming in on communicative drivers because communication is an
instrument that is relatively easy to handle and that is already there in practically 
any company. It does not require extreme innovations. A few points of attention 
and practical adaptations can make the beginning of a change or strengthen an 
to corporate responsibility for animals in the food industry.
The research question of this study is: What factors of communication help food 
companies to take responsibility for animals, and how do these factors interact?
Answering this question will also help answer one of the sub-questions of this
thesis: What factors of communication help companies to adopt a responsible stance
towards animals? We take as a starting point the Laswell Formula for ethical 
communications: Who says what to whom in which channel and with what effect?
(Schlegelmilch & Pollach 2005). In this case we start from the effect: we will look 
towards animals. In addition, we focus on who and in which channel, so that we can
explore the routing of the communication. Analysing the content (what) is beyond 
the scope of our research question, aside from our starting point that the content 
relates to animal welfare.
We looked into Western food companies because they are relative frontrunners in 
taking animal welfare into account (Janssens & Kaptein 2016). In these companies, 
clearly. In addition, there is the fact that qualitative data were available. We will 
elaborate on this reuse of data in the next section. In the third section we will 
4.1 Method
In this exploratory study, we use part of the data from a former exploratory, 
qualitative study, collected in 2015 and 2016 during nine interviews with 
managers who were made responsible for animal welfare, whom we called 
RMs (Responsibility Managers), of 9 large (1000+ employees), internationally 
operating, Western-Europe based companies in the animal-based food production
chain (Janssens & Van Wesel 2018). The companies were producers, processors, 
wholesalers and retailers. The methodology used was based on grounded theory 
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(Boeije 2010, Corbin & Strauss 2015). We searched online and in real life for 
directed to new companies by asking the interviewees for potential participants 
(snowball sampling). In total, we invited thirteen companies to participate. Four 
companies rejected our invitation. Within the sample of nine, seven companies 
were based in the Netherlands, one was based in the United Kingdom and one in 
Switzerland. The RM could be the CSR manager, the quality manager, or any other 
manager, but in all cases there was a manager who was responsible for animal 
use of data, trust was created.
The interviews were semi-structured using an interview guide, which provides 
the richest source of data for theory building (Boeije 2010; Corbin & Strauss 
2015). In each of the interviews, information on communicative factors was 
given spontaneously as well as by answering open questions. The length of the 
interviews was 40 to 90 minutes. The interviews were done in person by one of 
the researchers, who had more than 25 years of experience in journalism and 
communications. One interview was done by telephone. All interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim. For reasons of data triangulation, we combined 
the interview data with data from the companies’ CSR reports and their websites. 
Data were entered in NVivo and analysed in a cyclical process of interviewing, 
details about our method, see Chapter 3.
For the study reported here, which focuses on communication, we re-analysed 
the complete data set with a strong focus on communicative factors that were 
mentioned as positive drivers for a responsible stance of the company towards 
animals. Because of our focus on communication, we added extra data from social 
media as an extra (fourth) data source. We checked the companies on the most 
Instagram. We read the companies’ posts, going back several months (the exact 
number of months depending on the frequency of the posts, varying from two to 
twelve), looking for information on animal welfare. By comparing and analysing 
explained to the RMs by email, asking them whether they recognised it from their 
practices. Their comments were incorporated in our discussion and conclusions.
4
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4.2 Findings
We found several communicative factors that appeared, based on the data, to
enhance the level of responsibility for animals taken by the company, which we
called drivers. By grouping these drivers, and drawing communicative connections 
between the stakeholders involved, we could design a model illustrating how these
elements interact. This model is shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, we made an 
inventory of the communication channels involved in each of the communicative
connections in the model. This inventory is shown in Table 11.
Figure 2: Communicative connections functioning as drivers for corporate responsibility for 
animals in the food industry
SOCIETY
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RM = Responsibility Manager (CSR manager or any other manager responsible for animal welfare)
UPPERCASE TEXT + icon = stakeholder involved in communication
Red or dark arrow = driver in the form of a direct communicative connection with the RM
Green or light arrow = driver in the form of a communicative connection in which the RM plays 
moderating role
Arrow point = direction of the communication
Dotted lines = borders between companies within the production chain (one stakeholder group, 
but different companies: producers, processors, wholesalers and retailers of different types of 
animals and animal-based products)
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Table 11: Communication channels used by RMs in food companies
Communicative connections Communication channels used
Connections of the responsibility manager (RM) with stakeholders
Intranet, meeting, event, game
Meeting
Event, award, campaign, stakeholder debate
Meeting
Visit, meeting, extranet, newsletter, stakeholder
debate
Connections between stakeholders, in which the RM plays a moderating role
Visit, event
Newsletter, intranet, company website, press
release, social media
public
CSR report, packaging, website, press release, 
social media, traceability system
NGO website, company website, social media, 
joint press release, label
Visit, website
Visit, meeting
combined all positive factors that appeared to enhance corporate responsibility 
for animals from the way they were presented in the data. Therefore, we view our 
model and table as an overview of what works well in frontrunner companies, and 
how these elements could interact if they were all put into practice in a variety 
communicative drivers, all of which can be found in practice. All companies in 
the study use a selection of the connections and channels. Some use many, in 
interconnected combinations, while others use only a few. From here on, when 
we talk about RMs it can mean either one of them or all of them, or any number 
in between. As our study has a qualitative and exploratory design, we do not 
make statements about the quantity
conclusions about how many companies make use of them.
We will now explain Figure 2 and describe each connection (shown as an arrow), 
including the communication channels that are used, as listed in Table 11. In Figure 
2, arrows pointing both ways express a dialogue, while the arrow pointing one
way expresses communication in one direction. Now and then we will illustrate 
4
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our delineation with statements from our data: RMs (marked RM ), annual reports
(marked AR ), websites (marked WS ), and social media (marked SM ).
The RM connecting to stakeholders
As can be seen in Figure 2, the RM connects with several parties, and additionally 
builds connections between those parties. An open, accessible, and sensitive 
as we will see in the following examples. The RM can make direct communicative 
(i) employees and (ii) adjacent departments (management, communications, 
marketing, etc.), outside the company with (iii) NGO’s, with (iv) the government,
and with (v) parties in the production chain. We will now describe some
characteristics of these connections as they emerge from our data, going clockwise
through Figure 2.
For connecting with employees, RMs use channels for dialogue by which they 
can connect directly. Channels we found in our data (see Table 11) are intranet, 
meetings, and live events such as celebrations of milestones. The next citation
offers an example of how this is done, and includes a statement on the integration
of animal welfare as a topic of sustainability. We will touch upon that later.
RM4: ‘We have this external newsletter for stakeholders, that goes to 
employees as well. So in that newsletter we’ve just had a complete issue about 
sustainable farming, including interviews with farmers. And in the former
issue one of the pig farmers was interviewed extensively, who was as well
on the stage during our last stakeholder update event of [our sustainability 
program including animal welfare], together with the brand manager [of a 
separate issue. To us, animal welfare is just one of many topics we are actively 
dealing with. In this way it is included, but it’s not lifted out of a certain setting 
or placed on a pedestal. It is simply integrated.’
It is helpful for the dialogue if an RM is accessible to the people in the workplace. 
Between these communication partners, both channels that facilitate dialogue
and one-way channels are used.
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is positioned. (…) And those people are empowered to stop production. – 
those people are functionally connected to me. The site manager is their 
hierarchical superior, but functionally it’s me. If we disagree, the power of 
decision immediately goes to the next level. And they will discuss it with one 
of my employees who’s in charge of this kind of issues, or with myself. And in 
no time, there is a discussion about whether we think it’s acceptable or not.’
One RM raises awareness about responsibility and sustainability dilemmas for
companies by initiating a game for employees that explores this issue. This way 
the company helps employees understand its dilemmas, including those regarding 
the average employee on corporate decisions is limited, as is illustrated in the
following quote, in which the communication with the majority of employees is
described as being one-way.
RM7: ‘Let’s distinguish between people in the workplace with the knife in 
their hands, who, like, cut into the animals or pluck their feathers, or [handle 
them] in other ways. They know about these [animal welfare] things. There 
one sees differences, one sees developments. But, of course, they are not really 
involved in the direction of the company. (…) [We have] several meetings, 
informal worker meetings. There are ways to communicate these things with 
each other. But, with all due respect for what all the employees do, they are not 
very determinative for these transitions. It’s much more a somewhat smaller 
group of people (…). And as soon as we have chosen that direction, one can 
start to communicate with those people what the changes will be.’
The complexity of animal welfare as a CSR issue, concerning for example
what is best for animals, makes it important for the RM to communicate with
colleagues from adjacent departments in a sensitive way (the next connection in
Figure 2), especially those responsible for reputation, strategy, marketing, issue
management, and product quality, which were all mentioned in the data, including
the management department. A strong connection between the RM and these
departments is a driver for a responsible attitude of the company. If the RM has
a connection with these departments and involves them in the change process,
more can be achieved. One of the RMs describes illustratively how an agreement 
on working with an animal welfare label for chickens came about.
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RM8: ‘That initially was discussed between the CSR/Quality Department,
that’s us, and the Category Manager, the people who are responsible for what’s 
[one should] talk about what [animal welfare] means; what are we talking
about here? And is everyone aware what it means to work with a slow growth
[chicken] breed, and what the impact will be?’
Outside the company, RMs connect with NGOs (see the next connection in Figure 2).
Programs for working together on, for example, meeting the requirements for an 
animal welfare label are helpful for getting companies to take a responsible stance 
towards animals. RMs invite NGOs to stakeholder debates about animal welfare.
Some regularly organize a stakeholder debate or a materiality assessment with 
stakeholders, in which the topic of animal welfare is introduced and discussed. In 
the next statements, the RMs are explaining how the animal welfare strategy of 
the company comes about and is revised now and then.
RM9: ‘When we hold these stakeholder meetings, we do invite the animal 
protection welfarist organizations.’
see as the important issues we should pay attention to. And then ‘animal
health / animal welfare’ just scores high.’
Governmental organizations were not often mentioned in the data. RMs expressed 
the opinion that government regulation at national or European level makes sense, 
but that the sector itself should also have substantial autonomy. Opinions on how
proactive on the one side or reserved on the other side governments should be, 
differ among the interviewees. Communication plays a role, albeit a modest one, 
in the complex relationship between government and company (see the next 
connection in Figure 2). A dialogue, which is effectuated through meetings (Table 
11), is necessary to start innovative programs in cooperation with the government. 
An RM who is willing to join the debate, and is supported to do so by corporate
described:
RM5: ‘The House of Representatives wanted to discuss the stunning of 
slaughter animals. The Association [of the industry] wanted to delegate
people there to explain things on behalf of the industry. Being a frontrunner 
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for animal welfare we [as a company] said: we slaughter more than 50% of 
Dutch pigs, so I’m going to explain it myself.’
There are connections between RMs and companies in the production chain
(Figure 2) which are helpful. In addition to a rather impersonal channel such as
a newsletter, and a quasi-personal channel such as an extranet (a website with
controlled access for partners), live meetings and farm visits are stimulating, 
because they can establish mutual trust and understanding (Table 11). For
example, RMs visit farmers to see how things work from their perspective.
RM4: ‘I myself, through my work and walking around on farms, with boots 
on, talking to farmers, have started to appreciate farming and animal-based 
production systems, and the people behind them. I think they are extremely 
undervalued in society. (…) So, through my work and through the years I 
have started to value all this, and as well the importance of animal welfare. 
Honestly, I think, I wasn’t aware of all that before, because I wasn’t raised on 
a farm. We didn’t really have companion animals. So, it was a rather remote 
issue to me.’
RM directly communicates – in most cases bilaterally – with stakeholders, we will 
now describe communicative connections between stakeholders in which the RM
plays a moderating role.
The RM moderating connections between stakeholders
Apart from communicating with the stakeholders as described above, the RM 
connects stakeholders. We found six connections inside and outside the company, 
in which the RM is involved as a kind of moderator, stimulating stakeholders to 
communicate about animal welfare issues. Again, we will describe them clockwise, 
starting at the left of Figure 2.
RMs sometimes connect employees to parties in the production chain by 
organizing farm visits, based on the view that visiting farms increases employees’
understanding of animal welfare issues.
Because our experience is: if you take people with you, then it comes alive.’
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We have already seen that RMs connect with adjacent departments to work closely 
with them. Through this channel, the RM also initiates and facilitates connections
between those departments and other stakeholders. One of these connections is
that between those departments and other employees. To begin with, employee 
newsletters, for which the RM can offer information on animal welfare issues, are 
put together at the Communications department. The same holds true for part of 
the content on the intranet and on the company’s website. The latter is created for 
the public but is used by employees too. We found no clear examples of employees
responding on animal welfare issues, which is represented by the unidirectional
arrow between adjacent departments and employees in the model. This quote 
RM9: ‘It is widely communicated. We offer public updates on our websites.
As part of our creating shared value, we report. Lots of employees look on 
the websites and it can also be accessed via the intranet, so, yes, it’s there for
people to take advantage of.’
There are many external communicative connections of adjacent departments 
that enhance corporate responsibility for animals. The RM plays a facilitating
role by working together with these departments or providing information. We 
will now proceed with the arrow on top, right from the middle, between adjacent 
departments and the consumer and the public. As already mentioned, websites
are open to the public. They can present animal welfare issues and steps taken by 
the company. One of the corporate websites mentions ‘farm-to-fork transparency’. 
Another one explains the differences between Good Nest Chicken, free-range 
chicken, and organic chicken. Besides their explanatory role, websites contain
press releases about the company’s intentions and achievements. This type of news
can also be published on social media, as is done in this example:
SM2: ‘All [brand, nationality] dairy products satisfy the requirements of 
outdoor grazing.’
Other relevant channels between adjacent departments and the public by which the
RM can stimulate animal welfare topics mentioned in the data are packaging (where 
product information is disclosed), product traceability systems, and integration 
of animal welfare as a topic in overall CSR or sustainability communication. The 
last point was observed in general in the CSR reports we studied, for example. An 
illustrative quote about the use of packaging is the following:
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WS6: ‘To help consumers make choices, [NGO] have developed a simple star 
these stars on [our] meat packaging.
In addition, we found that the connection between these adjacent departments
and the public (including consumers) through these channels helps to establish 
transparency and trust by providing information. The channels are used to make
the complex issue of animal welfare come alive and to receive and answer critical
consumer questions, making this connection a two-way street. One of the annual
reports explains how this connection to the public works, and one of the RMs
illustrates how the reaction of the public plays a role.
AR8: ‘[Company] thinks it’s important that communication about our products 
is honest, open and clear. [Company] wants to help its clients to be sure that 
they can make well-informed choices. [Company] says what it does, and does 
what it says. Integrity and trust are important values of our cooperation 
with suppliers. This applies as well to consumer communication. If claims 
checked beforehand, to guarantee that products really match these claims. If 
possible, [company] works with licensed inspection bodies and labels. In some 
inspection body in cooperation with parties involved. In the horsemeat chain, 
for example, [company] has started to do its own inspections. In addition, 
RM5: ‘A lot has to do with transparency, openness. The consumer pays a lot 
more attention, right? And we have other media, social media. What you see is 
that many changes start after something goes wrong, and the [public] reaction 
to it. That kind of things have a lot of effect.’
Especially if products are being sold with a trusted animal welfare label, it helps
if the label is communicated extensively and at the same time honestly.
RM8: ‘What we haven’t meddled with – I think that’s been our strongest 
weapon – is that we have been communicating based on facts (…). So, we have 
just been very honest about how much space the chicken has. (...) We are not 
going to depict chickens sitting in a wicker basket somewhere in the meadow, 
or something like that. (...) No, welfare really requires factual communication. 
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(...) If you don’t do it well, you’re going to be lynched. And that’s a good thing,
I think.’
Marketing and communication departments use communication channels for
texts or videos on the website. A video on the corporate website (WS6), showing 
a farmer who says how much he loves his animals and enjoys the change to a more 
animal-friendly system, helps to increase trust and partly replaces live farm visits. 
In the next example, the wish to tell a positive story and be authentic at the same 
time stimulates change.
RM3: ‘If you would like to state that in Ireland the cows are always in the
meadow... In winter they’re not in the meadow, right? So, you cannot write 
that down. Marketing would love to tell that story. Well, in that case we’ll have
to make it happen.’
Even food-processing companies, on whom reputation issues may seem to have less
impact because there is no direct consumer contact, are aware of indirect effects
on their reputation. RMs acknowledge that if animal welfare is important to the 
companies next to them in the production chain, it is automatically important to
themselves.
RM3: ‘The retailers we are dealing with are all, let’s say, number one 
companies in their home countries, who put CSR in a high position already. 
So automatically we put it in a high position too. (...) Actually, we don’t really 
like to be in the news. It’s all about our retailer.’
responsible stance towards animals, for example as part of the company’s CSR.
For these NGOs, communicating with the public is an obvious activity (see the next 
arrow, between NGOs and the consumer and the public). They use several channels
to express themselves on animal welfare in relation to the food industry in general, 
positive change by being in close contact with these NGOs and working with them.
They facilitate communication between NGOs and the public, for example about 
products, labels and NGO awards. According to our data, the channels used are 
NGO websites, company websites, social media, joint press releases, and packaging
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(NGOs allow companies who meet their requirements to use their label). This is a 
quote from one of these press releases, which the company also put on its website:
WS7: ‘Animal welfare prize Good Chicken Award for free-range chicken chain
– [Company] received the so-called [award] in [place] on [date]. This prize 
has been awarded to [Company] for their unique free-range chicken chain
by [NGO].’
If a company obtains an animal welfare award for their achievements, the RM can 
help the NGO communicate about it with the public. An RM describes how even a 
‘shaming’ NGO campaign can be used for progress by tuning in on it.
RM4: ‘When you see that animal welfare is what resonates [with the public],
you start working with [label]. That’s what you communicate with the
consumer. (...) We’re also always in contact with [an NGO] internationally,
and received a few awards from them. (…) And locally, we also work with
(...) various NGOs. (...) What happened with [an NGO] and chickens, this ‘pop
offer opportunities. We have long been concerned with animal welfare as an
integral element, but in some materials we are such small players, that we can
hardly be the trigger. But (...) since it’s already on the internal agenda, you can
seize the opportunity of the ‘pop chicken’ campaign to announce your own
switch, and start free riding on the attention, instead of digging your heels
in and being defensive.’
If RMs make their companies join an animal welfare label program, it becomes 
possible for an NGO to share this information through its website and a press 
release. In addition, an animal welfare label can be introduced on product 
packaging. The RM in the following example sees the animal welfare label as a 
communicative tool.
RM6: ‘Five years ago, the [label] came into existence (...), a great tool to make
things known to the consumer.’
In case of collaboration with an NGO, shared press releases about joint actions or 
achievements are issued and exposed on websites.
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WS9: ‘[Company] has announced a major pledge to improve the welfare of 
the farm animals in its supply chain, following the signature of a partnership
agreement with [NGO].’
As animal welfare is strongly demand driven, we observed that companies try 
to make their activities and achievements publicly known through these press
releases, which increase consumer trust by including a partner NGO as a co-sender.
of both naming and shaming of the company by NGOs. Indirectly, RMs can turn a
shaming campaign into an opportunity. One retailer’s website uses the negative 
term ‘pop chicken’ to make its own products stand out positively in comparison.
WS8: ‘From October 2014, the [label] has been on the shelves. The living 
conditions of this chicken are considerably better than those of the current 
basic chicken, or pop chicken. [Label] is a slower-growing breed. The chickens 
live longer, gain less weight, and have more space. In addition, they get 
more daylight, which offers them a natural day-night rhythm. Those are all 
conditions a pop chicken doesn’t have, and which are good for the chicken.
It is [the company’s] ambition to replace all pop chicken on the chicken shelf 
with [label] by 2015.’
the collaboration between the company and the NGO. People in the company can 
feel offended or betrayed. RMs and their colleagues get demoralised if things get 
nasty, for example when excesses of animal abuse are presented as common for 
the industry, or when unfounded criticism is given. But even then, shaming can 
indirectly provoke change, as we see in the next example.
RM2: ‘[This NGO] raises a very loud voice, with harsh commercials. And on
the one hand they have enticed us to (...) ultimately improve the chicken shelf, 
because internally we started seeing: Right, we can’t go on like this, there is
a need for sustainability, for improvement. That happened on the basis of a 
steps, but they did contribute to that process.’
Food scandals outside the reach of the company pose challenges and at the same
time accelerate the overall process of taking responsibility, as they reveal practices
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through the media of which the public and the consumer were not, or hardly, 
aware. And again, RMs turn this challenge into an opportunity.
AR8: ‘During the past few years, several abuse issues in the South American
horsemeat chain have been revealed. A team from CSR and Quality did some
research in the chain of the horsemeat sold by [company]. Luckily they found
none of the practices shown in the documentary. Nevertheless, arrangements
for improvement with our suppliers have been made, to further improve the
well-being of the horses, also during transport.’
We have dwelled for some time on the connection between NGOs and the public and 
the consumers, and will now move on to the next arrow: connecting the production 
chain with the public and the consumer. What holds for employees, holds for the 
latter groups as well: the topic comes alive as soon as one meets farmers and 
their animals in real life. Therefore, RMs initiate participation of chain partners 
in activities such as open-door days. This extends transparency, establishes trust, 
and takes away negative prejudices. On one of the websites it is formulated thus:
WS7: ‘The image that chickens have a bad life, living in small cages, is
persistent. (…) Therefore, more poultry farmers should open their farms to
the public (…) for example on Open Farm Days. It’s important that people see
with their own eyes that chickens have a good life, because only in that case
will they really remember it.’
The bottom arrow in Figure 2 expresses connections between parties within 
the production chain, facilitated by RMs. Views on animal welfare and corporate 
responsibility can vary considerably between chain partners. According to the 
data, trust and mutual engagement are crucial for achieving progress. Both are 
established by live meetings between parties within the chain. Therefore, the 
use of live communication channels, such as visits and other meetings (e.g., focus 
groups, program meetings and strategic sessions), is a positive factor. Sometimes 
communication is embedded in partnerships, to make sure that the chain partners 
meet, connect and collaborate. Once again, the RMs are moderators.
RM7: ‘We take retailers to the farms. We take farmers to the retailers. (...)
We invited our farmers into a session to exchange ideas on issues like health,
welfare, or any issues they are dealing with. And we invite external speakers
to shed a new light on these kinds of issues. Well, it works. And why do we
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do that? Not so much because we want to change the farmers ourselves, but 
because the awareness at poultry farms of [the situation of] market parties 
is very important for getting support for transitions, for improvement, for
change. Conversely, market parties also need to understand very well what 
the problems of daily farm practice are. Only in this way one can jointly search
for improvement.’
4.3 Discussion, conclusions, and recommendations
What 
factors of communication help food companies to take responsibility for animals,
and how do they interact? The positive communicative drivers we were looking
for take the form of communicative connections and communication channels.
They are summarised in our model (Figure 2), in combination with our overview 
of the communication channels we found (Table 11). We found them by analysing 
data from nine semi-structured interviews, the company’s websites, their annual
(CSR or general) reports and their social media posts, looking for references to any 
animals. The interviews were the most informative, as they offered not only 
communicative expressions, but also elaborations and explanations. Nevertheless,
documents and posts also provided useful additional information.
The role of the RM
Our model (Figure 2) and the accompanying table (Table 11) show a network of 
interactions of which elements are used by several RMs and stakeholders. As a
connecting parties around the RM’s own position. Concepts that play a role are 
trust, collaboration, and meeting each other in person, for example in company 
visits and meetings.11 Additionally, more remote channels (and one-way channels)
are used out of habit or for practical reasons, since involving all stakeholders 
extensively in visits and meetings is simply not feasible.
11 One of the interviewees remarked after seeing our results that in their case (a cooperative 
company), the communication with the supplying part of the production chain is of a slightly 
different nature, as their suppliers are co-owners of the company and therefore have a voice 
appeared equally important and were integrated in the overall results and conclusions.
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The RM acts as both a connector and a moderator of connections between others.
Both types of connections involve the same set of stakeholders and therefore can
in some cases intertwine. For example: if the RM organizes an employee visit to
a farm, it is quite natural for him or her to join the group of employees on their
can also keep in personal contact with the farmer. The RM who encourages the
marketing department to provide information to consumers about animal welfare
on the corporate website is likely to get involved in creating content. Note that all
data as drivers.
or the public. This may have to do with the large numbers, but a written text or
a video message could be an option. We have no data that show why RMs do not 
communicate with the public or consumers directly.
Channels
Table 11 shows that many different channels are used for communicating with 
the public (and meanwhile the consumer), such as websites, newsletters, press 
releases and social media, although differences exist between companies. Some 
of these differences can be explained from the position companies have in the 
production chain. For example, it is more important for a retailer to inform the 
public thoroughly than for a processor. Although quantity is not an issue in our 
study, we want to remark that not many references to animal welfare were found 
on the social media channels of the companies. For CSR issues in general, Etter 
(2013) concludes that, fearing the potential negative publicity, companies are 
hesitant to proactively communicate CSR topics on Twitter, although several of 
the companies have solved the paradox of engagement and risk management by 
put forward by the public.
Looking more closely at Table 11, we see that each stakeholder has its own 
appropriate communication channels. Personal contact works out well with 
partners in the production chain and with NGOs. It would probably work with 
consumers and the public too but is not feasible, except during events like Open 
Farm Days. For large stakeholder groups, however, multimedia approaches
such as websites, social media and press exposure via press releases are more 
viable. Sometimes authentic storytelling, as well as tuning in to trends and NGO 
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campaigns with genuine commitment, can work as a substitute for personal
contact in approaching large audiences.
Animal welfare as a topic of CSR communication
welfare as a CSR topic. Du et al. (2010) found a mix of general CSR communication 
channels (reports, Public Relations, websites) and outcomes (trust, awareness,
importance of trustworthiness and transparency, and the link with reputation.
channels that we found. One difference is the relatively personal and reciprocal
character of the communication that we found in our research. This difference 
can be explained by their stronger focus on corporate communication instead
of manager communication. Another explanation may be the complexity of the 
animal welfare issue (Vanhonacker & Verbeke 2014) and the dilemmas it raises, for 
example between animal welfare and environmental issues, or between differing 
positions about what is best for animals (Janssens & Van Wesel 2018). At the
same time, we cannot be sure that these characteristics (personal, reciprocal)
are unique to animal welfare issues. For communication with employees about 
CSR in general, for example, it is in line with Chen and Hung-Baesecke (2014), 
who conclude that managers enhance employee participation in CSR activities by 
participating themselves in them and actively advocating them. Further specifying
the differences between communication about animal welfare and about other CSR 
topics requires additional research.
The success of working with adjacent departments points towards embedding 
animal welfare communication in broader, existing channels of (CSR or other) 
communication within a company. This is in line with what Vanhonacker and
Verbeke (2014) conclude: that incorporating animal welfare in CSR communication 
can be fruitful for the company and its animal-friendly stance. In addition, 
Cornelissen (2004) states that CSR communication needs to be an integrated and
inherent part of business activity. Ross et al. (2015) suggest that many companies
in the agri-food industry still do not use sustainability (including animal welfare) 
strategically, but instead defensively. In this way they overlook opportunities to
use sustainability as a mechanism to build competitive advantage.
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We have indicated that communication with the public and consumer 
communication are supportive of a responsible attitude of the company towards 
Theuvsen (2016). Taking the limited consumer knowledge of food production 
into account, they state that it is important for a company to share its view on the 
process, in order to increase transparency, knowledge, trust and reputation. The 
and Pollach (2005), and especially for the food sector by Gössling (2011) and 
that stakeholder pressure is a strong motivator for CSR in agribusiness, as do 
a CSR topic.
Limitations of this study and recommendations for further research
We realize that our study is of an exploratory nature, and that the small number 
of participants is a limitation. We stopped interviewing when saturation in the 
diversity of topics occurred, which means that some of the drivers we found 
were only experienced by one or two of the interviewees. Thus, we cannot make 
statements about the strength or frequency of the drivers found. Therefore, we 
characteristics of animal welfare as a CSR issue. Another limitation of this study is 
that it does not offer all possible drivers for animal welfare. Despite the saturation 
effect, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that additional interviewees 
could have surprised us with new channels, or that there are several potential 
channels or connections that have been overlooked by the industry and have 
new communication channels and communicative connections is therefore 
recommended. Furthermore, it is possible that the RM plays a less central role 
and only looks more central because of the relatively high weight of the interviews 
of the data we were looking for communicative drivers for an ethical stance of 
the actual performance in terms of animal welfare. Nevertheless, we think we have 
revealed a model that draws a useful picture of communicative drivers around the 
RM, inside and outside the company.
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In our exploratory study, we cannot make statements about strong causal relations 
between communicative drivers and a responsible corporate stance. What we have 
shown is in which ways RMs with a relatively responsible attitude take a central
role in a web of communicative relations that are potential drivers of corporate 
responsibility for animals, at least from their own point of view.
take a responsible stance towards animals, has led us to focus on companies that 
do express themselves on animal welfare and therefore appeared to have linked 
responsibility for animal welfare to one of their managers. This is a limitation 
as well. Our data offer no options for comparison with companies who have not 
done so.
2012, Vidales et al. 2012) it was interesting to observe that they were hardly 
mentioned in any of our data sources. Sometimes they were implicitly included in
terms like stakeholder debate and materiality assessment. We did not explicitly 
ask RMs to elaborate on investor communication, and RMs did not mention them
spontaneously. Therefore, investors are not included in our model. An explanation 
of their relative absence in the data may be that they are beyond the scope of the 
RM and thus are more remote.
Applicability of the results
relation to other more common CSR topics. Although our study focused especially 
on animal welfare in the food industry, we think the odds are high that the drivers
we found can be translated to other CSR topics and industries as well, as was 
argued above in the light of CSR communication literature. Nevertheless, the 
strength of each driver will depend on several aspects of each topic, such as how
common it is and where the company stands on the topic. Therefore, on the one 
play an important role in, for example, child-labour issues in the production chain,
and that site visits could accelerate processes by creating understanding. We also 
think that openness, accessibility, and sensitivity are positive characteristics of 
any responsibility manager working on a CSR issue. At the same time, we think 
that the issue of animal welfare in the Western food industry is so urgent and so
relatively new that it reveals communicative drivers more easily than other topics
in other industries would have done.
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For the issue of animal welfare, we conclude that there is much that companies 
and their RMs can do to strengthen a responsible stance of the company by 
communicating. For example, they can share information in their reports, organize 
farm visits, talk about their goals and achievements on social media, and work 
towards an animal-friendly reputation by showing the trusted face of the farmer 
who state that any company can express its responsibility for animals, at least by 
showing it more clearly on its website.
Our list of communication channels offers plenty of tools for RMs to enhance a 
responsible corporate stance towards animals. We recommend that from this list, 
they extract ways to take the corporate stance further by using the communicative 
drivers (both connections and channels) described in this model. We also want to 
repeat that we are showing the cumulative connections and channels that are used 
by the RMs of the frontrunner companies in our study, and that none of them uses 
the complete set. This means that RMs of any company can derive new ideas from 
our model and overview. For the convenience of the reader, we have summarised 
our recommendations for RMs and their companies below.
First, if no manager is responsible for animal welfare yet, make it the explicit 
responsibility of the CSR manager, the quality manager, or any other manager 
opportunities for connecting with stakeholders, and the six opportunities for 
facilitating connections between stakeholders, that can function as drivers for 
a company’s taking a responsible attitude towards animals. One can strengthen 
existing connections and initiate new ones where this is possible and appropriate, 
and use existing (CSR or other) communication channels for communication about 
animal welfare. The next step is to add personal contacts to these channels for 
establishing trust and explore substitutes like storytelling. Finally, one could 
add creative new ideas and to the existing use of communication channels: take 
inspiration from the gaming example and explore where dialogue can enrich 
current one-way communication by making use of the input from communication 
partners (e.g. on social media), et cetera.
Although most of the communicative drivers and channels we found may not come 
communications around the RM and a broad spectrum of communicative tools 
that a company, and especially the RM, can use to strengthen and communicate 
the responsibility it takes for animals.5
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Using insights from business ethics and animal ethics, this chapter argues that 
companies have a responsibility towards animals. It argues that animals have a moral 
status, that moral actors have the moral obligation to take the interests of animals 
into account and thus, that as moral actors, companies should take the interests of 
this corporate responsibility, categories of corporate impact on animals in terms of 
welfare and longevity are offered, including normative implications for each of them. 
The chapter concludes with managerial implications for several business sectors.
welfare in corporate practice from a blind spot into the spotlight, and thus connecting
This chapter is based on the article Animal Business: An exploration of corporate
responsibility towards animals that is under review. I am grateful for comments 
received when the article was presented in Barcelona at the EACAS 2019 conference.
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In our times, animals are viewed, at least legally, as things people can own and
use as they please, with certain restrictions on the ways they are handled (Meijer
2016, Stallwood 2017). Many countries, at some point, enacted animal-protection
laws, if initially for people’s sake, because people who hurt animals could easily 
start hurting people as well, and people watching an animal being mistreated
might be offended (Svoboda 2014, Timmermann 2005). Despite developments in
legislation, there are huge differences in legal protection of different categories
of animals based on their function for humans. Land animals in the United States
that are raised and killed for food, for example, are hardly protected by law, in
contrast to companion animals (DeMello 2012).
During the last few decades, societal and philosophical support for the idea that 
animals should receive more moral and legal protection has grown. Consumers,
investors, and NGOs have become critical of the treatment of animals by 
corporations and nations (Amos & Sullivan 2018, Special Eurobarometer 2015).
Nevertheless, normative explorations of the responsibility of companies towards
animals are scarce (Van Liedekerke & Dubbink 2008). In The Pyramid of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (Carroll 1991) animals are not mentioned, and Freeman’s 
stakeholder theory (Freeman et al. 2010) only touches on the subject. When
animals are discussed in animal ethics literature, the approach is often empirical
(e.g. consumer attitudes), limited to one sector (e.g. the fur industry) or to one
Therefore, in this chapter I will explore the ethical responsibility of companies
towards animals in general from a normative point of view, using the most 
common modern ethical approaches. This aim takes a few steps. First, I will
argue that sentient animals, able to experience pleasure and pain, have a moral
status. A second step is to argue that from the acknowledgement of animals’ moral
obligations we need ethical theory. Therefore, I will discuss the fact that according
to different modern moral theories, this moral status entails that moral agents
should take the interests of sentient animals into account in their actions. The next 
step is that I will argue that this holds not only for individual moral agents, but as
well for collectives, including companies. Taking are argument further, I will state
that the interests of animals should play a role in the discussion on the ethical
whether the killing of animals can be discussed in terms of welfare. Having done
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this, I will offer a categorization of different types impact of companies on the
and offer managerial implications for companies. I will conclude with brief 
recommendations for different industries and for further research.
5.1 The moral status of animals
In this section I will explore the concept of moral status and identify how it applies 
to animals. I will look into the concept of moral status in relation to sentience, and
then identify to which animals it is applicable. I will summarize relevant biological
knowledge of animal sentience and conclude that some groups of animals can make 
a moral claim on moral agents, based on their sentience.
Moral status and sentience
‘To have a moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral standing. It 
is to be an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations’, 
as Warren (1997:3) points out. She explores which entities (humans, animals, 
plants, things) have a moral status. In that search, she considers the views of 
several philosophers, such as Taylor on the one hand, who attributes moral status
to each goal-oriented organism with a tendency to maintain its existence and 
reproduce, including plants, and Kant on the other hand, who limits moral status
to rational moral agents, which in general equates: humans. Warren argues that 
sentience, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, should be the key concept for 
those who can experience it. She distinguishes the Sentience Only view (sentience 
is a necessary and criterion for moral status) and the Sentience Plus view
(sentience is a , but not necessary criterion for moral status, because there
She argues that there may be valid reasons for ascribing moral status to some 
non-sentient entities (e.g. biological species or ecosystems) and for ascribing a
stronger moral status to some sentient beings than to others. Additionally, she
distinguishes between some moral status and full moral status. Although this
multi-level and multi-principle system of moral status is beyond the scope of this 
granting sentient animals at least some moral status (Warren 1997).
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Several authors agree with Warren on the importance of sentience as an essential
condition to speak about the moral status of animals. The most obvious candidate
(1975/2009) utilitarian view, which is explicitly based on a moral status of 
animals dictated by their sentience. Rollin (2016b) as well agrees with Warren
of pleasure and pain to include any positive or negative mental state, such as the
negative state of boredom, and prefers to speak of what matters to animals.
The deontological perspective on moral status is another matter. It seems harder to
(1983/2004) acknowledges moral status of all individuals who are subjects-of-a-
life, because they have beliefs, desires, preferences, intentionality, memory and a
who have these features, and therefore as ‘moral patients’: they have a life that is
theirs and can undergo moral acts from moral agents. His concept of those who
count morally is therefore narrower than those who are sentient, which means 
that he does not agree that sentience is  for having moral status. Is this
the line at mammals from the age of 1 year, and later added that birds probably 
This means that he is drawing closer to acceptance of all vertebrates as morally 
relevant, but does not include reptiles and amphibians. In addition, Korsgaard
(2018:33) states: ‘There is such a thing as the good because there are creatures
in this world for whom things can be good or bad. Those creatures are animals,
who pursue their functional good through action: locomotion guided by valanced
representations, or in simpler terms: by sentience.’ From that perspective she
agrees to attribute moral status to sentient animals, stating that animals pursue
the objects of their inclinations just like humans do, and that both are creatures
for whom things can go well or badly. I conclude that there are deontological
approaches that acknowledge moral status to sentient animals, noting that there
is uncertainty about reptiles and amphibians.
Well-founded views of opponents could undermine the argument that sentient 
animals have a moral status. Scruton (1996/2006) stresses that distinctive
features of humans versus animals matter morally and that, although researchers
continue to discover capacities in animal species which were formerly attributed
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human capacities have been detected in animal species to a certain degree. 
Meijer (2017:13) offers an overview of how the idea that ‘non-human animals 
are categorically different from human animals’ has been challenged in different 
(Bekoff and Allen 1999), cultures (Smuts 2001) and language (Gentner et al.
2006, Slobodchikoff 2009).12 She describes (2017:13) how ‘Poststructuralist and 
posthumanist thinkers challenge the underlying hierarchy, questioning a binary 
opposition between humans and other animals, as well as human exceptionalism
(Calarco 2008, Derrida 2008, Wadiwel 2015, Wolfe 2003).’ To refute the idea that 
grammar is a unique human capacity she refers to nonhuman primates learning
grammar, amongst whom ‘Chimpanzee Sarah, who was born in Africa, was taught 
to parse and produce streams of tokens that obeyed a simple grammar. Along
with three other chimpanzees she learned to use a board with plastic symbols 
to analyse syntactic expressions, including if-then-else’ (2017:44). Syntactic
communicative expressions of this type are seen as a form of grammar, but these
conclusions do not remain undisputed. Conversely, humans lack capacities of other 
species, for example the capacity of bats to navigate in the dark with echolocation
and the capacity of chameleons to adapt their skin colour to the environment.
This means that humans may have literally more of certain different capacities, in 
number and in , but this does not make them any more a unique species
than other species are unique.
Another opponent is Hsiao (2017), who argues that welfare matters to an animal
only in the way water matters to a plant and fuel matters to an engine. Although
the analogy is interesting, it fails when explored further, because this is not how 
the verb ‘to matter’ is used in common language, nor in ethical idiom. Having access 
to water makes a difference for a plant (the difference between living or dying), but 
we normally do not say it matters to the plant. It is sentience that makes a being 
experience that something matters (Rollin 2016b). I therefore reject both Scruton’s
and Hsiao’s arguments against attributing sentient animals a moral status.
Up until now I have argued that there are several philosophers who ascribe a
moral status to sentient animals, and that those who challenge it do not seem to
have convincing arguments. There might be differences in levels of moral status 
(Korsgaard 2018), but for the purpose of my argument, there is no need to explore 
12 This should probably be 2012.
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the differences between the different views any further. From here I assume that 
at least some animals have a moral status: those that are sentient beings. One 
for moral status, which most authors accept, and the narrower group of animals to 
which Regan attributes moral status. The reason why this is an issue here, is that it 
leads to differences in the demarcation of which animals to attribute moral status. 
at least one year old, and later added that birds probably should be granted moral 
closer to the sentience threshold, as we will see later. Despite the remaining fuzzy 
now which groups of animals are considered sentient.
Demarcating sentient animals
Sentience is the ability to experience positive and negative affective states, 
such as pain, grief, hunger, thirst, happiness, fear, and pleasure (Duncan 2006). 
Apart from that, anticipation, memory and coping with challenges play a role 
(Spruijt et al. 2001). Knowing that a positive or a negative state is to come, as 
well as remembering it, can intensify the experience (Varner 2012). Varner sees 
a continuum from mere sentience (of beings who can experience positive and 
negative mental states) via near-personhood (of beings who have a sense of their 
mental states in the past and the future) to personhood (of beings who can place 
their mental states of the past and the future in their life story, which is in line 
with DeGrazia 2006). Akhtar (2011) and Rollin (2011) on the other hand argue 
that animals may experience pain more negatively than humans do, because 
animals have less understanding of the situation. Without drawing conclusions
about differences based on memory, anticipation, and understanding (earlier I 
have concluded that Regan has doubts about sentience as being for moral 
status, and therefore excludes reptiles and amphibians), I will stick to the concept 
Biological research uses four types of evidence for sentience: a nervous system 
similar to the human nervous system, behaviour in reaction to injury that is similar 
to human behaviour in reaction to injury (crying, howling, shrieking, moaning, 
etc.), the presence of sense organs and/or behaviour indicative of perceptual 
presence of neurochemicals that in humans are related to the experiencing of 
pleasure, pain, or emotion (Warren 1997). Based on these criteria, researchers
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have drawn conclusions about several groups of animals, which I have listed in
to be sentient. There are signs that many other groups of animals may be sentient 
molluscs). Therefore, one can say that at least vertebrates have a moral status. For
practical reasons, I will from here on use the term ‘sentient animals’.
Table 12. Current knowledge of animal sentience per animal group
Animal group* What is known of their sentience
Mammals Experience pain and pleasure (Bateson 1991, Dawkins 1980)
Birds Probably experience pain like mammals (Marino 2017, Nasr 
et al. 2012, Varner 2012)
Reptiles Probably experience pain like mammals (Stoskopf 1994, 
Varner 2012)
Amphibians Probably experience pain like mammals (Stoskopf 1994, 
Varner 2012)
Fishes Probably experience pain like mammals (Braithwaite 2010, 
Bovenkerk & Meijboom 2012, Chandroo et al. 2004, Elder 
2014, Varner 2012)
Cephalopods (squid) Highly sophisticated and poorly understood nervous 
system, added to list of sentient animals in European animal 
experiment legislation (Broom 2007, Crook & Walters 2011, 
Fiorito et al. 2014)
Other molluscs (oysters, 
mussels, snails, sea slugs 
etc.)
Motivational states and cognitive capabilities in some species 
that may be consistent with capacity for states with functional 
parallels to pain (e.g. avoiding food previously combined with 
electric shock) (Crook & Walters 2011)
Crustaceans (crabs,
shrimp)
Different systems from those of vertebrates, similar functions, 
possibly similar experience of suffering (Broom 2007, Elwood 
et al. 2009)
Insects Reaction to harm and potential harm, no change of activity 
when bodies are damaged, uncertainty about pain experience, 
species diversity too large to generalize (De Goede et al. 
2013b); pessimistic interpretations and lowered levels of 
dopamine, octopamine, and serotonin of agitated honeybees 
(Bateson et al. 2011)
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5.2 Moral obligations
If entities have a moral status, they can make a moral claim on moral agents 
(Warren 1997, Gruen 2017). Their moral status represents general claims about 
the ways in which moral agents ought to conduct themselves towards them. It 
is not necessary for animals themselves to be able to express this moral claim. 
Infants cannot express any moral claims either, but their moral status is beyond 
doubt. Acknowledging their moral claims, we make sure they are represented by 
adults who can express their claims. Still, the claim is not their representatives’, 
but theirs. The same holds true for sentient animals. Even if they are represented 
by people or NGOs, the moral claim remains theirs.
If vertebrates can be called sentient animals and have a moral status, which I 
concluded above (with uncertainty about reptiles and amphibians for those who 
follow Regan), it is an obligation of moral agents (in general: humans) to give them 
moral consideration. What do these obligations consist of? What should be done 
need ethical theories. Different modern ethical approaches have explored human 
for exploring what humans (and maybe collectives of humans, see 5.3) should do 
when animals are involved.
Utilitarianism
Singer’s (1975/2009, 1981/2011) ground for embracing utilitarianism is the idea 
that for ethical reasoning one should see one’s own interests as one set of interests 
among the sets of interests of other beings, who are equally important. Humans, as 
rational creatures, should acknowledge that it does not matter whether someone 
in pain is our kin or a stranger, our neighbour or someone far away, black or white, 
male or female, our own species or another species. The interests of sentient 
animals, including humans, count equally, and therefore we should treat all of 
say that utilitarianism has strong rational grounds. The utilitarian argument, 
know about other living beings, but what we do know is that sentient beings tend 
to prefer positive experiences over negative ones. If sentient beings prefer positive 
experiences, then we should strive for the most positive experiences and the least 
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negative (not in number but in total quality) experiences for all sentient beings.
Nevertheless, a few objections have been raised that are especially relevant to the 
One problem is the issue of abuse or malicious pleasure. If many people enjoy 
pleasure will at some point (at some number of people) outweigh the harm done to
the bull. This type of problem is avoided by rule utilitarianism: instead of weighing
the good and bad for every single act, we should decide in a consequentialist 
way, including long-term side-effects of actions, about which rules to observe, 
and observe them from then on (De Lazari & Singer 2014, Varner 2012). This 
broadcasting, sponsoring, or otherwise encouraging it – because a world without 
the painful killing of sentient beings for fun is a better world in terms of pleasure
and pain than one with these activities, which would include acceptation of cruelty 
and fear of becoming a victim.
Another objection to utilitarianism is that it fails to respect the separateness of 
individuals and treats them as mere ‘receptacles of value’. Both Varner (2012)
and Chappell (2013) have offered plausible solutions to this objection. Varner
argues that since interests are always connected to the being having them (my 
interests, your interests), they should be viewed from this being’s perspective. 
Therefore, we should consider the experiences of all those affected as if we would
experience them all one by one. Chappell comes close to this approach by offering 
‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’, by which each person’s interests are separately 
accorded value. My happiness and yours have equal weight but are nonetheless 
may outweigh a smaller harm to another, this does not cancel it. The loss remains 
regrettable for the one who loses.
A related issue is that maximizing the total good would require us to keep adding 
sentient individuals to the world population ‘so long as their net utility is positive 
lie in the fact that too many humans and sentient animals would indeed put too
much pressure on the earth’s space and the resources for there to be an increase
in total utility.
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A fourth objection is the ‘argument from cluelessness’ (Lenman 2000), which 
argues that utilitarianism depends on estimations of consequences in the future 
and their positive or negative value, which will always be uncertain, and which 
therefore may introduce subjectivity. I cannot go deeply into this objection here, 
but two of its solutions are: building on experience and approaching objectivity as 
closely as possible through risk analysis techniques and deliberation.
Finally, I would like to mention, without pretending to be exhaustive, the argument 
that utilitarianism is so demanding that one intuitively feels that it exceeds what 
can reasonably be expected from moral actors (Bruder & Attila 2014). It is very 
well possible that the best thing to do is to put an endless effort into maximizing 
welfare. Nevertheless, I will return to the topic of the extent of obligations and 
responsibilities later.
I am aware that I have offered only very short summaries of the way authors 
have dealt with the issues of utilitarianism, but this thesis is not the place to
discuss these issues more extensively. Nevertheless, I think I can conclude that 
utilitarianism has rational grounds for supporting the idea that the interests of 
sentient animals should be taken into account in assessments of right and wrong.
Duty-based approaches
The most well-known duty-based approach to ethics is Kant’s deontological 
theory, which acknowledges no direct human duties with regard to animals 
(Kant 1785/1996). Kant claims that rationality and autonomy are central features 
for having inherent worth (i.e. being an end in itself), and therefore for obtaining 
moral consideration. These features of others give us reasons to respect their 
autonomy. As, in his view, animals lack rationality, the ultimate normative reason 
for taking animals’ interests seriously lies in duties towards other moral agents.
This stance had been challenged by several successive duty-based approaches. 
I mentioned earlier that Regan (1983/2004) offers a duty-based approach that 
recognizes animals as beings who can have moral status. He argues that subjects-
of-a-life should be treated respectfully and not harmed, which implies direct moral
duties of moral agents towards animals. Kaldewaij (2013) shows that starting 
from the Kantian idea that similarities between rational actors can lead to direct 
duties towards humans, direct duties of humans towards animals are defendable. 
Without exploring these proposals any further, we note that there are indeed 
several duty-based approaches which conclude that humans can have direct moral 
duties towards animals.
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Korsgaard as well has contributed to the link between deontology and direct 
moral obligations towards animals. She summarizes Kant’s view on animals in
two theses: ‘First, we owe the duty of treating animals well in various ways to 
ourselves rather than directly to the animals, because we cannot have obligations 
to animals. Second, the ground of the duty to treat animals well rests in the
effects of the way we treat animals on our own characters, or on those of our 
emotions that are, in Kant’s words “serviceable to morality in one’s relation with
other people”.’ (Korsgaard 2018:115) She then argues that his position is based 
on the concept of reciprocity: autonomous rational beings can only impose on
themselves obligations towards other autonomous rational beings who can do the 
same reciprocally towards them, because only then they are able to ‘will’ these
obligations as a universal law (2018:120). This is the case because moral principles
should be acceptable from anyone’s point of view (2018:122). Moral actors should
be able to conceive of themselves as being under shared laws (2018:124). Finally 
she concludes: ‘…there is no reason to think that because it is only autonomous
rational beings who must make the normative presupposition that we are ends 
in ourselves, the normative presupposition is only about autonomous rational
beings. And in fact it seems arbitrary, because of course we also value ourselves
that many of the things that we take to be good-for us are not good for us in our 
capacity as autonomous rational beings. Food, sex, comfort, freedom from pain 
and fear, are all things that are good for us insofar as we are animals. (…) [We]
are not the only beings for whom things can be good or bad; the other animals are 
no different from us in that respect. So we are committed to regard all animals 
as ends in themselves.’ (2018:144-145). Note that her statement that normative 
presuppositions come from autonomous rational beings, but are not necessarily 
about autonomous rational beings, can be associated with Regan’s distinction
between moral agents and moral patients.
Telos-based approaches
A third group of modern ethical approaches is based on Aristotelian virtue ethics
and its concept of telos
argues that, just like humans, animals have a telos and should be allowed to exercise
following: a life (and continuing it, although killing non-sentient animals for good
reasons may be acceptable), bodily health, bodily integrity (no violence, abuse, and
other forms of harmful treatment), access to sources of pleasure (free movement 
in an environment that pleases their senses), emotions through attachment to 
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others (feelings of friendship and care, no fear), practical reasoning (to the extent 
(attachments and bonding with their species), relationships with other species 
(as preferred), play, and control over their environment (Nussbaum 2007). These 
capabilities constitute a minimum threshold. Note that staying alive is one of them. 
Her arguments for this approach, based mainly on Aristotelian philosophy and 
broadly accepted intuitions, may from a point of view of pure rational argument be 
less strong than the arguments that substantiate utilitarianism or Regan’s animal 
rights view, but the translation of telos into concrete capabilities is extremely 
useful for case assessments.
Although Rollin (2006) claims to combine approaches in a pragmatic way – because 
in his view it is obvious that sentient animals’ positive and negative experiences 
matter to them – the core of his approach is also the animal’s telos: ‘the unique 
set of traits and powers that make the animal what it is, the “pigness” of the pig, 
Not satisfying these needs and desires results in poor welfare, which should be 
avoided (Rollin 2016).
Combined approaches and other approaches
Several authors have taken other routes, sometimes combining elements of the 
main approaches. Cochrane (2013) uses utilitarian elements and those of a duty-
based view for his argument that the interests of humans and animals can and 
should be weighed against one another. Garner (2013) offers a contractarian 
and Kymlicka (2011) argue from a political approach that animals can be seen 
as fellow citizens who should be granted rights on grounds of their ability to 
communicate, work and relate to others. Their approach is viewed as one of the
triggers of the political turn in animal ethics, a paradigm shift characterised by, 
among other things, less focus on ethical theory, more focus on liberal values 
and positive rights, and a pragmatic attitude towards political engagement and 
compromise (Milligan 2016). Schmitz (2016) as well pleads for political and 
institutional change and argues that it cannot be right to maintain institutionalised 
practices that make animals suffer for trivial human purposes.
Similarities
I have discussed several approaches of animal ethics with serious theoretical 
differences and issues. Three central approaches to ethics, and a few ‘combined 
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and other approaches’, offer perspectives on animal ethics that provide arguments
that point in the direction of direct human obligations towards sentient animals.
Although I do not advocate choosing and mixing ethical approaches as it suits
one’s case, I conclude that there are widely shared moral understandings
between approaches in animal ethics with regard to using animals. According to
utilitarianism, for example, interests of human and non-human sentient creatures
should be taken equally into account, and therefore Singer concludes that harming
sentient animals can only be acceptable if it is outweighed by a crucial human 
interest that maximizes overall interest, which in the light of current food
production and availability, enjoying the taste of meat is not (Singer 1975/2009). 
From a rule utilitarian approach, this stance comes close to what can follow from 
a direct duty not to harm animals for unnecessary purposes (if one assumes that 
eating meat is not necessary). The telos-inspired capabilities approach also rejects
the ways in which sentient animals are currently used for the purpose of meat 
production (Nussbaum 2007).
Based on the argumentation up to now, I conclude that sentient animals count 
morally and that this translates to a moral obligation to consider their interests.
Though the exact demarcation line of sentient animals remains undetermined, 
as well as other issues of identifying the right thing to do (how should we weigh 
interests? how much effort should we invest?), the broad spectrum of ethical 
approaches gives us many reasons to avoid harming sentient animals and to
take their interests into account. How and to what extent this should be done by 
companies will be discussed in the next sections of this chapter.
5.3 The responsibility of companies
I have argued that humans should attribute sentient animals a moral status
and take their interests into account. Does this mean we can talk of moral 
responsibilities of companies towards animals? A personal moral obligation is not 
yet a corporate responsibility. Therefore, I will now investigate what responsibility 
is and how individual, collective and corporate responsibility are related.
Individual versus collective responsibility
According to Scanlon (1998/2000), there are two types of responsibility. Attributive
responsibility means that an action can be attributed to an actor who is properly 
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role or position requires them to act in a certain way. If this type of responsibility 
applied to companies, it would mean they owe something to someone, for example 
to society, to consumers, or to animals. However, companies are not persons, so in 
the relationship between responsibilities of persons and those of companies.
responsible: there is an autonomous agent facing a value-relevant choice involving 
the possibility of doing good or bad, or right or wrong; the agent can judge the 
value of the options (understands it and has access to supportive evidence); and 
the agent has the control that is necessary for being able to choose. Members of 
groups can be held responsible for their part in the design of the group, for the 
actions of the group (as members, unless they protested) and for acting in the 
group’s plans. These conditions often apply to decision-makers in companies, who 
according to Isaacs (2011) bear more responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions than individuals outside companies, because of their powerful position. 
Isaacs explores the issue that collective moral responsibility requires collective 
intentions, whereas collectives cannot have intentions, which are mental states. 
Her argument is that individual intentions can set in motion collective actions, 
and therefore individuals are responsible for the consequences of their actions 
within a collective. At the same time, they can be bound by formal policies and 
structures, such as interests, attitudes, practices and cultures. I assume with 
Isaacs that individual agency is not absorbed by collective agency, but, on the 
contrary adds power.
In addition, Isaacs states that when a collective has obligations that are not met, 
this failure shapes and alters the obligations of individuals as members of the 
collective. This means that powerful people in companies can, and should, take 
individual responsibility and use their power to initiate responsible collective 
corporate actions. Groups of these powerful individuals (boards, for example) are 
collective agents. Apart from these existing collective agents, there are, according 
to Isaacs, potential collective agents: groups that could be formed to act upon 
and Van Wesel (2018). But, Isaacs warns, fuzziness of roles and tasks can pose 
a challenge to the outcomes. Therefore, against the background of collective 
responsibility, members are morally required to sort out their roles and tasks, so 
that collective actions can take place. The individual is not responsible for change, 
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but for doing her part. This also holds true for issues that were not caused by the
collective, and of which the cause may be unclear. Vagueness about what can be 
done, or a wrongful social practice combined with widespread ignorance about the
wrongness or harmfulness of actions, diminishes the individual’s responsibility.
Corporate responsibility
Companies have societal responsibilities, as has been argued thoroughly from the 
point of view of both business ethics (Kaptein & Wempe 2002, Kolstad 2017) and
CSR (Van Marrewijk 2003, Visser 2014). These responsibilities have hardly been 
applied structurally to the interests of animals (Janssens & Kaptein 2016, Van
Liedekerke & Dubbink 2008). Arguing from the idea that individuals in collectives,
including companies, bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions, 
there are two options: the functional model (the company cannot be perceived as 
an autonomous moral agent) or the autonomy model (the company can be perceived
as an independent social entity that can be held responsible for the effects of its 
actions) (Kaptein & Wempe 2002). I think the autonomy model does the most 
justice to the fact that companies make policy choices through institutional
decision-making processes that can be distinguished from individual staff choices 
and that are embedded in corporate practices. Therefore, I will proceed from the 
autonomy model.
Carroll (1991) distinguishes four categories of responsibilities of companies, which
together constitute CSR. The basis of the pyramid of corporate responsibilities
philanthropic responsibilities. Though responsibilities towards animals could 
appear in each of these categories, I will focus on ethical responsibilities: those
which are not prescribed by law but are more binding than philanthropy – the 
responsibility to do what is right, just and fair, and to avoid harm.
attributive and substantial responsibility can occur in companies. A retailer who
uncritically continues to sell meat from a producer who has been found guilty 
of animal abuse bears attributive responsibility: There is a direct relationship
between not acting and the consequences, for which the non-actor can be blamed.
At the same time, the retailer bears a substantial (role-based) responsibility to 
monitor the interests of sentient animals through the production chain. For the 
scope of this chapter it makes no difference in which cases corporate responsibility 
is attributive or substantial. They may supplement and intermingle.
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Animals as stakeholders
Stakeholder theory may offer supporting arguments for corporate responsibilities 
towards animals, because it states that companies have an ethical responsibility 
to create value for stakeholders (Freeman et al. 2010, Freeman & Velamuri 2005). 
or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Donaldson & 
Preston 1995, Freeman 2010). Animals differ from (other) stakeholders in two 
possibly relevant ways.
who can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives, 
which can be the case for animals. The three animal ethics approaches I discussed 
above agree that sentient animals have interests. Therefore, there is undeniably 
something at stake for them when business activities have an impact on their 
lives, which makes them potential stakeholders. This stance is supported by Hart 
and Sharma (2004), who argue in favour of including currently marginalised 
stakeholders like the poor, the weak, and the non-human, and by Mitchell et al. 
(1997), who classify animals as ‘dependent stakeholders’: those who lack power 
but who have urgent legitimate claims as ‘dependent’, ‘because they depend upon 
others for the power necessary to carry out their will’ (1997:977).
for themselves – which can easily be overcome by letting animal-protection 
preferences (Janssens & Van Wesel 2018), observing their behaviour (Wemelsfelder 
et al. 2000) and putting an effort in communicating with them (Meijer 2017). 
Webster (2006) describes farm animals as stakeholders of farming, besides 
farmers and customers.
An important critic of stakeholder theory is Heath (2014), who argues that a 
robust moral code can be derived from the fundamental obligation of a manager to 
maximize shareholder value within the framework of the law. His main argument is 
of business operations. As we have seen earlier, stakeholders are those who are 
affected by the company’s actions, those for whom there is something at stake, 
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which can be the case in different ways. For some who are affected, a different 
type of doing business, or even stopping operations, may be in their interest, while 
for others the solution may lie in changing to innovative products or processes
this type of sustainable continuation that may be overlooked by shareholders but 
could in the end be in the interest of all affected.
Following the above arguments in this section, the conclusion should be that 
powerful people in companies bear an individual responsibility for the impact 
of their actions on the interests of sentient animals. In addition, the company has
an institutional responsibility. Both levels of responsibility may be attributive or 
substantial, based on CSR or stakeholder theory. It makes no decisive difference.
From here on I will therefore speak of corporate responsibility, which can be 
institution.
Animals can be treated badly by companies (Engster 2006, Fraser 2008),
or even be abused on a large scale (Braithwaite 2010, Foer 2009, Leder 2012, 
Singer 1975/2009). The extent of professional and corporate responsibility may 
differ by context. A remote farmer in Sudan who is not aware of the increasing 
academic recognition of moral obligations towards animals cannot be expected to
proactively transcend local norms for treating animals. Multinationals, by contrast, 
norms and increasing academic knowledge, and to act accordingly. They have both
the resources to conduct thorough research before they make policy decisions 
(Isaacs 2011, Pettit 2007) and the opportunity to cooperate with researchers 
(Janssens & Van Wesel 2018). The responsibility of a company who produces and
sells locally may be restricted to its own actions, whereas the responsibility of a 
company in the middle of an industrial network and an extended production chain
& Svensson (2016).
A limitation to responsibility of individual actors in a company is that one can only 
be held responsible if one has the control necessary to make and implement choices
(Pettit 2007). This restriction matches Isaacs’ (2011) statement that sometimes an
individual or an inter- or intra-corporate group may not have the power to make
changes. In that case, Isaacs adds, the company should help these individuals or
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groups to design their roles in such a way that power is added. If the company 
itself lacks power, it can search for ways of extending their power to make changes 
(Janssens & Van Wesel 2018).
and trade-offs have to be made. Taking the interests of animals into account may 
of this chapter I will discuss the role of animal welfare and the implications 
5.4 Animal welfare
Having argued that companies have a responsibility to take the interests of 
sentient animals into account, I will now consider what these interests consist of.
If humans have moral obligations towards sentient animals, this means that they 
have an obligation to consider the interests of these animals in their actions, or the 
animals’ ‘good’. Sumner (1996:35-37) chooses not to talk of interests when talking 
about the subjective ‘good’ of beings, but of welfare, because the term interests is 
too ambiguous: ‘on the one hand my interests are the same as my concerns (what 
I am interested in), while on the other my interest (self-interest) is the same as 
my welfare.’ For the purpose of this study, it is functional to embrace this choice
a common term in both societal and academic practice, secondly because it is 
the central value that should be maximised in utilitarianism (Singer 1975/2009, 
1981/2011), and thirdly because translated into practice it gets close to the 
notion of not being harmed of Regan (1983/2004) and part of Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities that animals should be allowed for being able to live according to their 
telos (e.g. bodily health, access to sources of pleasure, relationships with other 
species, play, control over their environment) (Nussbaum 2006). I will now say 
a bit more about the meaning of the term welfare in this context, without trying 
to offer a full operationalization of what animal welfare beholds in practice and 
how it can be measured.
me) happiness. In his view it is more than a mental state: welfare is about the 
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relationship between the subject and the world and has to do with overseeing
options and deciding in a way that is true to one’s goals. This may be true for
humans, but does it apply to animals as well? Can animals be ‘tricked’ into non-
authentic or non-subjective ‘preferences’? To check this, we imagine a hungry sow, 
lured away from her piglets with food and then separated from them permanently. 
Her fake preference will be to take the food, but her authentic preference would 
probably have been to go on taking care of her litter and feed herself later, had 
she been able to oversee the consequences of her options. Therefore, authentic 
preference seems to be applicable. Secondly, can animals have non-subjective
preferences? A subjective preference of a dog could be to curl up with one of its
owner’s old sweaters, which will make her feel happy. The same sweater has no 
sweater is not a preference of the neighbour’s dog, although someone might 
that the notion of subjective preferences can apply to animals as well. Therefore, 
would have, overseeing and understanding the consequences of relevant options. 
At the same time it is very hard to determine what these authentic, subjective
preferences are.
There is another aspect to animal welfare that is relevant to this argument. That is 
the awareness that it is impossible to identify when an individual has an acceptable
level of welfare. Welfare takes a continuum from extremely negative to extremely 
positive welfare. Which level of welfare is acceptable in the case of animals and 
how it can be measured and weighed against other interest is hard to determine 
account when moving to the implications of my argument for companies.
The harm of taking life
An ongoing discussion in animal ethics that is relevant for this study of the 
responsibilities of companies towards animals is the question of whether taking
the life of healthy animals without causing them pain or distress constitutes harm.
Regan (1983/2004) from his deontological approach is rather clear about this: 
moral patients have an inherent value, and therefore killing them is a violation of 
The telos-based approaches are also clear on the issue: Nussbaum (2007) includes
continuing life in the list of capabilities we should at least allow sentient animals,
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and therefore taking their lives is harming them; Rollin (2006) takes the position 
lacking in, for example, the case of eating them.
utilitarian perspective, taking life painlessly is not diminishing welfare as long as 
the animal is not aware of death approaching, and therefore is not experiencing 
negative emotions, such as fear, due to that awareness. No harm is done before 
death, and from the moment of death, there is no living animal anymore to have 
an interest in welfare, and therefore no welfare of an animal is taken away (Broom 
2011, Webster 1994). This view is opposed by those who claim that cutting a 
sentient animal’s life short is taking away its future welfare, and therefore is 
a wrong if this future welfare is expected to be an overall positive experience 
(Balcombe 2009, Bovenkerk & Braithwaite 2016, Bruijnis et al. 2016, Deckers 2016, 
DeGrazia 2016, Kagan 2016, Kasperbauer & Sandøe 2016, Singer 2011, Višak 2015, 
should be maximised (Singer 1993/1999). In this view, killing is taking away 
even greater for those with future-oriented preferences (Chappell 2013). Though 
could be an argument for differentiating ending human lives and ending animal 
lives, since humans have the ability to plan ahead and look forward to future 
experiences, and for distinguishing between animal species in light of the extent 
to which similar abilities are present in them. At the same time, there is evidence 
that animals of at least some vertebrate species can have a concept of the future 
et al. 2003, DeGrazia 1996).
Let us try to grasp this idea of harm done by taking away future pleasure by doing 
a small thought experiment. Let us imagine a pig, for example. We can imagine 
very well that for a pig, expectations (after feeding time there will be sun in the 
back of the meadow) and plans (I will go and lie there then) can be thwarted if 
it is slaughtered, which results in a loss of the pig’s future welfare. How large or 
compared to the loss of a human planning to become a nurse, whose life is cut 
short. Still, to the pig, living in a shorter time frame, the modest afternoon plan 
could be half its world.
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An interesting view to take into account here is DeGrazia’s (2016:516-517), who is 
time-relative interest 
account (TRIA): ‘The basic idea of the TRIA, applied to the harm of death, is that 
in determining how harmful a particular death is to the individual who dies, we
must take into account not only (1) the value of the life that the individual would
have had, had he not died at that point – what I’ve here called the net good of the 
life – but also (2) the extent to which the subject is psychologically related to his
possible future life at the time he dies.’ (DeGrazia 2016:515) This psychological
relatedness consists of memories, plans and a narrative of one’s life. Based on this 
TRIA concept, DeGrazia concludes that in the case of positive expectations of future
life experiences, killing is a harm for both persons and sentient non-persons, but 
that it is a greater harm for persons, who have a stronger psychological relatedness 
to their future.
The example of the pig is no more than a thought experiment of what being killed 
and have expectations of the future. These abilities offer extra arguments, but are 
not conditional for being able to conclude that taking a life is a welfare issue. In
many cases of the current practice of killing animals, there is no need to choose
between human or animal life.
Based on the argument that killing animals is taking away positive experiences 
that the animal could have had in the future if it had stayed alive, I conclude that 
killing is a harm if done to a being that at the moment of death has an interest 
in being able to enjoy positive experiences in the future, an interest that can be 
ascribed to all sentient animals, as it does not depend on extra capacities, like
having a sense of the future. Having a potential positive future is enough. What I 
cannot do is draw conclusions about the extent of that harm.
What about killing animals living unpleasant lives or facing an unpleasant future?
Would it not be better for them to kill them painlessly? If they are already alive and
their situation cannot be changed, this would indeed be the best option for them,
but it would be even better to change their situation to a positive one and to stop 
bringing animals destined to lead lives of misery into the world.
Replaceability argument
Expecting that this argumentation may put moral limits on the use of animals
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could be brought forward against our case. In a nutshell, the argument, employed
especially against the utilitarian approach of animal ethics, goes like this: Moral
actors have a moral duty to maximize overall welfare, but it does not seem to
make any difference to which individual this welfare is attached, except that all
individuals count equally. This means that taking an animal’s life is permissible if 
the animal is replaced by a newly bred animal with at least the same welfare level
(Singer 1993/1999). Would it then be ethically neutral to kill animals and replace
them with equally happy animals?
One of the answers to this question is from Chappell (2013). He argues that an
to choose which of two poisoned persons to save. Finding this choice horrible is
what makes him or her a moral agent, and it shows that he or she accords separate
value to the interest of each individual, and that those who count are not mere
receptacles of welfare. Their interests count equally but as distinctive intrinsic
absorb a lesser
loss by person B. I think Chappell’s argument is well grounded, and applies to
animals’ welfare as well, because animals are individuals too (Braithwaite 2010,
DeGrazia 2006, Rollin 2011). A similar analysis of the replaceability argument is
offered by Višak (2011), who claims that the existence of an animal and the non-
existence of a potential animal are incommensurable.
Without analysing the issue of the replaceability argument any further, I will
stick to my assumption that killing a (sentient) animal is an infringement upon
the animal’s welfare and therefore a harm done to the animal, even if the animal
is replaced by a new animal. If the animal’s life is bad, the effort should go into
improving it.
Categories of impact on animals
Different types of impact on animals may lead to different ways of dealing with 
whether or not the animals are killed. Other prima facie relevant differences are 
whether they are living in a positive or a negative state, and, thirdly, whether they 
are living freely or are kept by the company (or by another company in the chain).
Those who keep animals for economic reasons might argue that animals are better 
off in their care than in the wild. They are indeed protected from many threats, 
such as unhealthy weather conditions, hunger, and predation (Rollin 2016). On 
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ignored or actively suppressed, for example mobility, relationships, interaction
with the natural world, and autonomy (McMullen 2015). Degrazia (2011) states 
to animals. It is my view that if the animal’s autonomous, informed preference is
I will now offer a categorization of (sentient) animals, based on the above 
characteristics and existing practices, and formulate corresponding 
responsibilities they should consider based on my earlier argument that the
welfare of animals should be taken into account and that taking their lives counts
as taking part of their welfare. (Note that more practical management advice for 
different industries using animals will follow in the next paragraph). For the sake
of clarity, some pronounced examples of each category are provided, assuming
that the negative and positive welfare states are the true states of the animals 
involved, thereby avoiding the discussion about how happy or unhappy for example
a free-range dairy cow is (Višak 2015, Webster 2013).
Animals kept in a negative welfare state, bred and killed for economic reasons
(e.g. industrially kept pigs, broiler chickens, minks, some laboratory animals).
Companies who bear direct or chain responsibility for them should:
a) consider their living and dying conditions critically,
b) look for ways to solve welfare issues,
c) consider innovating towards alternate products that make killing animals
unnecessary.
Animals kept in a positive welfare state, bred and killed for economic reasons 
(e.g. free-range pigs and broilers). Companies who bear direct or chain 
responsibility for them should:
a) consider their dying conditions critically,
b) look for ways to solve welfare issues.
c) consider innovating towards alternate products that make killing animals
unnecessary.
Animals kept in a negative welfare state, used for economic purposes over a 
longer period (e.g. industrial dairy cows and laying hens, circus animals of wild 
species). Companies who bear direct or chain responsibility for them should:
a) consider their living and dying conditions critically
b) consider innovating towards alternate products that make keeping them
unnecessary.
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Animals kept in a positive welfare state, used for economic purposes over a longer 
period (e.g. free-range dairy cows and laying hens, roaming sheep). Companies 
who bear direct or chain responsibility for them should:
a) monitor their welfare to make sure there is no decline,
b) consider their dying conditions critically,
c) in case of persistent welfare and killing issues, consider innovating 
towards alternate products that make keeping them unnecessary.
reasons (e.g. male chicks and steers). Companies who bear direct or chain
responsibility for them should:
a) consider their living and dying conditions critically,
b) take measures to solve welfare issues,
c) consider innovating towards alternate products or production methods 
that prevent their coming to life as by-products.
Free-living animals, killed or harmed for economic reasons or as a result of 
economic activity 
Companies who bear direct or chain responsibility for them should:
a) consider their impact on these animals critically,
b) look for measures, alternate processes or products that solve welfare and 
killing issues.
Critics may argue that the categories are neither complete nor absolute. 
Intermediate categories can occur (animals in a semi-wild enclosure), or animals 
may change categories (sheep living in a positive state shifting to a negative state 
when transported for slaughter). In this case, in-between categories or shifts can 
easily be derived. In the next section I will explore the practical implications of the 
former argument and categorization, and offer recommendations and conclusions.
5.5 Implications, recommendations and conclusions
In this chapter I have argued that companies bear responsibilities towards 
on them, including killing, and to protect their welfare. A mind shift in companies 
is necessary to accept that sentient animals have interests that count ethically 
amongst other interests in and outside the company. Harming animals is ethically 
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negative, and asks for thorough ethical accountability. It cannot be denied that 
the impact on animals of many industries is far from neutral and should be 
reconsidered and set against the societal necessity or value of the products and
services produced.
We have also seen that implications and considerations may differ by context and
impact category. Responsibilities can be limited by vagueness about what can be
done, secondly by wrongful social practice combined with widespread ignorance, 
and thirdly by lack of power (Isaacs 2011). For most companies, operating in
limiting factors will play a minor role. The third limitation, lack of power, can at 
least partly be solved by efforts to cooperate within industries and production 
chains (Janssens & Van Wesel 2018). I have categorised different types of impact 
of companies on animals and listed appropriate responsibilities for each of them.
I will now offer some managerial implications and some recommendations with
accompanying informative (not argumentative) references.
Managerial implications
Managers of companies who acknowledge their responsibility for those animals 
that are affected by corporate activity should assess their impact on animal
welfare and consider taking steps to minimize this impact, based on the above
categorization. Although it is not the purpose of this PhD thesis to offer an
operationalization of how exactly animal welfare can and should be supported, 
I will offer a few possible directions of managerial action. For livestock welfare 
issues, various companies are using the Five Freedoms concept (Janssens &
Kaptein 2016). The original Five Freedoms are: freedom from hunger or thirst,
freedom from discomfort, freedom from pain, injury or disease, freedom to
express normal behaviour, and freedom from fear and distress (Brambell 1965).
They were updated several times (Botreau et al. 2007, Brando 2016, Farm Animal 
Welfare Council 2009, Sandøe & Jensen 2011) and were recently expanded to 14 
welfare criteria (Brando & Buchanan-Smith 2017), which offer an up-to-date 
guideline. Another concrete road to taking responsibility for animals in economic
processes is to offer them ‘labour rights’ to representation by a union, rest, leisure,
and retirement (Cochrane 2016). Although this may seem a large step for some 
companies, looking at animals through this lens may trigger a mind shift. Thirdly,
treating animals as stakeholders, and discussing their alleged preferences with
NGOs and animal behaviour scholars, can be a fruitful approach.
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A disclaimer for companies can be that it is hard to know what is best for animals 
and what is minimally required, especially if one takes into account their authentic, 
subjective preferences, which are hard to determine. At the same time, several 
knowledge sharing between academia and business practice is desirable.
There are no rational arguments for rejecting responsibilities for reasons of 
burden. Ethical requirements can be tough, especially if they have remained 
unrecognised by common practice for a long time. At the same time, some weighing 
of interests is inevitable, for example between animal welfare and protection of 
since it can involve many uncertainties (Janssens & Van Wesel 2018). For a correct 
weighing process, an ethical assessment can be useful. There are several tools for 
sense ethics and facilitates discussion and assessment. Bovenkerk and Meijboom 
in their case) and weighing interests.
Implementation barriers can be overcome by taking leadership, working in 
partnerships with e.g. chain partners and NGOs, and by celebrating ‘championships’, 
like targets that have been achieved (Baur & Palazzo 2011, Janssens & Van Wesel 
2018, Varner 2012). There is a special role for the CSR manager, who can have a 
parties (Janssens & Van Wesel 2019). Gjerris et al. (2010) propose to introduce 
four virtues in the relationship between consumers and producers of animal-
based products: attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness. 
Rollin (1995a) sees four problematic beliefs in agricultural communities that stand 
in the way of improvement: the idea that paying attention to animal welfare is 
opening doors to animal rights (which many people consider a bridge too far), the 
conviction that one can talk of animal welfare in a value-free context, the idea that 
science and ethics are separate worlds, and the notion that research into animal 
welfare cannot adequately address the animal’s experience of pain. It is a challenge 
for companies to contribute to eradicating those barriers.
Recommendations for food production and retail
The most animal-consuming and animal-welfare-threatening industry is probably 
the animal-based food industry (Francione 2010a, Rollin 2006). It has many 
branches, each with its own issues. I have argued that killing sentient animals is 
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ethically dubious. At the same time, demanding an immediate termination of the
killing of animals for food is too remote from practice. I do agree with most of the 
previously mentioned ethicists that in an ideal world, humans neither eat sentient 
animals nor use products for which sentient animals are killed as a by-product, 
and that phasing out is feasible. Nevertheless, I will now offer some information
direction.
Aside from death, welfare problems in industrial farming are overwhelming, some
of the main ones being lameness, stereotype behaviour, tail biting or tail docking 
of pigs, feather pecking or beak trimming of poultry, and exhaustion (De Goede 
et al. 2013a, Webster 2013). Measures for enhancing animal welfare will differ 
between groups of animals. Examples could be: cage enrichment, more space, 
better housing, free-range options, social contacts, safer transport, and humane
slaughter methods. Webster (2013) introduces the Planet Husbandry concept,
which means that animals can live in accordance with their natural needs and
are cared for responsibly. Rollin (1995a) as well sees options for paying more 
attention to sources of animal suffering. One way is to engage in research into 
alternative practices, because industrial killing can almost never be done without 
pain and stress (Pachirat 2011, Rollin 2006). Breeding dual-purpose animals and
introducing new methods for sex determination of eggs, for example, can prevent 
the early killing of male by-products of egg and dairy farming. Fish industries,
for whom the discussion about welfare is extra complex and plural (Bovenkerk 
& Meijboom 2012), should consult biologists, physiologists, and ethologists to 
take steps (Bovenkerk & Meijboom 2013). The next ethical challenge is the up-
and-coming insect industry (De Goede et al. 2013b), which is popular for reasons
species). Lacking any other norm, De Goede et al. apply the Five Freedoms, 
designed for more conventional animal husbandry, to insects, which is a delicate
practice. They conclude that there is a need for transparency in the sector and
research into the welfare of insects.
If companies would attribute the interests of animals a relatively heavy weight in
their ethical assessments, the far-stretching ideal of some, a vegan society, seems
feasible in the future. To reach that, companies could invest in the development 
of imitation meat and cultured meat, and promote vegetables, beans, nuts, and 
plant-based ‘dairy’ (Deckers 2016). Franzione (2010a) as well argues in favour 
of stopping animal use for food (or any purpose), which is possible if it is phased 
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out gradually (Simmons 2016). Still, the road to a vegan society is challenged by 
the debate about animal casualties from arable farming (e.g. machine kill and
pest control, Davis 2008). Varner (2012) tries to solve that problem through
innovations such as nest protection and new methods for expelling animals.
Davis also mentions physical, economic, political, religious, historical, legal,
psychological and cultural obstacles. Although these are many, they should not 
prevent companies from doing the right thing.
Recommendations for other industries
I will now offer some prima facie recommendations for other industries, not 
argumentation that necessity of products and services and the value they add for 
society should be set against the interests of the animals involved, keeping in mind
that I cannot make statements about the extent of their responsibilities and the 
weight of different interests.
Fur and leather have alternatives like imitation fur, plastics, cork, and leather made 
from pineapple waste. Sheep, goats, llamas, alpacas, and angora rabbits are used 
for wool production, which raises several welfare issues. Angora rabbit wool, for 
example, is sometimes harvested in a painful way. In the sheep industry mulesing, 
Rough handling can be a problem for all the species mentioned. According to 
Garner (2016), animal-friendly wool production can be morally acceptable if the 
welfare of the animal involved is guaranteed.
and cruel training methods. In zoos, deprivation of space, activities and free choice 
of company can be problematic. Solutions are: substitution of activities (natural 
ones for new ones) and habitat enrichment (Keulartz 2016). As a minimum, the 
animals’ basic needs should be met (DeGrazia 2011). In some cases, animal-friendly 
training methods can be helpful (Haraway 2008, Hearne 2003). Additionally, 
one could argue that displaying animals in circuses, zoos and aquariums is not 
be too high a price. Each company involved should make their own assessment, 
weighing the ‘good’ of entertainment, and sometimes species conservation, against 
the interests of the animals involved.
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Many industries, including food and pharmaceuticals, use sentient animals in 
experiments. In most countries the weighing of their interests against those of 
society is imposed by law and is being done relatively carefully. Other industries 
could learn from the ethical assessment done by Animal Experiment Committees.
Still, ethical issues of animal research deserve attention (Linzey & Linzey 2018).
Even in industries with no direct animal use, for example the raw materials
industry, an assessment of impact on animals is useful. Issues that can be 
encountered here include pest control, pollution, building activities, transport 
and catering (Janssens & Kaptein 2016, Varner 2012).
Conclusions
I have argued that animals count morally, and that humans as well as their 
institutions, including companies, have moral obligations towards sentient 
animals, which had led us to the argument that companies bear responsibilities
for the animals they have an impact on. Companies should take the welfare and life 
of animals into account in their ethical assessments and (at least) diminish animal 
suffering. I think my argument supports the position that companies should assess 
their current and future impact on the welfare of animals, explore cutting-edge 
knowledge about the needs and preferences of the animals involved, and draw
conclusions on actions to take. The outcome of these assessments and the options
for change may differ per context (corporate impact on animals, necessity of the 
products or services, status quo of the industry, national or international level on
A limitation of this ethical exploration is that many questions remain unanswered.
Apart from uncertainty about the precise extent of corporate responsibility 
stakeholders, how to deal with interaction with government, and how to assess 
consumer responsibility in relation to corporate responsibility. Therefore, I 
recommend these topics for further research. It would be useful as well if scholars
further explored the implications for different industries and the moral status of 
several non-vertebrate animal species.
from a relatively blind spot into the spotlight, and by connecting insights form 
business ethics and animal ethics. The claim I put on companies may be an 
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unwelcome message to some involved. Nevertheless, change is morally desirable 
and even obligatory, as it is the only way to end systematic abuse of animals in 
industries, of which I have argued that many aspects are wrongful. I therefore 
hope that decision makers in companies will initiate the recommended changes.
5
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 154
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 155
6
Conclusions of this 
thesis
547025-L-sub01-bw-Janssens
Processed on: 17-8-2020 PDF page: 156
This chapter combines the results and conclusions of the previous chapters into
companies and their managers. The latter recommendations are also summarized 
point by point in an overview. Additionally, there is  a step-by-step plan for determining
the Commitment to ANimals (CAN) score of corporate websites.
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Conclusions of this thesis
In this PhD thesis I have studied the question What is the ethical responsibility of 
companies towards animals and how do they deal with this responsibility? To do this, I 
explored the responsibilities of companies towards animals from different angles. 
I discussed the is and the ought: After the introduction (Chapter 1), in which I 
asked: Are companies prima facie responsible for their impact on animals? I provided
empirical research, both quantitative (Chapter 2) and qualitative (Chapters 
3 and 4), to answer the following questions: 
about ethical responsibilities towards animals? What drivers help them to adopt a 
responsible stance towards animals? and What factors of communication help them 
to adopt this responsible stance? As a result of these three empirical studies, I was
able to describe some aspects of what the position of animal ethics in companies 
is as expressed on company websites, and what factors support a responsible
stance of a company towards animals. In addition, I presented a normative study 
(Chapter 5), in which I argued how companies ought to act towards animals from 
an ethical point of view, answering the question What are the ethical responsibilities 
of companies towards animals from a normative-philosophical point of view? I will 
now offer my conclusions from each type of research and see what conclusions 
can be drawn from the combination of studies. I will do this going backward: if 
one accepts the conclusion from the normative Chapter 5, that companies bear 
responsibilities towards sentient animals which oblige them to prevent harm 
to animals and to enhance animal welfare, then how should we interpret the 
of this thesis and offer recommendations for further research and resulting 
recommendations for managers and other decision makers in companies.
6.1 Combining the results
In Chapter 5, I argued that companies bear responsibilities towards sentient 
animals, which oblige them to prevent their being harmed and to enhance their 
welfare. Although implications may differ by context and responsibilities can be
limited by several factors (vagueness about what can be done, wrongful social 
practice combined with widespread ignorance, or lack of power, Isaacs 2011), there 
is a strong case for a moral obligation to at least assess the impact of the company 
interests and looking for shared interests between stakeholders, including animals.
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When we return with this conclusion to the study presented in Chapter 2, it shows
that there are many companies that seem to fail on this responsibility and should
start taking action. In Chapter 2, our conclusion was that slightly less than half 
of the largest companies in the world make statements of ethical responsibility 
towards animals on their websites, which means that a narrow majority does 
not. In this study all types of industries that relate to animals differently were 
combined, but it was also argued that each company has some impact on animals,
directly or indirectly. There were examples of companies with only an indirect 
impact on animals that do express their commitment to animals quite extensively.
It was striking that, although all of the companies in the study have an impact 
on animals with the food options in their company restaurants, none of them
mentions the topic. I am aware that the caterers are often separate companies;
however, the companies that hire caterers could implement an animal-friendly 
procurement policy. At the end of the chapter the question was raised whether all 
companies have an ethical responsibility towards animals, which would imply that 
half of the companies in this study (those without any statement about animals)
are failing. The argument in Chapter 5, that companies do have a responsibility, 
supports this actually being the case: in 2013, slightly more than half of the largest 
companies in the world did not show any commitment to animals on their websites
and therefore failed to express themselves on an ethically relevant issue that is a
potential CSR topic.
Another conclusion of Chapter 2 was that companies that do express responsibilities
towards animals seem to display in their words quite a high level of concern, but 
most of them do so in documents of relatively low importance, and not for example
in online CSR reports or business codes. How should we interpret this conclusion 
in the light of our main question (what the responsibility of companies towards
animals is, and whether they express themselves about this responsibility)? It could 
mean, and I admit that this is somewhat speculative, that in parts of companies – in
individual employees, teams, or departments – a commitment to animals is felt that 
does not come to the surface or is not seen as important. Therefore I think it would 
be useful if companies were to assess where their commitment to animals resides
chapter, where recommendations for companies are brought together.
From Chapter 3 it was concluded that in the food industry, leadership, partnership,
and what we named ‘championship’ are drivers that help to overcome obstacles to
taking a responsible stance towards animals. These obstacles were clustered as
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prepared to move), the problems that different dilemmas bring about, and the
risk of slander, respectively. In Figure 1 we sketched the different parties who,
can be taken by the managers themselves (a CSR manager, a quality manager, et 
cetera), as well as by CEOs or by the whole company as a leader within the industry.
There are many potential partners: companies in the supply and retail chain,
companies in the industry (including competitors), governmental organizations,
researchers, and NGOs. All of them came forward from the study as being entities
with whom helpful partnerships can be started and maintained to strengthen an
ethical corporate stance towards animals. The ‘championships’ we found were
ways of celebrating actions, targets, and achievements with the consumer and
the public through public media, eventually in partnerships with NGOs. These
appeared to be helpful ways to prevent or overcome slander. All in all, we can say 
Focusing on communicative drivers in Chapter 4, the conclusion was that the
manager responsible for animal welfare has two ways of connecting to parties
these parties through various communication channels, and the second is to
facilitate communication between parties in which the manager is not involved
per se. The channels that are used for both types of communication partly overlap,
but there are also differences between them. In many cases extra factors such
as trust, collaboration, and meetings in person appeared helpful. Using Figure
2 in combination with Table 11 makes it possible for the reader to analyse each
connection, including the channels that were mentioned in our data. Comparing
it is useful to include communication about animal welfare in CSR communication
that is already being carried out by the organization.
The above conclusions from the food industry may be relevant to other industries
as well. We conducted these qualitative studies on the industry with the strongest 
for companies in general. I kindly request the reader to keep in mind that the
conclusions were partly drawn from research in the food industry only. Some
alertness when applying the principles to other industries is therefore desirable.
6
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In Chapter 5 we also referred to the work of Heath (2014) and argued that it is 
possible that changing the business in a way that has a positive impact on animals
also can have a positive impact on other stakeholders, including shareholders. As
and many forms of communication.
The conclusions of this PhD thesis relate to existing literature not in the way that 
I have turned over existing theories or designed completely new ones – except for 
a few models of helpful drivers – but in the way that I have explored how animal 
ethics could be positioned within business ethics and business practice. The main 
conclusion that companies do bear responsibilities towards sentient animals is 
supportive of earlier indications in literature of responsibilities of companies for
or are purely descriptive (see the ‘Theoretical background’ section of Chapter 
2). In addition, the separate conclusions of this thesis add arguments and action 
in favor of institutional and societal responsibilities towards animals, such as 
Fraser (2012) and Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), and to those who have opened 
the door to stakeholdership for animals, such as Hart and Sharma (2004) and
Webster (2006).
In trying to incorporate animal ethics insights in business ethics, there is one
more topic that draws attention: our argument from Chapter 5 that animal welfare
in animal ethics includes future welfare, and therefore that taking a potentially 
good life of an animal prematurely is an infringement on animal welfare and a 
harm done to the animal. This leads to a strong moral obligation of companies to 
see how they can prevent sentient animals being killed for unnecessary purposes
in the future. Taking this conclusion seriously would lead to a revolution in our
industrial use of animals.
The main strength of this thesis may at the same time be its main limitation:
and animal ethics. They each have their own academic traditions and preferred
requirements and expectations. For the purpose of looking through a multifocal 
lens, I also combined an empirical and a normative approach, which means that I 
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have only been able to work out either of them to a limited extent. Many questions 
remain open in terms of both the is and the ought. Nevertheless, I think I have 
In addition, the limitations of the separate studies have an impact on the full thesis.
The quantitative study of Chapter 2 was based on websites of the 200 largest 
companies from the Fortune Global 500 list of 2012. Though in business ethics, 200
is an accepted number of companies for drawing conclusions, numbers appeared
between continents, industries, animal groups or ethical approaches. Selection
continents, industries, et cetera) cannot be fully excluded. And there is the fact 
tentative conclusions based on the results that stood out the most.
Another limitation of Chapter 2 is the fact that the CAN score offers information
about the commitment expressed by the company, but not about real company 
behaviour. Neither does it reveal the exact impact of the individual factors (the 
level of concern, the document type, and the length of the statement) and how
they are related, nor what the scoring method does for companies smaller than
the Global Fortune 200. We did, however, give an insight into the overall presence
of the animal in statements of large companies.
Although we adhered to the methodological rules of qualitative research in the
studies described in Chapters 3 and 4, there are limitations to these studies as 
topic list or the saturation point. It cannot be fully excluded that an extra topic or
company could have added new elements to the conclusions. We are aware that 
the relatively high contribution of interviews with managers may have positioned
the manager in a more central role in our outcomes. The effects of this limitation
were minimized by triangulating the study design.
Another limitation is that, although during our analysis of the data we were looking
for drivers for an ethical stance of companies towards animals, again we cannot 
animal welfare.
6
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As for the normative Chapter 5, a framework bias cannot be excluded. I have 
focused on those views from animal ethics that accept or dictate a moral status
of sentient animals, leading to moral obligations towards them. Though I have 
presented some challenging views, I have not elaborated on what would happen 
if one would consistently follow these lines of thought, for example the more
limited view of Regan on the circle of morally relevant creatures. Neither can 
a consequentialist bias be fully excluded. In every step of my argument I have
offered views from multiple ethical approaches, accepted in both business and
animal ethics, that lead to similar conclusions about ethical responsibilities of 
companies towards animals. Nevertheless, several readers have pointed out that 
hold for some preoccupation of companies with utilitarianism. Although both
mechanisms may have led to some imbalance in my discussion of the respective 
ethical approaches, they do not weaken my main conclusion that companies do 
have ethical responsibilities towards sentient animals and that they should act 
upon these responsibilities.
Finally, it is a limitation of this thesis that it does not distinguish between the needs 
or preferences of the countless different vertebrate species, let alone between
those of the individual creatures that populate these species. Research in biology 
6.2 Recommendations for further research
In this PhD thesis I have argued, amongst other things, that in business literature
animal issues are not often listed amongst corporate responsibilities, and that 
animal ethics, or more concretely, animal welfare, including longevity, deserves a
topic, which I recommend, will make it easier to study the moral problems that 
occur when companies deal, directly or indirectly, with animals.
before this thesis is going to press. Drawing conclusions from web-derived 
data is tricky, as websites can change quickly over time. Therefore, the results
should already be seen as historical. It is possible that commitment to animals as
expressed by companies on their websites has grown over time, but theoretically 
way the trend is heading.
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In a direct response to this thesis it would be helpful if follow-up studies of 
in Chapters 3 and 4, which are exploratory in nature and are based on data from a 
world. Further qualitative research could for example explore different industries 
and trends over time. Quantitative research is needed to explore the weight of the 
drivers for an ethical stance of companies towards animals. In addition, it could 
take our CAN scoring method for websites further by testing it more thoroughly on 
non-multinational companies and see how expressions about animals and actions 
In addition, a deeper analysis of the complex role of communications would 
be useful. As soon as more companies incorporate animal welfare in their 
organizational and external communications, a study of the effects of these 
communications would be helpful to create models for these extended ways of 
CSR communication. What remains underexposed in this thesis is a philosophical-
communicative approach to the discourse about animals in companies. The 
question of how companies talk about animals and their interests would as well 
be a useful one to explore.
It would as well be helpful to explore the complex role of animal welfare NGOs. On 
the one hand they sometimes keep companies at a distance by naming and shaming, 
but on the other hand they achieve changes, sometimes in the same provocative 
and antagonistic way, sometimes by working with companies in partnerships. It 
seems that different NGOs play different roles that complement one another. An 
Other interesting subtopics of research that emerge from this thesis are: animal-
related interaction between governmental organizations and companies, and 
consumer responsibility in relation to corporate responsibility. It would as well 
be a good idea to work out more precisely the implications for different industries 
presented in Chapter 5, combining animal ethics and business ethics with research 
studies.
From a philosophical point of view, a further analysis of the ethical responsibilities 
of companies towards animals from different ethical approaches would be helpful. 
My argument is based on the main approaches used in animal and business ethics: 
6
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deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Although all three of them have led
us to roughly the same conclusions regarding the responsibilities of companies
towards animals, I have now and then remarked that the utilitarian approach to 
where trade-offs in interest assessments are broadly accepted, and I therefore
have sometimes discussed it more thoroughly. At the same time, virtue ethics
could provide a source of inspiration to those people in companies who take up the 
gauntlet of leadership in animal ethics. In addition, the virtue-based capabilities
approach supplies a concrete checklist. Nevertheless, exploring implications of 
other ethical approaches may be just as helpful.
At the end of Chapter 4, we observed that investors were not mentioned in 
the qualitative data. A possible explanation is their remoteness from the RM.
Additional information can be offered by ESG (Environment, Social, Governance)
rating systems, meant to inform investors on responsibilities taken by companies. 
of ESG rating. At the same time, the most important ESG screening systems they 
2019) and KLD (MSCI 2018) do not mention animals. The SAM system does not 
mention animals either, only biodiversity (SAM 2019), which is, as I have argued 
in Chapter 1, something different. EIRIS (Vigeo-Eiris), according to their website, 
seem not to check on animal welfare given their domains of analysis (Environment,
Community involvement, Business behavior, Human Rights, Governance, and
Human Resources), but claim to have contributed to the criteria of The Business
Benchmark on Farm Animal Welfare (Amos & Sullivan 2018) and therefore can 
be expected to have the topic on their radar.
Another list where animals do not appear is the KPIs (Key Performance Indicators)
for ESG from the European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies. Renneboog et 
al. (2008) summarize the regulatory SRI initiatives taken by national governments 
in a table, and identify the topic ‘Animal testing’, which interestingly is described 
hunting/trapping equipment or using animals in end products’ (Renneboog et 
al. 2008:1729). This short summary of the relationship between ESG and animal
welfare reveals that there are movements that recognize animal issues as relevant, 
but also acknowledge the need for broadening the scope.
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Chapter 5 mentions the political turn in animal ethics: a relatively new approach
from political philosophy that moves from rather abstract reasoning about 
what is the right thing to do to concrete propositions about how to live with
animals on Planet Earth. Though I did incorporate some of the new insights
in that chapter, I have not given them abundant credit. Nevertheless, they are
important developments that could turn the way we co-habit this planet upside
down. I am fascinated by the work of Meijer (2017), who explores possible ways to
communicate with animals and to acknowledge some of their actions as political
her writings, I noticed the related work of Wadiwel (2015) who takes the position
that systematic instrumental use, abuse, and killing of animals could be seen as
an ongoing war against animals, based on the sovereignty of humans and the
legitimization of violence towards other groups. To Wadiwel, focusing on reducing
animal suffering and enhancing animal welfare within existing systems is no more
than a way of enabling the ongoing oppression of non-human animals by humans:
‘a violence that claims to care’ (p. 112). Thirdly, I would also like to bring to mind
again the work of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), who sketch a society where
there is room for humans and animals to live peacefully together or alongside
each other. Although I do not agree that the social position of animals as perceived
by humans should be decisive for how they should be treated, I recommend their
works to anyone interested in building on new views on the relationship between
creatures living on Planet Earth. The political-philosophical approach might as
well offer answers to a question still open in this thesis: how far exactly should a
company push taking responsibility for animals?
from Chapter 5 that animal welfare in animal ethics includes future welfare, in
relation to the issue of taking the life of an animal prematurely. If this life could
have been a good life in the future, then ending it is an infringement on animal
welfare and a harm done to the animal. I realize that there are approaches of animal
welfare, especially from ethology, that do not incorporate loss of lifetime into loss
of welfare. A study of the differences between these views is recommended as well.
6.3 Recommendations for companies
Based on the empirical results and the normative argument that companies bear 
responsibility for their impact on sentient animals, I recommend the following 
actions for companies and their managers.
6
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using our CAN scoring method. It can then see how it scores on expressed
commitment to animals, in what places on the website animals are mentioned in 
what way, and what can be done to move the topic from the margins of the website 
to the centre of CSR policy and reporting. This self-examination will reveal where 
commitment to animals resides within the company and what form it takes. This
insight will offer starting points for expanding commitment.
Companies who do a materiality assessment for their CSR could make sure that 
animals or their interests are represented in the corresponding debate. They 
which party can represent the interests of the animals involved in the best way. For
with other interests, ethical assessment systems and ethical debating groups can 
be established within the policy-making systems.
If there is no manager responsible for animal welfare yet, I recommend making 
it the explicit responsibility of a CSR manager, a quality manager, or any other 
manager with the appropriate expertise and job description. This manager can 
function as a contact person for animal welfare issues and be presented as such 
within and outside the company. It is recommended as well that this manager be
familiar with methods of ethical assessment and be encouraged to use them.
The models in Figures 1 and 2 and the examples in Chapters 3 and 4 can be used to 
explore how progress can be made through leadership, partnership, ‘championship’, 
communication with parties, and encouraging mutual communication between
these parties. I advise those who want to improve the ethical stance of their 
company towards animals to go more thoroughly through these chapters, check 
whether all the relevant options for leadership, partnership, ‘championship’, and
communications are being applied and which examples can inspire them to do so
even more. In addition, the overview of communication channels in Table 11 can 
be used to include animal welfare in current CSR and other communications, and
where in the company an ethical stance towards animals resides and how this
stance can be shared with other employees and departments. I recommend as well 
that external communications about plans, goals, obstacles, and achievements be
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proactive and honest. Finally, I recommend personal contact when communicating,
to establish even more mutual trust. Where this is not feasible, one can explore
storytelling as a substitute for personal contact.
I am aware that I am laying a heavy moral claim on companies. This may be an
unwelcome message to some of those involved. But, as mentioned earlier, a heavy 
for refusing to take action. Changing companies’ ways of dealing with animals is
morally desirable and even obligatory, and in fact is the only way to end companies’
of that claim. Let me quote Green (2013:227) here, who offers individual actors
a solution to the problem of the huge demands of moral claims (in particular
utilitarian ones), leaning on the similarity to self-imposed demands of healthy 
food consumption:
‘If you were a food-consuming computer, maintaining an optimal diet 
might be a realistic goal. But as a real person with limited time, money, and 
willpower, trying to maintain a physiologically optimal diet is not, in fact, 
optimal. Instead, the optimal strategy is to eat as well as you can, given your 
real-world constraints, including your own psychological limitations and 
including limitations imposed on you as a social being. This is challenging 
because there’s no magic formula, no bright line between the extremes of 
perfectionism and unbridled gluttony. To be the healthiest that you can 
actually be – not in principle but in practice – you have to set reasonable 
goals, which will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary, and then work reasonably 
hard to attain them.’
If all involved start working reasonably hard to make their companies more animal
friendly, then there is hope.
Let me give one example from my own country. On 29 June 2018, branch
organizations in the food sector, NGOs, trade unions, and the Dutch government 
signed a covenant (SER 2018) offering Dutch food manufacturers and retailers an
overview of issues of international CSR and sustainable chain management, with
the explicit purpose to support companies in dealing with the risks involved, and
inadequate. One of the themes dealt with is animal welfare, in addition to human
6
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rights, labour rights, health and safety, land rights, and the environment. These
themes were derived from the OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural
Supply Chains that was launched a few months earlier (OECD-FAO 2018). It is an 
important step forward that may boost initiatives from companies themselves into
an upward spiral. I hope that my contribution to this process is helpful as well,
and that decision makers in companies will initiate the changes recommended. My 
parting message is: Make the most of it. It is thrilling to take part in a movement 
that will make the world a better place for humans and animals.
Recommendations for companies in brief
1. Do a self-assessment with our CAN scoring method
2. Include the interests of animals in materiality assessments; establish assessment 
3. Make animal welfare the explicit responsibility of a manager
4. Use our models in Figures 1 and 2 and the examples in Chapters 3 and 4 to explore 
how progress can be made
5. Use the overview of communication channels in Table 11 to include animal welfare 
in current communications and add new channels where appropriate
6. Communicate proactively and honestly about plans, goals, obstacles, and
achievements
7. Add personal contacts (or personal storytelling) to the channels used
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Commitment to ANimals (CAN) assessment in brief
1. Search on the corporate website for places where animals are mentioned. If the 
site search is unavailable or unreliable, use this search in a common web browser: 
the names of animal groups or species you would expect on this website. If the
website is in another language, use equivalent terms in that language.
2. Follow and scan each hit. Read the title of the text where the term is found and 
relevant paragraphs around it. If more paragraphs directly around it mention the 
term animal(s) and describe the same subject within the same text type, this counts 
as one quote. If there is text in between them on another subject, the texts count 
as separate quotes.
3. Identify whether it is the company speaking in this text (other possibilities include a 
news item about the company quoted from the media, a report from an independent 
committee or jury, a consumer letter). If it is the company speaking, or showing that 
it stands behind the text, then accept the quote. If this is not the case, ignore it.
4. Identify in the quote any ethical views on animals, a reference to a moral status of 
animals, and especially references to: animal welfare, well-being, pleasure, pain, 
suffering, happiness, the balancing of interests, animal rights, inherent value, 
respect for animal integrity, sanctity of life, dignity, an attitude of kindness, wonder, 
and/or compassion towards animals, enabling animals to practice capabilities and 
quote about species or habitat protection should be excluded unless they refer at 
the same time to views such as the above. In case of an explicit or implicit reference
to an ethical stance towards animals, copy the relevant part of the quote to a
document, with the relevant section, article, or document titles. If varieties of the 
same text are merely updates (press releases, newsletters, reports), select the most 
recent one mentioning the animal issue. If varieties of the same text fragment occur 
in different text types (e.g. newsletter and press release) select both.
5. Search on the same website via the terms CR, CSR, social, environment, and code for 
CSR documents and codes of conduct that might have been skipped by the website 
search. Check them for the term animal too and select quotations as described above.
6. Assign points to each quote for Document Level (DL), Concern Level (CL), and Size 
CL, Concern Level: 5 = result; 4 = action; 3 = aspiration; 2 = attitude; 1 = information
DL, Document Level: 5 = long-term corporate information (basic corporate 
information, business code, policy statement); 4 = mid-term corporate information 
(CR report, mid-term policy document); 3 = short-term corporate information 
information with a narrow scope (product information, research information, 
a marginal scope (texts from individual staff members on private choices, staff 
or guest blogs)
SL, Size Level: 5 = > 1,000 words; 4 = 301-1,000 words; 3 = 101-300 words; 2 = 21-100
words; 1 = 1-20 words
7. Add all the points assigned to all the quotes. This total is the CAN score that 
6
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I was born a utilitarian. It may have been my inborn Dutch-Flemish matter-of-
factness, a capacity for rationality and empathy in the same person, or something 
else, but I knew it as soon as I started reading the works of Peter Singer. It felt as if 
Singer had written down what I had known all the time – which says everything 
about his skills and nothing about mine. From that day on, I have felt connected 
to his writings in one big stream of touching recognition.
A few years before, at the age of twelve, I had told my mother that I wanted to 
become a vegetarian because I was appalled by the way animals were treated 
in industrial husbandry. Images of their treatment from animal advocacy 
organizations had shocked me. My love for the many animals in our household 
may also have played a role, just like visits to my rabbit-breeding grandfather, 
who gave us a dead, skinned rabbit as a present each Christmas. Since I was also 
still an all-vegetable refusing child, my mother was concerned about my health 
us typically Dutch triangled meat-potato-veg meals and wanted to protect me 
from committing to a potato-only diet. Two years later I met like-minded peers 
and gained the necessary knowledge and skills to become a healthy vegetarian. In 
those pre-internet times we exchanged paper recipes, magazines, and books. That 
was probably when I read Singer’s Animal Liberation in Dutch translation, rather 
hot off the press. And I knew immediately: Peter Singer is right. All sentient beings 
count, no matter how small.
My brother and sisters learned things in school I was sure I would never be able 
to learn, like drawing curls on paper that could be read as words, and later – when 
these curls had turned out to be doable – drawing tail divisions that helped them 
wish to learn bake cookies and care for children in the lower vocational school in 
our small town. The nuns in my elementary school advised my parents to enrol 
me in a Catholic lower general secondary school 15 kilometres by bicycle from 
home. They didn’t tell us that there was a public school the same distance from 
parents had no idea. Looking back now, it is of no importance. I went through 
public school, was infected with a hunger-for-knowledge virus, moved to Utrecht 
to study Dutch Language and Literature (to make the world a better place through 
communication), and many years later gained an extra Master’s degree in Applied 
&
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Ethics (to make the world a better place full stop). In the meantime, I worked for a 
range of NGOs for the protection of animals, humans, and the environment.
I loved to work but started to miss academic thinking. My Master’s in Applied Ethics 
had triggered that longing, as well as working with researchers as a communications 
consultant for Utrecht University. I collected some of the papers I had written while 
doing my master’s and reassembled them into a book in Dutch (Janssens 2010). I
also had a pet topic of my own that I had not been able to research yet: Corporate
Social Responsibility was of growing importance, but it seemed to overlook the
starting to take responsibility, but not for animals, the system of animal abuse I
critically on animal use, after which, of course, they would stop abusing them.
Utrecht University would not support my topic. According to the professor I spoke 
societal responsibilities at all. I did not agree but understood that animal ethics 
and business ethics specialists did not communicate with each other. By that time, 
I had attended the 2012 Minding Animals Conference in Utrecht where Peter Singer
spoke. I addressed him personally with a short question: Do you think I can argue 
convincingly that companies have responsibilities towards animals? He answered 
that we already know that companies have responsibilities towards society, and
that from there I could argue that they should include animals (paraphrase MJ). 
On another conference I asked John Elkington, the founder of Triple P (People, 
and later on Twitter. I cherish his tweet.
Re-motivated, I tracked down almost every ethics professor in the Netherlands
who had anything to do with animal ethics. They all turned my proposal down, for
different reasons. My last hope was with Prof. Muel Kaptein of Rotterdam School
of Management. He had nothing to do with animal ethics but was very much into
business ethics. I had already started to give up on the idea of doing a PhD but to
my great surprise he immediately recognized the urgency of the issue and said yes.
We may conclude that, all the way through my career, my own driver has been 
the way we, as a society, deal with animals. I have no illusions that this thesis will
have an enormous impact, although I am trying to intensify the impact it will have 
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by means of my professional communication skills: using press releases, videos,
social media, et cetera. At the same time, I am very happy to see a strong consumer
large scale. It is now hip rather than weird, as it was in my student days. Traditional
restaurants are following only hesitantly, but young people are starting their own
vegan bars and eateries. In the small city of Utrecht alone there are four exclusively 
vegan restaurants. The internet seems to be a very helpful tool in the transition.
And the young are inspiring their parents. I recently spoke to a friend whom I had
not seen for almost twenty years, from a dining circle, in which it should be obvious
I had always been the veggie weirdo. This friend told me she had recently become
a vegan. Why now? Because of the discussions with her children and the horrible
same way they do human welfare. And those who have read the foregoing chapters
know that this includes not taking their lives for reasons as bite and taste of food.
As a very rational utilitarian I have always found it hard to understand why people
can admit rationally that there is something wrong with the system but refuse
to change their behaviour accordingly. At the same time, I have begun to realize
that psychological mechanisms can stand in the way. I experience them myself 
sometimes, when I cannot resist a dairy-based dessert in a restaurant or try to
about products like these is a tiny struggle. What I have learned over the years is
to use the non-rational as a source of inspiration and a motivator, the way heart-
to argument, but the emotional, the literary if you like, is necessary to make people
do what they should do, to gain courage, to connect. See the enormous impact of 
Foer’s book Eating Animals (Foer 2009).
I grew up with dogs, cats, rabbits, pigeons, a turtle, and a canary. All had either
been abandoned or were no longer wanted. As a grown-up I had a few cats, but have
stopped keeping animals, as I am unable to offer them a good home. The animals
sister’s. When I look them in the eyes, I know why I must continue advocating
better lives for animals. In their eyes I see the individuals they are, with their own
preferences and frustrations, for whom life can go well or badly, and, especially,
for whom life has now started getting better.
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welfare, part of CSR.
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